What if the German western campaign of 1940 does not invade or occupy Netherlands?

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
What if the final campaign design the Germans adopted and launched in spring 1940, avoided invading and occupying the Netherlands?

What happens as a consequence? Does respecting Netherlands neutrality (at least on the ground and most of the airspace) simply make it impossible for Germany to succeed in beating France, Belgium, and Britain in the 1940 campaign? Or could the Germans still achieve a success basically matching that of OTL? Or something in between the two options I outlined?

I will give you flexibility to have the Germans alter their campaign design to taste and fit, as long as Netherlands is left alone. It can be north-central Belgium heavy, or it can be Ardennes heavy. It is completely optional whether it starts in April, May or June. Whether the Germans do the Denmark and Norway invasions is completely optional.

Can the Germans win, and occupy France and Belgium, without invading the Netherlands, including Maastricht/Limburg?

How will Netherlands neutrality, if preserved in Europe, affect DEI trade policy, particularly regarding oil, with Japan in 1940 and 1941? Will Netherlands continue to sell for cash as a strictly neutral behavior, instead of participating in any embargoes? What might the maximum or minimum effects on the Pacific be?

What would the effects on the postwar be? Presuming Europe like OTL is liberated from west and east, perhaps Netherlands remains staunchly neutral through the Cold War, instead of a NATO country? Or perhaps, like another couple WWII neutrals, Turkey and Portugal, it nevertheless signs on after NATO is created.
 
Can the Germans win, and occupy France and Belgium, without invading the Netherlands, including Maastricht/Limburg?
In a word? No.

Were I in command back then, I would have steamrolled the Netherlands too. I stand to gain plenty for little liability and it's not as though they are strong enough to stop me.
 
For Germany, leaving the Netherlands exposed would be foolish. The British and French had revealed that they were willing to violate the neutrality of Norway during the opening of that campaign. Who was to say that they would not do so again to another neutral, especially somewhere as strategically important as the Netherlands.

I think the best one could hope for would be a Denmark style arrangement, with German troops and coastal fortifications but little interference in domestic affairs as long as the Dutch government went along with what Germany wanted.
 
For Germany, leaving the Netherlands exposed would be foolish. The British and French had revealed that they were willing to violate the neutrality of Norway during the opening of that campaign. Who was to say that they would not do so again to another neutral, especially somewhere as strategically important as the Netherlands.

I think the best one could hope for would be a Denmark style arrangement, with German troops and coastal fortifications but little interference in domestic affairs as long as the Dutch government went along with what Germany wanted.
I thought Britain enforced the blockade of Germany w/o attacking Norway, but Germany attacked north to secure the goods over a narrowed Norwegian sea?
 
For Germany, leaving the Netherlands exposed would be foolish. The British and French had revealed that they were willing to violate the neutrality of Norway during the opening of that campaign.
Are you referring to the Altmark incident? In which the Royal Navy entered Norwegian waters to liberate British prisoners illegally concealed on a German ship?

Or perhaps the proposal (never acted on) to block the shipment of iron ore from Narvik by laying mines inn the "Norwegian Leads"?
Who was to say that they would not do so again to another neutral, especially somewhere as strategically important as the Netherlands.
What exactly could Britain and France do in 1940 which would violate Netherlands neutrality that would inconvenience Germany?

In any case, there is no evidence whatever that German invasion of the Netherlands had anything to do with any possible Allied action. On the contrary, there is ample evidence that German strategists decided that occupation. of the Netherlands was necessary to provide scope for the attack on France via Belgium.
I think the best one could hope for would be a Denmark style arrangement, with German troops and coastal fortifications but little interference in domestic affairs as long as the Dutch government went along with what Germany wanted.
Invasion and conquest, and use of territory for invasions of other countries, and handing over to Germany such citizens as Germany wanted to imprison or murder. What a great deal!
 
Use it as a staging ground to attack the Ruhr.
Oh, yes, that would be very clever. Get 500,000 or so troops from somewhere (they had vast numbers just standing around with nothing to do), infiltrate them into the Netherlands (the Germans would never notice), and rush SE across the Rhine. How could such a cunning plan possibly fail?
 
Oh, yes, that would be very clever. Get 500,000 or so troops from somewhere (they had vast numbers just standing around with nothing to do), infiltrate them into the Netherlands (the Germans would never notice), and rush SE across the Rhine. How could such a cunning plan possibly fail?
Would you necessarily know that they don't have five hundred thousand men lying around, or the capability to launch such a lightning strike? It's a risk I know I wouldn't be willing to take. Underestimating your opponent never pays.
 
Oh, yes, that would be very clever. Get 500,000 or so troops from somewhere (they had vast numbers just standing around with nothing to do), infiltrate them into the Netherlands (the Germans would never notice), and rush SE across the Rhine. How could such a cunning plan possibly fail?
So like the Breda plan but with lots more people. It's hard to see it going well.
 
For Germany, leaving the Netherlands exposed would be foolish. The British and French had revealed that they were willing to violate the neutrality of Norway during the opening of that campaign. Who was to say that they would not do so again to another neutral, especially somewhere as strategically important as the Netherlands.

I think the best one could hope for would be a Denmark style arrangement, with German troops and coastal fortifications but little interference in domestic affairs as long as the Dutch government went along with what Germany wanted.

My thoughts? One is I remember the Luftwaffe wanted the Netherlands airfields to put their bombers in practical range of England and the Channel. The bits on this I had read indicated the Luftwaffe leaders and staff had no confidence airfields nearer the Channel or London would be captured. Like many generals in 1939 & thru April 1940 they thought the ground offensive would fail.

A second point is the German wargames and related staff studies in early November indicated a half hearted attack into the Netherlands would leave the enemy with a viable enclave on the Dutch coast. A complication Halder & the others did not like to think about.
 
Would you necessarily know that they don't have five hundred thousand men lying around, or the capability to launch such a lightning strike? It's a risk I know I wouldn't be willing to take. Underestimating your opponent never pays.
"lightning strike"? The French and British armies of 1940? The armies that sat inactive for seven months? If one was that worried, the thing to do would be deploy large reserves in dug-defenses around Berlin lest the Allies make a "lightning strike" there with airborne troops.

Regardless of such fantasies, German strategic thinking about the Netherlands was quite clear. A full-on attack on Belgium and France couldn't pass through the narrow gap between the SE Netherlands and France. Therefore German forces would have to invade the SE Netherlands. The Netherlands would be at war with Germany, so Allied forces could enter the Netherlands via its ports and attack NW Germany and the right flank of the German forces attacking toward France. Therefore Germany needed to occupy the entire Netherlands - which they did.
 
Invasion and conquest, and use of territory for invasions of other countries, and handing over to Germany such citizens as Germany wanted to imprison or murder. What a great deal!
And yet, the survival of native government, provided it was willing to protect Jews, led to much higher survival rates than where there was no state to negotiate with the Germans. Denmark was able to save almost all of its Jews, in no small part because the state survived long enough under German occupation (due to being willing to accommodate) to act to protect them. That was not a choice faced by many countries like Poland, but for countries which were racially tolerable to the Germans, it was more effective at protecting the people than running away and letting the Germans administrate directly. A distasteful thing to do, but preferable. This is not to say most collaborationist governments protected their Jews; most did not, but those that did, were more effective at saving civilian lives than resistance movements trying to do the same. The Sword and Shield claim put forth by former Vichy officials was a bunch of post-facto lies, but that doesn't mean that such a strategy was not feasible if the governmental intent had existed to pursue it (in the French case, it did not).
 
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Garrison

Donor
Isn't that rather a repeat of the WWI strategy, which lead to an overcrowded battlespace in Belgium and hampered German operations. Also given the Third Reich had already demonstrated a complete disregard for neutrality in Denmark I can't imagine why they would baulk at invading the Netherlands.
 
"lightning strike"? The French and British armies of 1940? The armies that sat inactive for seven months? If one was that worried, the thing to do would be deploy large reserves in dug-defenses around Berlin lest the Allies make a "lightning strike" there with airborne troops.

Thats 100% correct. But, we know it is correct in hindsight. In march 1940 the Germans were running yet another map exercise at OKW HQ to test what was evolving into the sickle cut plan. A Lt Col List, a intelligence officer in the Enemy Forces West section was charged with running the French Army. he proposed the French would actually be a lot slower to act than assumed. During the exercise he slowed the French army decision>action cycle by a day. He was criticized as a imposing a unrealistic constraint of the enemy forces in the exercise. (Re: Mays 'Strange Victory'. An analysis of the development of the plans for Case Yellow).

Looking at what Halder, Rundsteadt, and the rest were actually thinking started with a lot of prudence and assumptions the enemy was very dangerous.

Regardless of such fantasies, German strategic thinking about the Netherlands was quite clear. A full-on attack on Belgium and France couldn't pass through the narrow gap between the SE Netherlands and France. Therefore German forces would have to invade the SE Netherlands. The Netherlands would be at war with Germany, so Allied forces could enter the Netherlands via its ports and attack NW Germany and the right flank of the German forces attacking toward France. Therefore Germany needed to occupy the entire Netherlands - which they did.

Exactly. Theres no decisive gain in half measures.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
All,

For a comparative, cross-forum, cross-fertilization perspective (or should I call it cross-contamination? 🤣)

Here out of responders directly addressing military feasibility and plausibility by 5:2 responders are saying: No way, German operational maneuver would be absolutely hamstrung, the success of the whole German western attack would be at risk through the narrowing of movement corridors for the Wehrmacht and it would fail if attempted this way. Therefore, the Germans simply never *would* have operated in this manner of bypassing Netherlands territory.

Over at the Sea Lion Press Forum, Scenarios and Points of Divergence sub-forum, most respondents are saying the German campaign west, including intricate pieces like the advance through the Ardennes to cutting off the Allies at the sea would ultimately be *just fine* in a skipped Netherlands scenario, not critically or substantially impaired by the bottleneck of being unable to use Netherlands territory, including even Limburg and the Maastricht "appendix."

Faith is strong the Germans have it figured out and the Allies and Belgians are not up to snuff at the tactical and operational level.

There is a generally similar viewpoint in the responses to the same question on Historum.com speculative history forum, when they address the military feasibility question. There is a comment there and in the SLP forum about a neutral Netherlands being a "terrain obstacle" for the *German* air campaign in the BoB.
 
What would happen in this scenario when the Pacific War starts and Japan attacks the DEI?
Or even before that, would the Netherlands sell oil to Japan?
 
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