AHQ: How can Russia revitalize itself?

[alexmilman]

It had this with Catherine the Great, but that was sadly not enough? The institutions corroded after she died?

Territorial conquests, yes. Wisdom of those in Poland and Caucasus is debatable.The rest, questionable. First time Russia got a foreign debt. Unrestricted emission of the paper money produced huge devaluation which Paul had to fix. Reform of the gubernias was good but administrative apparatus was probably at the peak of its corruption and lawlessness level. Attempt to create the legal codex failed and the laws were codified only during the reign of NI. Serfdom reached its peak in the terms of a permitted oppression level. Very oppressive policies toward the nomadic people with the resulting uprisings and cruel suppressions. Army, while victorious, was in a bad shape in the terms of a discipline and corruption level.

Most of the high marks came from the people who either directly benefitted from her reign or considered “glory” (territorial acquisitions, international prestige) as an overwhelmingly top priority considering everything else as the remote second.

 

[dachi]

Territorial conquests, yes. Wisdom of those in Poland and Caucasus is debatable.

Alexi My knowledge of Russian strategic goals in the 19th century isn't that good. The goal of expanding into the Ottoman Empire was driven by Ottoman weakness. But what was the end goal of the acquisition of more territories in Anatolia? Or even getting constant. If the latter, what expectations did the government have for the reaction of other's powers, especially Britain, which at that time duo to great game relationships wasn't the best? Was there a belief that Britain wouldn't support the Ottomans or even that their support wouldn't matter? Or even about France, which, as far as I know, didn't have any alliance with Russia before they started loaning their capital investment into Russia.
Was this expansion to Ottoman because of claims as the third Rome and Catherine's original plan to restore the Byzantines under her son Or simply seeing the weakness

Or about Austria and the fact that Russia was expanding its influence into the Balkans, especially Walchia and Moldova, and later Bulgaria.

What was the diplomatic thinking behind focusing on the Balkans and Anatolia, plus central Asia and later Manchuria? Was there no thinking that all of this could lead to possible isolation diplomatically or even a lack of adequate resources to handle all of these goals?

 

[alexmilman]

Alexi My knowledge of Russian strategic goals in the 19th century isn't that good. The goal of expanding into the Ottoman Empire was driven by Ottoman weakness. But what was the end goal of the acquisition of more territories in Anatolia?

The rational part was acquisition of the Black Sea coast done by Catherine II. Later there was a game of controlling the trade by the Danube by holding the only navigational canal at its mouth. This, IMO, was more of a childish behavior than a productive policy. Meaning of the rest I never could figure out.

Or even getting constant. If the latter, what expectations did the government have for the reaction of other's powers, especially Britain, which at that time duo to great game relationships wasn't the best? Was there a belief that Britain wouldn't support the Ottomans or even that their support wouldn't matter? Or even about France, which, as far as I know, didn't have any alliance with Russia before they started loaning their capital investment into Russia.

See above. Taking into an account that Russian Empire did not have a merchant fleet worth mentioning until the late XIX and not too much afterwards, I can’t explain its policies and plans.

Was this expansion to Ottoman because of claims as the third Rome and Catherine's original plan to restore the Byzantines under her son Or simply seeing the weakness

IMO, these were just the idle fantasies (BTW, the first failed plan was formulated during the reign of Anne) unrelated to the realities of life.

Or about Austria and the fact that Russia was expanding its influence into the Balkans, especially Walchia and Moldova, and later Bulgaria.

The obvious question is why Russia needed that influence. Surely not the economic reasons so this was what? Influence for the sake of influence?

What was the diplomatic thinking behind focusing on the Balkans and Anatolia, plus central Asia and later Manchuria?

Balkans and Anatolia - idiocy, CA - made sense (cotton, markets and not letting the Brits in), Manchuria - the part which is now a part of Russia made economic and geopolitical sense, the rest - misguided policies and economic fantasies.

Was there no thinking that all of this could lead to possible isolation diplomatically or even a lack of adequate resources to handle all of these goals?

 

[dachi]

The rational part was acquisition of the Black Sea coast done by Catherine II. Later there was a game of controlling the trade by the Danube by holding the only navigational canal at its mouth. This, IMO, was more of a childish behavior than a productive policy. Meaning of the rest I never could figure out.



See above. Taking into an account that Russian Empire did not have a merchant fleet worth mentioning until the late XIX and not too much afterwards, I can’t explain its policies and plans.


IMO, these were just the idle fantasies (BTW, the first failed plan was formulated during the reign of Anne) unrelated to the realities of life.

The obvious question is why Russia needed that influence. Surely not the economic reasons so this was what? Influence for the sake of influence?


Balkans and Anatolia - idiocy, CA - made sense (cotton, markets and not letting the Brits in), Manchuria - the part which is now a part of Russia made economic and geopolitical sense, the rest - misguided policies and economic fantasies.

That sort of makes sense, seeing as aside from the Baltic and before the acquaintance of Manchuria, there existed no territory outside of the Black Sea coastal area that was suitable for constructing an all-year ice-free port.



But still, wouldn't the Black Sea fleet always be easily blocked as long as ottomans held the straits and were supported by the British?. Was this, along with Catherine's own ideas, the reason for the focus on Istanbul?


Was the lack The merchant fleet duo lacked money or interest, as Baltic was famous for its naval supplies. Were there any attempts to build its own merchant marine aside from Peter's


I heard that the reason for Russian interest in the Balkans was due to the fact that the government contained many slavophiles who were interested in slavic people's of balkans



Central Asia, as for growing cotton, did indeed make sense. As did Manchuria with the completion of the trans-Siberian railroad.


In your opinion, aside from Central Asia and Manchuria, should the Russian Empire have been more focused on internal matters such as the development of industry and infrastructure instead of wasting blood and money on its useless foreign adventures?

 

[alexmilman]

That sort of makes sense, seeing as aside from the Baltic and before the acquaintance of Manchuria, there existed no territory outside of the Black Sea coastal area that was suitable for constructing an all-year ice-free port.

The major Russian ports, St-Petersburg, Riga and Archangelsk were doing just fine not being ice free.

But still, wouldn't the Black Sea fleet always be easily blocked as long as ottomans held the straits and were supported by the British?.

Speaking about “always”, to which country an overwhelming majority of the merchant ship trading through the Russian ports belonged? To the Brits. Which merchant ships doing more than a regional trade were almost completely absent? Russian. So, since the moment when the Russian Black Sea ports became functional, the Brits had a vested interest in arranging free merchant sailing through the Straits.

The treaty which existed prior to the CW was restricting sailing of the third party (neither Russian, nir Ottoman) warships into the Black Sea.

Was this, along with Catherine's own ideas, the reason for the focus on Istanbul?

She never really focused on it. She liked the grandiose plans regardless of their practicality and not necessarily tried to implement them. The greatest practical reach of the Russian army at that time was slightly beyond the Danube with a possibility for the light troops to reach outskirts of the Balkans. Conquest of Istanbul was unrealistic, holding it even more so and the whole Greek Project was Potemkin’s invention with a purpose to please her. In the personal terms, he liked to became a ruler of Walachia or the King of Poland but with a great difficulty managed to take a single Ottoman fortress so why pay serious attention to his fantasies.

Was the lack The merchant fleet duo lacked money or interest, as Baltic was famous for its naval supplies. Were there any attempts to build its own merchant marine aside from Peter's

Many of his successors tried but failed due to the absence of the interest and proper credit system.

With the huge domestic market and willingness of the foreign merchants to assume the risky (sea travel) part of a process, the incentives for the Russian merchants were quite small. But within the domestic market volume of the river trade was huge and the first tankers had been built in Russia to operate on the Caspian Sea and Volga.

I heard that the reason for Russian interest in the Balkans was due to the fact that the government contained many slavophiles who were interested in slavic people's of balkans

Under AII, this and the hysteria among the “educated classes” but the crap started earlier, during the reign of NI and formally over the Greek cause. The Russian troops reached Adrianople.

Central Asia, as for growing cotton, did indeed make sense. As did Manchuria with the completion of the trans-Siberian railroad.


In your opinion, aside from Central Asia and Manchuria, should the Russian Empire have been more focused on internal matters such as the development of industry and infrastructure instead of wasting blood and money on its useless foreign adventures?

Exactly.

 

[JaguarCD]

Serfs were always going to be more unproductive pound-for-pound than free laborers, serfdom limited economic opportunity for the Russian peasantry and for Russia overall as it limited the overall size of the creative class. And even though the Emancipation of the Serfs did have positive impacts, not providing the serfs with substantial amounts of land, plus saddling them with the redemptions payments, imposed a pretty harsh burden on their ability to become truly engaged citizens.

The creative class flourished because of the serf system and their detachment from it, not in spite of it.

 

[TrickyApe]

sigh, I wish the mythos about the liberal godsend Alexander II would just die already. Alexander II was- to put it mildly- an idiot.

This is all true but at least Alexander II got things moving by emancipating the serfs, an action which his father the great autocrat never felt strong enough to take.

The best way to "revitalize" Russia would be to have bitten the bullet and done emancipation after 1815, when Russian society was only slightly behind that of Austria, Prussia, and other parts of Central Europe. Wasting another half century cost a lot both in material reality and in reputational terms.

 

[alexmilman]

This is all true but at least Alexander II got things moving by emancipating the serfs, an action which his father the great autocrat never felt strong enough to take.

The best way to "revitalize" Russia would be to have bitten the bullet and done emancipation after 1815, when Russian society was only slightly behind that of Austria, Prussia, and other parts of Central Europe. Wasting another half century cost a lot both in material reality and in reputational terms.

Quite agree but even a better way would be to stay out of the anti-napoleonic coalitions and liberate the serfs even before 1812. Not that this was a simple task but at least the Russian economy was not also in a dump.

 

[Emperor Constantine]

@alexmilman Considering how AII did more overall harm then good for various reasons (primarily seems to be listening to advisors with a western European-liberal fetish), is there any realistic way to get him to move toward better policies? Like say protectionism instead of free trade, better handled military reforms, a more efficient focus on industrialization and possibly a better handled abolishment of serfdom? Were there any major or influential members of the government or the ruling class pushing any of the ideas you've suggested?

 

[alexmilman]

@alexmilman Considering how AII did more overall harm then good for various reasons (primarily seems to be listening to advisors with a western European-liberal fetish), is there any realistic way to get him to more toward better policies? Like say protectionism instead of free trade, better handled military reforms, a more efficient focus on industrialization and possibly a better handled abolishment of serfdom? Were there any major or influential members of the government or the ruling class pushing any of the ideas you've suggested?

Good questions to which I have no definite answers. 😢

It is reasonable to assume that there were high-ranking people with the different views but because the liberals got on the top, their opponents were not widely advertised. Then, many of the potential problems with a chosen course were not as obvious as they became later with a benefit of seeing it implementation. Not to mention that there were no people with a background in industrialization or anything “advanced” while there were plenty of the liberal enthusiasts, led by Grand Duke Constantine, who were guided by the best intentions and even did something good but, judging by the contemporary writers, too much of their energy was “going into the whistle”.

The same goes for a military reform. It was needed and outwardly it was just fine. The inherent problems became obvious when it was tested by real war. Certain things were, probably predictable. For example, wasn’t it more or less obvious that commander of a military district is a peace time position with the predominantly administrative functions and requires different qualifications from those of a corps/army commander during the war? But Milytin was predominantly a General Staff officer and was thinking along the administratively-organizational lines. This part, actually, did not perform too bad at the start of the war (when the optimistic schedule failed the Russian troops found themselves without winter clothes). But the fighting-related side was lagging behind and Russian army was lucky to fight the Ottomans who were even in the worse shape.

OTOH, none of the OTL decisions was inevitable so if the young and presumably not too intelligent Grand Duke Alexander, while being taught economy by one of the leading liberal economists, could came to the conclusion that the open markets philosophy is not good for Russia with its weak industrial base, probably his father could came to the same conclusion and change his policy correspondingly. I don’t think that AII was so dumb and detached that he could not see what is going on in the railroad industry so, if he wished, he could start asking questions, insist upon the answers and change situation. After all, Witte was not God Almighty or even an emperor, but he changed the system.

The emancipation is a nightmare issue because we can easily tell, with a benefit of the hindsight, what was bad but personally I have no idea what the good scenario could be and not sure that any of us can come with a good scenario based upon the full scope of the existing realities and not general schemas. Not sure if anybody present, myself including, knows for sure what such a scenario could be. We know only that the OTL one was quite bad. The only thing that I can guess is that if at the time it happened the measures were taken to stimulate the industrialization (easier said than done because besides protectionism you need huge amounts of money to modernize the whole technological base) then a “surplus” of the impoverished peasants could find jobs. In OTL they were going to the RR construction but this was not enough.

 

[Kurd Gossemer]

Quite agree but even a better way would be to stay out of the anti-napoleonic coalitions and liberate the serfs even before 1812. Not that this was a simple task but at least the Russian economy was not also in a dump.

Honestly this could be a good POD to a work. Paul manages to retain the throne instead of being couped and wisely keeps Russia out of the Napoleonic wars, with the most he does is a non aggression pact with Napoleon but still keeps up trade with the Brits and other countries as a neutral nation, steadily working on the internal situation instead of any foreign adventurism

 

[Emperor Constantine]

Good questions to which I have no definite answers. 😢

Well darn. I had an idea for a competent AII TL, but couldn't come up with realistic answers either.

It is reasonable to assume that there were high-ranking people with the different views but because the liberals got on the top, their opponents were not widely advertised. Then, many of the potential problems with a chosen course were not as obvious as they became later with a benefit of seeing it implementation. Not to mention that there were no people with a background in industrialization or anything “advanced” while there were plenty of the liberal enthusiasts, led by Grand Duke Constantine, who were guided by the best intentions and even did something good but, judging by the contemporary writers, too much of their energy was “going into the whistle”.

So basically AII needed the equivalent to the "modernizing conservatives" that surrounded AIII some 25 years later, perhaps mixed with getting experts to study the industrialization in western Europe and bring that knowledge back to Russia (a combo of Peter the Great's missions and the Meiji restoration's studies of western industry). Possibly even his own version of Sergei Witte. Someone from the "outside" who can recognize some of the issues and come up with solutions that the "traditional" advisors weren't willing to consider or implement.

Without finding a way to get AII to turn toward a more "modernizing conservative" approach, the best I can think of is the Tsar turning to protectionism after the end of his "liberal period" in the late 1860s. Though that wouldn't solve the industrialization and capital issues.

The same goes for a military reform. It was needed and outwardly it was just fine. The inherent problems became obvious when it was tested by real war. Certain things were, probably predictable. For example, wasn’t it more or less obvious that commander of a military district is a peace time position with the predominantly administrative functions and requires different qualifications from those of a corps/army commander during the war? But Milytin was predominantly a General Staff officer and was thinking along the administratively-organizational lines. This part, actually, did not perform too bad at the start of the war (when the optimistic schedule failed the Russian troops found themselves without winter clothes). But the fighting-related side was lagging behind and Russian army was lucky to fight the Ottomans who were even in the worse shape.

In some ways, I wonder if the exposure of the continuing deficeits could have been a good thing. Sadly, the overall victory in the war seemed to have meant the institutional, tactical and strategic defeciancies were left unaddressed. Again, without some kind of "push" I don't know how to get AII and his advisors to see that the system still needed improvements.

OTOH, none of the OTL decisions was inevitable so if the young and presumably not too intelligent Grand Duke Alexander, while being taught economy by one of the leading liberal economists, could came to the conclusion that the open markets philosophy is not good for Russia with its weak industrial base, probably his father could came to the same conclusion and change his policy correspondingly. I don’t think that AII was so dumb and detached that he could not see what is going on in the railroad industry so, if he wished, he could start asking questions, insist upon the answers and change situation. After all, Witte was not God Almighty or even an emperor, but he changed the system.

I agree. The problem seemed to be AII didn't seem to want to ask those questions, and that he surrounded himself with advisors that told him things were going well. He comes off as a "bury his head in the sand" kinda guy, combined with getting angry when his policy failures were pointed out (I seem to recall some kind of big blowout between the Tsar and Tsesarevich when the later was pretty scathing toward the overall proformance of the Army after the 1877-78 war).

The emancipation is a nightmare issue because we can easily tell, with a benefit of the hindsight, what was bad but personally I have no idea what the good scenario could be and not sure that any of us can come with a good scenario based upon the full scope of the existing realities and not general schemas. Not sure if anybody present, myself including, knows for sure what such a scenario could be. We know only that the OTL one was quite bad.

Looking at the end of serfdom in central Europe during the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the most I can think of would be ending it without the land loans. This would create something similar to the large scale tenancy systems used by the British and Prussian aristocracies. Of course, considering that something like a third of the nobles' estates were mortgaged to the State or to land banks, I don't think that would do much good; the nobility simply lacked the capital (and possibly skills/knowledge but not 100% on that) to create the large, modernized agricultural estates that brought the Peers and Junkers their continued economic power while also providing the foodbase needed to provide for the growing population. Not to mention their estates were often scattered across multiple provinces, rather then parcels of land that bordered each other.


Just spitballing, but I wonder if something like the émigre indemnity law of the Bourbon restoration could be a basis for the gordian knot around the landowners rights. Like, the Imperial government formally sizes the mortgaged lands to sell to the freed serfs (funded by low-interest loans provided to the peasants) and in exchange the nobles get a guranteed yearly indemnity of say 3% of the value of the lost land (the precentage mentioned in the French law) over a period of X years (say 50, the OTL period that the peasants were suppoed to repay the loans to the goverment). While pretty close to the OTL plan, I think this would help make sure the burden doesn't fall so heavily on the peasantry. I'd love to pair it with an agrarian reform similar to the later Stolypin reform, but no idea who would push for that.


Basically, the emancipation reform either needed to go all in on either the Anglo-Prussian system (creating large estates worked by tenant farmers), or the French system (ie land sold/given to peasant families), not the muddled mix they did OTL (with the long-term mess of the miir system thrown in for bad measure).

The only thing that I can guess is that if at the time it happened the measures were taken to stimulate the industrialization (easier said than done because besides protectionism you need huge amounts of money to modernize the whole technological base) then a “surplus” of the impoverished peasants could find jobs. In OTL they were going to the RR construction but this was not enough.

Which would involve something like the large French loans AIII and Witte secured in the 1880s. Considering the CW, I can't see such loans coming from the French or the British in the 1850s or 1860s. I would say German financiers, but not sure if they had yet to reach the amount of financial power necessary to do that yet.

 

[alexmilman]

Honestly this could be a good POD to a work. Paul manages to retain the throne instead of being couped and wisely keeps Russia out of the Napoleonic wars, with the most he does is a non aggression pact with Napoleon but still keeps up trade with the Brits and other countries as a neutral nation, steadily working on the internal situation instead of any foreign adventurism

I’m slowly moving to something of the kind in the current TL but the peaceful events are seemingly having much less popularity than the wars, even (or especially) the foolish ones. 😢

 

[Kurd Gossemer]

I’m slowly moving to something of the kind in the current TL but the peaceful events are seemingly having much less popularity than the wars, even (or especially) the foolish ones. 😢

Typical of everyone wanting to get into action instead of the situations that create it, much like seeing a street brawl without context: It's fun in a vacuum but becomes even better when you know why it started.

 

[TrickyApe]

Just spitballing, but I wonder if something like the émigre indemnity law of the Bourbon restoration could be a basis for the gordian knot around the landowners rights. Like, the Imperial government formally sizes the mortgaged lands to sell to the freed serfs (funded by low-interest loans provided to the peasants) and in exchange the nobles get a guranteed yearly indemnity of say 3% of the value of the lost land (the precentage mentioned in the French law) over a period of X years (say 50, the OTL period that the peasants were suppoed to repay the loans to the goverment). While pretty close to the OTL plan, I think this would help make sure the burden doesn't fall so heavily on the peasantry. I'd love to pair it with an agrarian reform similar to the later Stolypin reform, but no idea who would push for that.

Freezing the tenure on lands was done in some other land reforms and would work kind of like your suggestion. Basically the peasants are guaranteed hereditary possession of the land, with an obligation to continue paying cash rent to the feudal landowner a given frozen rate, generally the current rate as of emancipation. Essentially the nobles get a perpetual debt obligation on the land and the peasants get the equity, which encourages them to improve their output. For the time being at least the old landowners retain their relative wealth and position, but long term lose out in absolute terms from inflation and relative terms as overall wealth increases while their "rents" remain static. The peasants may not see an immediate material improvement, but at least they're free of the demeaning conditions of serfdom. It seems like something that might have worked in Russia better than solutions that demanded money injections from the impoverished state. One stumbling block would be the estates with rent paid in labor rather than cash. I don't know how this was handled OTL, or if everything had already moved to cash by the time of emancipation.

 

[alexmilman]

Well darn. I had an idea for a competent AII TL, but couldn't come up with realistic answers either.

My sincere condolences. 😉

So basically AII needed the equivalent to the "modernizing conservatives" that surrounded AIII some 25 years later, perhaps mixed with getting experts to study the industrialization in western Europe and bring that knowledge back to Russia (a combo of Peter the Great's missions and the Meiji restoration's studies of western industry). Possibly even his own version of Sergei Witte. Someone from the "outside" who can recognize some of the issues and come up with solutions that the "traditional" advisors weren't willing to consider or implement.

But is this realistic to expect if we leave his personality intact? He was brought up by an extremely authoritative father who demonstrably failed at the end so a reasonably natural reaction was along the lines “the past is bad, let’s do all differently” and he looked for the people with similar views and none of them had the needed experience or knowledge, just the good intentions. But even in this area he was trying to run in all directions at the same time with no visible logic.

Take the emancipation. Kiselev had a great experience (his first emancipation project is dated by 1816 and he did conduct reform for the state peasants) but almost immediately after the CW (which he helped to finish with the minimal losses), he was removed from his office and sent as an ambassador to France. Muraviev advocated a gradual change in the agrarian system, the implementation of which would not have met such sharp resistance at all levels, for which he was rated as a "conservative and serf-owner" in liberal circles. AII practically accused him in opposing his policy and Muraviev had to retire. Who ended up as a head of the emancipation commission? Rostovtsev. A professional military who got his ideas traveling in Germany (what’s common except that in both cases the peasants were bipeds?) and was seemingly mostly concerned with the moral considerations and after his death position was given, out of all people, to Panin who was arch-conservative Minister of Justice who was against emancipation and who’s main contribution (judging by wiki) was a proposal to put Russia under the martial law during reform’s implementation. Besides this he was trying to protect interests of the landowners.

Without finding a way to get AII to turn toward a more "modernizing conservative" approach, the best I can think of is the Tsar turning to protectionism after the end of his "liberal period" in the late 1860s. Though that wouldn't solve the industrialization and capital issues.

Yes. The problems were all over the place. Pretty much all Ural metallurgy had to be dramatically changed to be up to date and the capital was one of many issues because it had to switch from charcoal to coal and there was no good coal needed for the bessemer technology nearby, the horse and water power had to be replaced with the steam and, as I understand, this was just a tip of a very big iceberg.

In some ways, I wonder if the exposure of the continuing deficeits could have been a good thing. Sadly, the overall victory in the war seemed to have meant the institutional, tactical and strategic defeciancies were left unaddressed. Again, without some kind of "push" I don't know how to get AII and his advisors to see that the system still needed improvements.

Very true. Military result of the war of 2877-78 was quite ambiguous. On one hand, the top command level was mostly compromised and this applied to AII as well. OTOH, the war produced a number of the bona fide heroes some of whom, like Skobelev, introduced a novel tactics. But one of these heroes turned to be a time bomb producing the terrible negative results all the way to wwi. I’m talking shout general Dragomirov. He performed quite well in the war, became popular, served as commander of the Kiev military district and professor of the military academy. Was quite charismatic, had a lot of the good ideas regarding physical preparedness of the soldiers and their good treatment. But the good things end there. He was a vocal adherence of the spirit as the winning factor and a bayonet charge as the tactics. He was against pretty much any innovations: magazine rifles, machine guns, protective shields on the cannons and so on. But a huge number of the commanders of all levels came out of his “school” and during the RJW and WWI the soldiers paid dearly.

I agree. The problem seemed to be AII didn't seem to want to ask those questions, and that he surrounded himself with advisors that told him things were going well.

There was a fundamental between him and his son. Under AII the Grand Dukes were almost uncontrollable (and this involved, among other things, peddling the influence in getting the RR contracts) while AIII seriously cut their number and was quite strict with them (well, there still were numerous issues). IMO, AII was a rather weak personality (which did not prevent him from being vengeful and quite cruel).

He comes off as a "bury his head in the sand" kinda guy, combined with getting angry when his policy failures were pointed out (I seem to recall some kind of big blowout between the Tsar and Tsesarevich when the later was pretty scathing toward the overall proformance of the Army after the 1877-78 war).

Weakling with a lot of power…

Looking at the end of serfdom in central Europe during the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the most I can think of would be ending it without the land loans. This would create something similar to the large scale tenancy systems used by the British and Prussian aristocracies.

There was a fundamental psychological problem. The peasants of Germany and Baltic governorships (where, IIRC, serfdom was abolished early without land) knew that the land belongs to the landowner while in Russia they firmly believed that the land on which they were working for themselves was their. So releasing them without a land would cause massive revolts.
Then, with both sides sticking to the communal model, how the tenancy would work? A landlord could break contract with the individual tenant but how to do this with a whole community acting as a solid block? Then, how about the houses? They were not built by a landowner so could he throw the peasants out of them? Etc.

Of course, considering that something like a third of the nobles' estates were mortgaged to the State or to land banks, I don't think that would do much good; the nobility simply lacked the capital (and possibly skills/knowledge but not 100% on that) to create the large, modernized agricultural estates that brought the Peers and Junkers their continued economic power while also providing the foodbase needed to provide for the growing population. Not to mention their estates were often scattered across multiple provinces, rather then parcels of land that bordered each other.

Yes, the generally low competence of the Russian landowners had been well-known. Karamzin noted that on the sandy Baltic soil one serf was producing more income for his master than 3 Russian serfs on a black soil. Eventually, some estates survived and by 1913 most of the agricultural mechanisms were concentrated in these estates with a resulting higher productivity. But most landowners lost their land.

Just spitballing, but I wonder if something like the émigre indemnity law of the Bourbon restoration could be a basis for the gordian knot around the landowners rights. Like, the Imperial government formally sizes the mortgaged lands to sell to the freed serfs (funded by low-interest loans provided to the peasants) and in exchange the nobles get a guranteed yearly indemnity of say 3% of the value of the lost land (the precentage mentioned in the French law) over a period of X years (say 50, the OTL period that the peasants were suppoed to repay the loans to the goverment).

IIRC, something along the similar lines was proposed by Kiselev: seize the mortgaged land, pay the balance between its cost and unpaid debt and give land to the peasants (for the ransom?).

While pretty close to the OTL plan, I think this would help make sure the burden doesn't fall so heavily on the peasantry. I'd love to pair it with an agrarian reform similarj to the later Stolypin reform, but no idea who would push for that.

And if it was realistic at that time… It pretty much took the land crisis to push fraction of the peasants into individual farmership but during the time of AII the crisis was not there, yet. OTOH, there still was a noticeable number of the resettlers moving to the East.

Basically, the emancipation reform either needed to go all in on either the Anglo-Prussian system (creating large estates worked by tenant farmers), or the French system (ie land sold/given to peasant families), not the muddled mix they did OTL (with the long-term mess of the miir system thrown in for bad measure).

Land was sold to the peasants all the time but on a communal level.

Which would involve something like the large French loans AIII and Witte secured in the 1880s. Considering the CW, I can't see such loans coming from the French or the British in the 1850s or 1860s. I would say German financiers, but not sure if they had yet to reach the amount of financial power necessary to do that yet.

Actually, immediately after the CW AII and Little Nappy became quite cozy.

 

[Emperor Constantine]

My sincere condolences. 😉

Thanks. Its a real shame. AII's reign occupied such a pivotal point in Russian history, yet its furstraitingly difficult to find ways to make it a net positive. And I can't kill him off when young, sense that would just pass the crown to Konsantin, who'd be just as bad. That means either working around AII, assassinating him in 1866, or getting NI to pull the trigger on the end of serfdom and a few other proposed modernizations.

But is this realistic to expect if we leave his personality intact? He was brought up by an extremely authoritative father who demonstrably failed at the end so a reasonably natural reaction was along the lines “the past is bad, let’s do all differently” and he looked for the people with similar views and none of them had the needed experience or knowledge, just the good intentions. But even in this area he was trying to run in all directions at the same time with no visible logic.

Yeah that's the issue I'm running into. Its one thing to change events (like listening to one minister over the other), but changing an existing historical figure's personality feels a bit ... handwavy. Looking at AII's upbringing, the only real thing I could think of would be a different tutor for him rather then the "liberal-romantic" Vasily Zhukovsky. But even then, IDK.

Take the emancipation. Kiselev had a great experience (his first emancipation project is dated by 1816 and he did conduct reform for the state peasants) but almost immediately after the CW (which he helped to finish with the minimal losses), he was removed from his office and sent as an ambassador to France. Muraviev advocated a gradual change in the agrarian system, the implementation of which would not have met such sharp resistance at all levels, for which he was rated as a "conservative and serf-owner" in liberal circles. AII practically accused him in opposing his policy and Muraviev had to retire. Who ended up as a head of the emancipation commission? Rostovtsev. A professional military who got his ideas traveling in Germany (what’s common except that in both cases the peasants were bipeds?) and was seemingly mostly concerned with the moral considerations and after his death position was given, out of all people, to Panin who was arch-conservative Minister of Justice who was against emancipation and who’s main contribution (judging by wiki) was a proposal to put Russia under the martial law during reform’s implementation. Besides this he was trying to protect interests of the landowners.

Between what you've mentioned, and my own (admittedly limited) reading, the best solution seems to be AII turning to Kiselyov and Muravyov (as well as possibly keeping Nikolai Milyutin) as leading ministers instead of tossing out every lead official from his father's reign. Not sure how to get AII to that solution though. Or to get him to just take a step back and let his ministers cook, rather then his back and forth views throughout the emancipation.

Yes. The problems were all over the place. Pretty much all Ural metallurgy had to be dramatically changed to be up to date and the capital was one of many issues because it had to switch from charcoal to coal and there was no good coal needed for the bessemer technology nearby, the horse and water power had to be replaced with the steam and, as I understand, this was just a tip of a very big iceberg.

So basically Russia's industrialization needed tons of work, and would coast tons of rubbles, yet outside the Rail network was never properly prioritized until AIII's reign. I did find a book that coudl help me figure out some places on where to push, Beginnings of Russian Industrialization, 1800 - 1860 by William Blackwell. Its a fairly old book (from the '60s or '70s), but its about the only thing I've been able to find that specifially deals with Russia's industrialization from outside AIII's reign.

Very true. Military result of the war of 2877-78 was quite ambiguous. On one hand, the top command level was mostly compromised and this applied to AII as well. OTOH, the war produced a number of the bona fide heroes some of whom, like Skobelev, introduced a novel tactics. But one of these heroes turned to be a time bomb producing the terrible negative results all the way to wwi. I’m talking shout general Dragomirov. He performed quite well in the war, became popular, served as commander of the Kiev military district and professor of the military academy. Was quite charismatic, had a lot of the good ideas regarding physical preparedness of the soldiers and their good treatment. But the good things end there. He was a vocal adherence of the spirit as the winning factor and a bayonet charge as the tactics. He was against pretty much any innovations: magazine rifles, machine guns, protective shields on the cannons and so on. But a huge number of the commanders of all levels came out of his “school” and during the RJW and WWI the soldiers paid dearly.

So basically, the Russians learned lessons toward some of their issues, but just the wrong ones. They doubled down on things that simply weren't going to work in modern warfare, and neglected the things they actually needed to focus on. That feels like something that could be fixed without a huge amount of butterflying.

There was a fundamental between him and his son. Under AII the Grand Dukes were almost uncontrollable (and this involved, among other things, peddling the influence in getting the RR contracts) while AIII seriously cut their number and was quite strict with them (well, there still were numerous issues). IMO, AII was a rather weak personality (which did not prevent him from being vengeful and quite cruel).

So again, major personality issues from AII. Which is something that's pretty darn hard to butterfly without getting into hand waving territory. I'm almost thinking the best bet would be a successful 1866 assassination attempt against him...

Weakling with a lot of power…

Sounds like quite a few monarchs.

There was a fundamental psychological problem. The peasants of Germany and Baltic governorships (where, IIRC, serfdom was abolished early without land) knew that the land belongs to the landowner while in Russia they firmly believed that the land on which they were working for themselves was their. So releasing them without a land would cause massive revolts.

I saw that mentioned in an essay I was reading the other day! I mean, they're definitely wrong, but that does make sense. And explain why the reform needed a land component for the peasants.

Then, with both sides sticking to the communal model, how the tenancy would work? A landlord could break contract with the individual tenant but how to do this with a whole community acting as a solid block? Then, how about the houses? They were not built by a landowner so could he throw the peasants out of them? Etc.

Yeah, can see the issues with tenancy. It would also need to fully abandon the communal model to work "properly", but neither side was yet to the point where the communal system could be reasonably abandoned.

Yes, the generally low competence of the Russian landowners had been well-known. Karamzin noted that on the sandy Baltic soil one serf was producing more income for his master than 3 Russian serfs on a black soil. Eventually, some estates survived and by 1913 most of the agricultural mechanisms were concentrated in these estates with a resulting higher productivity. But most landowners lost their land.

So basically, one would need the Russian nobility to wake up and realize they need to reform their land managament if they were to reach the economic power of the British or Prussian nobility. And, considering that the vast amounts of land they had morgaged by the 1850s wasn't a giant waving red flag to them, its likely that such a shift wouldn't be possible before their economic downturn in the later half of the 19th century helped significantly weaken the nobles' financial position.

IIRC, something along the similar lines was proposed by Kiselev: seize the mortgaged land, pay the balance between its cost and unpaid debt and give land to the peasants (for the ransom?).

Jez. I didn't think it was possible for my low estimations of AII to get any worse, but he keeps surpising me.

And if it was realistic at that time… It pretty much took the land crisis to push fraction of the peasants into individual farmership but during the time of AII the crisis was not there, yet. OTOH, there still was a noticeable number of the resettlers moving to the East.

So realistically, land reform in the model of Stolypin would have to wait until the late 19th century. Got it.

Land was sold to the peasants all the time but on a communal level.

I was more meaning that the communal model was part of the issues.

Actually, immediately after the CW AII and Little Nappy became quite cozy.

Did not know that, very interesting. So potentially, French loans could be available for Russia if properly tapped into. Say if Nappy III was persuaded to balance out his major focusing on a British alliance with positive relations to one of the eastern powers (Russia, despite the Crimean war, being the easiest sense French ambitions didn't really cut into Russia's sphere).

 

[Fratsup]

Have the Russians expand earlier and farther across the Steppe/Siberia. Gaining control over the region and securing it would greatly increase their ability to manage security and resources along with the ability to one day gain access to the Chinese market which would allow them to make some much wanted gold.

Have them avoid or at least have a shorter Time of Troubles which would greatly help in terms of retaining population and wealth while also allowing a smother transition of power.

The Top of the World: A 1547 Map Game had this premise with this being the last map I made for it if you are interested.

Spoiler: Top of the World map game map

 

[RousseauX]

Basically, the emancipation reform either needed to go all in on either the Anglo-Prussian system (creating large estates worked by tenant farmers), or the French system (ie land sold/given to peasant families), not the muddled mix they did OTL (with the long-term mess of the miir system thrown in for bad measure).

Large estate worked by tenant farmers -was- what a large portion fo Russian agriculture was like by the early 20th century

Aristocrats owned large portions of land in Russia: it was farmed by tenant farmers.

The problem was just that Russian aristorcrats were really bad at farming.

 

[RousseauX]

So realistically, land reform in the model of Stolypin would have to wait until the late 19th century. Got it.

Stolypin's reforms were a failure even in the -20th century-