allanpcameron
Donor
2 April 1942. London.
It wasn’t unusual, but for Alan Brooke, meetings with the Prime Minister, in this case starting at 10.30pm and running until, looking at his watch, 1am, were tiring and trying. After the Cabinet meeting at 6pm, a hurried dinner, and back to Downing Street, as usual Churchill was full of questions, theories, flights of fancy and, worst of all, petulant if confronted with stark reality.
The question on many peoples’ minds was what could be done to save Russia. There had been rallies, from the Albert Hall to Trafalgar Square, with vast crowds shouting for a ‘second front’ now. The Beaverbrook press was stoking up the fires, looking for a new ‘western front’. Mountbatten’s Combined Operations had been pushing for a landing in the Cherbourg area, even though this would be out with air cover from southern Britain. The only real chance of a lodgment would be in the Pas de Calais, but Brooke was clear that there was nothing like the size of force that could cross the channel that would actually force the Germans to withdraw troops from Russia. The best that could be hoped for was bringing elements of the Luftwaffe back to France. All the RAF’s Rhubarbs and Ramrod operations were doing very little except wearing down the RAF and losing valuable pilots and aircraft which would be better off in the Middle or Far East.
Alan Brooke knew that he had in Britain about 10 Divisions that were capable of action. Even if there were enough ships to do it, sending them off to France would result surely in their destruction, and leave Britain vulnerable again. Reviewing the list of Corps and Divisional commanders, he felt that half of them lacked drive, character, determination and power of leadership. Even if he fired them, there were none could take their place that were any better. The loss of so many of the best officers in the last war meant that the generation that should now be commanding the Army were absent.
As he walked back to his quarters, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff contemplated the difficulty of having a democracy fighting a war with a dictatorship. Especially since the Government is powerless to some degree having only one big man in it, and him a grave danger in many respects. Party politics and interests still override larger war issues. Petty jealousies, politicians who know little of war, but think themselves great strategists, confuse issues, affect decisions, and convert simple problems and plans into confused tangles and hopeless confusion.
Much of this was written in his diary before getting to bed. As tired as he was, he couldn’t help reflecting on the current situation that he’d reported on at Cabinet and spoke at length with the Prime Minister. In a couple of weeks General Marshall and his American delegation were due to arrive for talks and working out plans for the American build up towards an invasion of France.
Much of this was taken from but a couple of days out:
It wasn’t unusual, but for Alan Brooke, meetings with the Prime Minister, in this case starting at 10.30pm and running until, looking at his watch, 1am, were tiring and trying. After the Cabinet meeting at 6pm, a hurried dinner, and back to Downing Street, as usual Churchill was full of questions, theories, flights of fancy and, worst of all, petulant if confronted with stark reality.
The question on many peoples’ minds was what could be done to save Russia. There had been rallies, from the Albert Hall to Trafalgar Square, with vast crowds shouting for a ‘second front’ now. The Beaverbrook press was stoking up the fires, looking for a new ‘western front’. Mountbatten’s Combined Operations had been pushing for a landing in the Cherbourg area, even though this would be out with air cover from southern Britain. The only real chance of a lodgment would be in the Pas de Calais, but Brooke was clear that there was nothing like the size of force that could cross the channel that would actually force the Germans to withdraw troops from Russia. The best that could be hoped for was bringing elements of the Luftwaffe back to France. All the RAF’s Rhubarbs and Ramrod operations were doing very little except wearing down the RAF and losing valuable pilots and aircraft which would be better off in the Middle or Far East.
Alan Brooke knew that he had in Britain about 10 Divisions that were capable of action. Even if there were enough ships to do it, sending them off to France would result surely in their destruction, and leave Britain vulnerable again. Reviewing the list of Corps and Divisional commanders, he felt that half of them lacked drive, character, determination and power of leadership. Even if he fired them, there were none could take their place that were any better. The loss of so many of the best officers in the last war meant that the generation that should now be commanding the Army were absent.
As he walked back to his quarters, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff contemplated the difficulty of having a democracy fighting a war with a dictatorship. Especially since the Government is powerless to some degree having only one big man in it, and him a grave danger in many respects. Party politics and interests still override larger war issues. Petty jealousies, politicians who know little of war, but think themselves great strategists, confuse issues, affect decisions, and convert simple problems and plans into confused tangles and hopeless confusion.
Much of this was written in his diary before getting to bed. As tired as he was, he couldn’t help reflecting on the current situation that he’d reported on at Cabinet and spoke at length with the Prime Minister. In a couple of weeks General Marshall and his American delegation were due to arrive for talks and working out plans for the American build up towards an invasion of France.
Much of this was taken from but a couple of days out: