Firstly, at the time in 1943, and even when he wrote his memoirs in 1958, von Manstein had a poor picture of actual Soviet dispositions and strengths. In particular he grossly underestimated the total forces he was actually facing. When Voronezh Front (whose strength von Manstein also...
Multiple historians have observed the bizarreness of the exchange. The percentages were supposed to be how much "influence" each side would have in that country but... well, you've already observed the issue with that: unlike a grand strategy game, in the real world influence defies easy...
No. The OP claimed the Soviet warplans post-1966 had the Red Army stop at the Rhine. But I noted in my reply to the OP this simply is not true. I can point to specific examples: the rather infamous 1979 exercise (frequently confused with the 1964 "7 Days to the Rhine" one) followed a war plan...
I wouldn't say inevitable. Just extremely unlikely to be avoided and if it isn't avoided, the WarPac states likely are not going to have time to even contemplate revolting before it's all over.
It's worth also considering some other factors here that are often ignored in the "Eastern European...
Frankly, once the nukes start flying it's probably not gonna matter who is committed to what. Once the first nuclear weapon goes off, you're past the last clear hurdle towards the apocalypse and everything beyond that is a fuzzy mess. Nuclear theorists love to talk about the logic of deterrence...
Except… no. Not all plans debarked the Rhine as an absolute limit. We have a number of post-1966 operational plans which called for pushes as far as the Pyrennees. It’s just there are ALSO operational plans which more sought to restrain the envisioned offensive. More than was the case...
Minor point of order, but the dedovshchina as we know it today* developed in the late-60s/early-70s due to a mix of developments in Soviet society and manpower recruitment/management regulations. Prior to then, it seems that it wasn’t any worse than common military hazing in most countries and...
What the actual response to that propaganda would be:
British Public: "But the Russians freed Poland?"
American Public: "Uh, no? We got into this war to beat Germany ASAP so we could go focus on Japan. We don't want you to let the British to drag us into their own fucking myopia about 'sphere's...
It might not have that much more significant to the final outcome in Central Europe, honestly. The biggest changes would be to Finland itself and probably also Sweden during and after the war. Though the butterflies naturally become more and more unpredictable the further out you get.
You wouldn't say the 2nd Jassy-Kishinev? Not only did it secure a similar proportion of territory as D'niepr-Carpathian (if not more), but it is one of the only operations of the war where overall casualty ratios were more than 2:1 in favor of the Soviets and irrecoverable casualty ratios...
Hmm... perhaps. It'd be a very tough pill for Churchill -with his very romanticized view of the Empire and White Man's Burden attitudes - to swallow, but yeah if the alternative is utter defeat he might be pressured into agreeing to start transitioning over to immediate Dominion status with an...
Which, as I noted, did not exist. Historical recruitment hit its limit and even then most of the volunteers wound up on policing duty because India was restive as fuck. Indian nationalists actually looked to the Soviet Union as a hope for independence, taking its anti-colonial rhetoric at face...
Turkey, maybe, as the Turkish Army is something of an unknown quantity. But getting bogged down in Iran? No, not happening. If the Soviets are in the war in 1940 or and attacking Iran, spare British Middle Eastern strength amounts to a few brigade, not mythical "large armies". Given how the...
Oh, I see. Yes, gotcha. A quick glance at the Wikipedia article tells me that the Finnish President basically had to be badgered into accepting the historical terms, so your answer does track.