A New Beginning - Our 1992 Russian Federation

Advancements and Challenges in Russian Tourism (2000s)
The strategic initiatives undertaken in the late 1990s continued to shape Russia's tourism landscape well into the mid-2000s. As the nation worked to position itself as a sought-after destination, several advancements and challenges marked this period of development.

1. Sustained Infrastructure Development: The expansion of necessary infrastructure remained a focal point. Roads, airports, and accommodations received ongoing upgrades, ensuring a comfortable and efficient travel experience for visitors. Regions with untapped touristic potential, such as Siberia and the Russian Far East, saw increased attention to infrastructure development to facilitate tourism growth.

2. Diversification of Tourist Offerings: Russia actively diversified its tourist offerings, recognizing the need to cater to a broad range of interests. Adventure tourism, eco-tourism, and cultural exchanges gained prominence. Unique experiences like trans-Siberian railway journeys and expeditions to the Arctic region were introduced to attract adventure enthusiasts and nature lovers.

3. Technological Integration: The mid-2000s witnessed the integration of technology into the tourism sector. Digital platforms and online travel agencies played a significant role in marketing Russian destinations. Virtual tours, interactive maps, and engaging content on social media platforms contributed to creating a digital presence that resonated with tech-savvy travelers.

4. Challenges in Perception Management: Despite the positive strides, Russia faced challenges in managing global perceptions. Lingering stereotypes and geopolitical concerns posed obstacles in attracting tourists, particularly from Western countries. Ongoing efforts were required to communicate the safety, diversity, and hospitality offered by Russian tourist destinations.

5. Economic Impact and Job Creation: The tourism sector became a notable contributor to Russia's economy. The influx of visitors generated revenue across various sectors, including hospitality, transportation, and local businesses. Job creation in tourism-related industries provided economic opportunities, especially in regions heavily invested in the sector.

6. Preservation of Cultural Heritage: The emphasis on promoting indigenous cultures continued, contributing to the preservation of Russia's rich cultural heritage. Festivals, cultural events, and heritage sites were actively marketed, encouraging tourists to explore the historical and artistic facets of the country.

7. Challenges in Regional Disparities: While popular destinations like Moscow and St. Petersburg thrived, regional disparities in tourism development persisted. Efforts were intensified to promote lesser-known regions, ensuring a more equitable distribution of tourist traffic. Regional partnerships and collaborations aimed to showcase the diverse offerings beyond the well-trodden paths.

8. Sustainable Tourism Practices: Environmental concerns led to a growing focus on sustainable tourism practices. Conservation efforts, eco-friendly accommodations, and responsible tourism campaigns aimed to minimize the ecological impact of increased visitor numbers. The government implemented policies to strike a balance between tourism growth and environmental preservation.

9. Cultural Exchanges and People-to-People Diplomacy: Tourism played a pivotal role in fostering people-to-people diplomacy. Cultural exchanges, homestay programs, and language immersion initiatives sought to bridge cultural gaps and enhance international understanding. These initiatives contributed to Russia's soft power diplomacy on the global stage.

In conclusion, the mid-2000s marked a continuation of Russia's efforts to position itself as a diverse and inviting tourist destination. While facing challenges in perception management and regional disparities, the nation made significant strides in infrastructure development, technological integration, and the promotion of sustainable and diversified tourism offerings. Russia's tourism sector emerged as a dynamic contributor to the economy and a powerful tool for cultural exchange on the international stage.
 
Expanding the Influence of Eastern Orthodoxy: A Strategic Collaboration
In the dawn of the 21st century, the Russian government and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) embarked on an ambitious journey to expand the influence of Eastern Orthodoxy globally. This strategic collaboration, initiated in the early 2000s, aimed at not only strengthening the spiritual fabric of the Russian nation but also positioning Eastern Orthodoxy as a geopolitical tool on the world stage. The coordinated efforts of both entities sought to promote Orthodox Christianity in regions far beyond Russia's borders, spanning South America, Africa, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and the broader Asian continent.

Foundations of the Collaboration: The strategic collaboration between the Russian government and the ROC had its roots in the renewed interest in religious identity following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As Russia grappled with the challenges of defining its post-Soviet identity, the ROC emerged as a unifying force. Recognizing the moral and cultural influence the church wielded, the Russian government saw an opportunity to leverage this influence as part of its geopolitical strategy.

Step-by-Step Global Expansion:

1. South America:
The collaborative effort to expand the influence of Eastern Orthodoxy commenced with a focus on South America. Historically Orthodox communities in countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela became focal points. The Russian government, in alignment with the ROC, invested resources in reaching out to expatriate Russian communities and promoting the cultural and spiritual ties that bound them to Eastern Orthodoxy.

In South America, the emphasis was on establishing cultural centers, educational initiatives, and fostering a sense of connection with the historical roots of Eastern Orthodoxy. The intention was to create a strong foundation for the further spread of Orthodox Christianity within the region.

Financial Investment and Cultural Ties:
The financial investment in South America included the construction of Orthodox churches, cultural centers, and educational institutions. These initiatives aimed not only at religious conversion but also at establishing a sense of cultural continuity among expatriate communities. Educational programs focused on teaching the Russian language, history, and the Orthodox faith.

Community Engagement and Integration:
Collaborative efforts extended to community engagement programs, ensuring that expatriate Russians and locals alike felt integrated into the broader cultural narrative of Eastern Orthodoxy. Festivals, art exhibitions, and exchange programs created a vibrant cultural exchange, fostering a sense of unity among Orthodox communities.

2. Africa: The African continent, with its diverse religious landscape, presented both challenges and opportunities. The Russian government and the ROC targeted regions with historically limited Orthodox presence. Missionary activities, educational programs, and collaborative efforts with local communities aimed to introduce Eastern Orthodoxy as a viable spiritual alternative.

Missionary Activities and Educational Initiatives:
In Africa, the collaborative effort included extensive missionary activities, with a focus on regions where traditional Orthodox communities were sparse. Educational initiatives ranged from establishing schools to supporting existing educational institutions that aligned with the Orthodox ethos. Scholarships and exchange programs facilitated cross-cultural understanding.

Cultural Sensitivity and Adaptation:
Recognizing the rich tapestry of African cultures, the promotion of Eastern Orthodoxy emphasized cultural sensitivity. The adaptation of Orthodox practices to align with local traditions helped bridge cultural gaps, making the faith more accessible and relevant to diverse African communities.

3. Middle East: The historical roots of Eastern Orthodoxy in the Middle East provided a natural entry point for the collaborative expansion. Countries like Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt, with significant Orthodox Christian populations, became key areas of focus. The collaboration involved diplomatic efforts to strengthen ties with Orthodox communities, support for the restoration of Orthodox churches, and the promotion of shared cultural heritage.

Diplomatic Outreach and Heritage Preservation:
In the Middle East, diplomatic outreach was intertwined with efforts to preserve the rich Orthodox heritage. The Russian government provided support for the restoration of ancient churches, monasteries, and religious artifacts. This dual approach aimed at both reinforcing diplomatic ties and safeguarding the cultural legacy of Eastern Orthodoxy in the region.

Interfaith Dialogue and Cooperation:
Collaborative initiatives extended beyond the Orthodox community to include interfaith dialogue and cooperation. Engaging with leaders of different religious traditions, the Russian government and the ROC sought to foster mutual understanding and respect, positioning Eastern Orthodoxy as a unifying force in a region often marked by religious diversity.

4. Indian Subcontinent: The Indian subcontinent, with its rich tapestry of religions, saw a concerted effort to promote Eastern Orthodoxy. The collaboration involved engaging with Orthodox Christian communities in India and Sri Lanka. Educational programs, cultural exchanges, and the establishment of Orthodox churches aimed to create a sense of belonging within the diverse religious landscape of the subcontinent.

Educational Exchange Programs:
In the Indian subcontinent, the collaborative effort focused on educational exchange programs between Russian and local institutions. These programs facilitated the exchange of knowledge, cultural practices, and spiritual teachings. The emphasis was on creating a platform for meaningful dialogue and understanding.

Cultural Integration and Diaspora Support:
The promotion of Eastern Orthodoxy in the Indian subcontinent extended to supporting the Orthodox diaspora. Cultural integration initiatives included the celebration of Orthodox festivals, the establishment of community centers, and language programs that preserved the linguistic and cultural heritage of Orthodox communities.

5. Rest of Asia: In the diverse nations of Asia, the collaboration sought to build bridges with Orthodox communities in historically non-Orthodox regions. The focus was on countries like Korea, Japan and reaching out to expatriate communities. The Russian government and the ROC aimed to foster cultural diplomacy, emphasizing shared values and historical ties.

Cultural Diplomacy and Historical Bonds:
The collaborative effort in Asia leveraged historical bonds between Russia and countries with Orthodox traditions. Cultural diplomacy initiatives included art exhibitions, historical symposiums, and joint research projects that explored the shared heritage of Eastern Orthodoxy. By emphasizing historical connections, the collaboration sought to build bridges between cultures.

Interfaith Understanding and Tolerance:
Recognizing the diverse religious landscape of Asia, the collaborative initiative extended to promoting interfaith understanding and tolerance. Dialogue forums, religious conferences, and joint community projects aimed to create spaces where different faiths could coexist harmoniously, with Eastern Orthodoxy contributing to the broader tapestry of religious diversity.

Turning Religion into a Geopolitical Tool:

1. Cultural Diplomacy:
The collaboration between the Russian government and the ROC utilized Eastern Orthodoxy as a tool for cultural diplomacy. The establishment of cultural centers, the promotion of Orthodox traditions, and educational programs became integral components of this soft power strategy. The goal was not only to spread religious teachings but also to showcase Russia's rich cultural heritage.

Artistic and Cultural Exhibitions:
Cultural diplomacy initiatives included artistic and cultural exhibitions that showcased the richness of Orthodox iconography, music, and literature. These exhibitions, hosted in collaboration with local cultural institutions, aimed to create an appreciation for the artistic contributions of Eastern Orthodoxy.

Educational Exchanges:
To enhance cultural diplomacy, educational exchanges were facilitated, bringing students and scholars from different parts of the world to Russia. These exchanges promoted cross-cultural understanding and contributed to the global dissemination of Orthodox cultural values.

2. Diplomatic Leverage: The promotion of Eastern Orthodoxy also served as a diplomatic leverage tool for Russia. The Russian government, by aligning with Orthodox communities, sought to strengthen diplomatic ties. The ROC's endorsement of Russian policies became a significant factor in international relations, especially in regions where Orthodox Christianity held historical significance.

Diplomatic Summits and Collaborative Projects:
Diplomatic summits that brought together leaders of Orthodox nations provided a platform for discussions on shared values and geopolitical interests. Collaborative projects, ranging from infrastructure development to cultural preservation, became the currency of diplomatic engagement, solidifying alliances.

3. Soft Power in Global Affairs: As part of a broader soft power strategy, the Russian government strategically positioned Eastern Orthodoxy to influence global affairs. This involved engagement with international organizations, participation in interfaith dialogues, and initiatives that projected Russia as a defender of religious freedoms.

Engagement with International Organizations:
Collaborative efforts extended to engaging with international organizations focused on religious freedoms and cultural diversity. Russia, through its alliance with the ROC, actively participated in forums that discussed the role of religion in fostering global peace and understanding.

Interfaith Dialogues and Global Initiatives:
Interfaith dialogues became a key arena where Eastern Orthodoxy contributed to global discussions on ethical governance, human rights, and environmental stewardship. The collaborative initiative sought to position Russia as a proponent of a multipolar world that valued religious pluralism.

Ethical Considerations and Challenges:

The global promotion of Eastern Orthodoxy by the Russian government and the ROC raised ethical considerations and challenges that necessitated careful navigation.

1. Autonomy of Religious Institutions: The intertwining of religious influence with geopolitical objectives brought to the forefront questions regarding the autonomy of religious institutions. Critics argued that such collaborations risked compromising the spiritual independence of the church, blurring the lines between religious and political authority.

Ensuring Spiritual Independence:
To address concerns about autonomy, the ROC took measures to ensure the spiritual independence of its institutions. Declarations emphasizing the separation of religious and political authority were issued, reaffirming the church's commitment to its ecclesiastical role.

2. Ethical Implications: Ethical considerations centered around the potential for cultural imperialism and the imposition of a particular religious worldview on diverse societies. The collaborative effort aimed to strike a balance between promoting Eastern Orthodoxy and respecting the cultural diversity of regions where it was introduced.

Cultural Sensitivity Programs:
Acknowledging the diverse cultural contexts, cultural sensitivity programs were implemented to adapt Orthodox practices to local traditions. The goal was to avoid an imposition of religious norms and foster a sense of inclusivity within diverse communities.

3. Religious Freedom: The need to uphold the principles of religious freedom became a critical aspect of the collaborative initiative. The Russian government and the ROC, while promoting Eastern Orthodoxy, emphasized the importance of respecting the religious choices of individuals and communities.

Interfaith Dialogue and Inclusivity:
Interfaith dialogue initiatives aimed to create spaces where different religious traditions could coexist harmoniously. Emphasizing inclusivity, the collaborative effort sought to build bridges between Orthodox communities and adherents of other faiths.

4. Navigating Diverse Religious Landscapes: In regions with diverse religious landscapes, navigating the intricacies of different faith traditions posed a significant challenge. The collaborative initiative required a nuanced approach that respected existing religious pluralism.

Interfaith Cooperation Programs:
Interfaith cooperation programs were developed to foster understanding and cooperation between different religious communities. Joint projects, humanitarian initiatives, and cultural exchange programs aimed to create an environment of mutual respect and coexistence.

The Global Response:

The global response to the collaborative efforts of the Russian government and the ROC in promoting Eastern Orthodoxy was characterized by a mix of fascination, apprehension, and critique.

1. Fascination: The cultural richness, historical depth, and spiritual traditions of Eastern Orthodoxy fascinated many across the globe. Artistic exhibitions, cultural events, and educational programs garnered positive attention, creating an appreciation for the contributions of Orthodox Christianity to global cultural heritage.

2. Apprehension: Apprehension stemmed from concerns about the geopolitical motives behind the collaborative initiative. Skepticism about the separation of church and state, fears of cultural imperialism, and questions about the ethical implications of such a strategy fueled apprehension among certain international observers.

3. Critique: Critique focused on the potential for using religion as a tool for political influence. Concerns were raised about the blurred lines between religious and political authority, and the perceived instrumentalization of faith for geopolitical objectives.

Conclusion:

The collaborative efforts of the Russian government and the Russian Orthodox Church in promoting Eastern Orthodoxy globally represent a complex interplay between religion, geopolitics, and cultural diplomacy. The multi-faceted initiative, spanning continents and diverse cultural landscapes, reflects an ambitious strategy to position Eastern Orthodoxy as a geopolitical tool. The ethical considerations and challenges encountered underscore the need for careful navigation in intertwining religious influence with political objectives. As the world witnesses the ongoing impact of this collaboration, the future trajectory of Eastern Orthodoxy's global influence remains intricately connected to the delicate balance between cultural diplomacy, religious autonomy, and the principles of religious freedom. The evolving dynamics between the Russian government, the ROC, and the global community will shape the narrative of Eastern Orthodoxy's role in the ever-changing landscape of geopolitics and spirituality.
 
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Navigating Contrasting Trends: Eastern Orthodoxy's Global Expansion Amidst Western Dynamics
In the opening decades of the 21st century, a profound contrast unfolded between the evolving role of religion in the West, particularly in Europe and North America, and the resurgent Eastern Orthodoxy in Russia. These divergent trends underscore transformative shifts in societal values, political dynamics, and the intricate interweaving of faith with geopolitical objectives.

Western Dynamics: Marginalization, Atheism, and Identity Crisis
Marginalization and Shifting Values: The traditional role of the church in the West underwent seismic transformations, marked by marginalization and a departure from centuries-old religious frameworks. Societal values shifted away from institutionalized faith, with secularism and individualism taking precedence. Churches, once central to public discourse, found themselves relegated to the sidelines, their influence waning as secular perspectives gained prominence.

Atheism's Ascendance: A defining characteristic of Western dynamics was the acceleration of atheistic sentiments. A growing number of individuals identified as non-religious or secular, reflecting a broader trend of detachment from organized religion. As atheism gained traction, the once-pervasive influence of religious institutions in shaping societal norms faced a formidable challenge.

Identity Crisis within Western Churches: Western churches grappled with an identity crisis, an existential challenge amplified by the accelerating secularization of societies. The foundational doctrines and teachings that had shaped communities for centuries faced scrutiny, prompting internal debates about adapting to contemporary values while preserving core religious principles. The identity crisis extended beyond theological considerations to encompass the church's place in social, ethical, and political discourse.

Contrasting Dynamics: Eastern Orthodoxy's Resilience in Russia
Resilience and the Resurgence of Religious Identity: In stark contrast to the marginalization experienced in the West, Eastern Orthodoxy, particularly in Russia, witnessed a resurgence of religious identity. The church, far from being marginalized, became a focal point for national unity and cultural continuity. The rekindling of spiritual fervor became intertwined with a profound sense of national pride, positioning Eastern Orthodoxy as a unifying force in a post-Soviet Russia seeking to define its identity.

Alignment with Geopolitical Objectives: The collaboration between the Russian government and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) reflected a strategic alignment with geopolitical objectives. Unlike the West, where religion faced marginalization, the collaborative efforts in Russia positioned Eastern Orthodoxy as an integral part of the national narrative. The church's influence extended beyond spiritual matters, actively contributing to geopolitical and diplomatic endeavors.

Expanding on Contrasting Dynamics
Global Reception: As collaborative efforts between the Russian government and the ROC unfolded, the global reception mirrored the divergent trends in the West and Russia. In the West, where the church faced marginalization, the promotion of Eastern Orthodoxy was often perceived as an attempt to fill a perceived religious void left by diminishing influence. Observers questioned whether these initiatives served as an endeavor to provide a spiritual anchor in societies marked by increasing secularization.

Skepticism and Political Instrumentalization: Skepticism arose concerning the intertwining of religion with political objectives. The perception of Eastern Orthodoxy being utilized as a geopolitical tool fueled concerns about the potential instrumentalization of faith for political gain. Questions emerged about the autonomy of the church in collaborative initiatives with the Russian government, raising debates about the delicate balance between spiritual guidance and political alignment.

The Role of Religion in Geopolitics: A Comparative Perspective: In the West, the marginalization of the church prompted questions about the role of religion in geopolitics. As secularism gained prominence, religious institutions found themselves on the periphery of political decision-making. This raised important questions about the evolving nature of governance, societal values, and the complex interplay between religion and state affairs.

Navigating Identity Crisis vs. Resilience:
Identity Crisis in the West: Western churches faced an identity crisis as they grappled with the evolving values of secular societies. The challenge lay in preserving core doctrines while adapting to contemporary perspectives. The marginalization of religious voices left Western churches navigating uncharted territory, seeking relevance in an era dominated by diverse secular ideologies.

Resilience in Eastern Orthodoxy: Eastern Orthodoxy, particularly in Russia, displayed resilience by becoming a source of national pride and identity. The church's ability to adapt to changing political landscapes and align with the geopolitical objectives of the state positioned it as a significant influencer in both spiritual and secular realms.

Global Implications and Projections:
As the contrasting trends continue to unfold, they carry significant global implications. The West grapples with questions about the role of religion in an increasingly secularized world, raising debates about societal values and the potential void left by the diminishing influence of religious institutions. In contrast, the collaborative efforts between the Russian government and the ROC project Eastern Orthodoxy as a geopolitical player, intertwining faith with political objectives.

Western Societal Reflections: The marginalization of the church in the West prompts a profound reflection on the evolving nature of societal values and the place of religion in governance. Questions about ethics, morality, and the source of societal norms come to the forefront as traditional religious frameworks face challenges in the contemporary landscape.

Eastern Orthodox Geopolitical Influence: The resurgence of Eastern Orthodoxy in Russia, actively supported and promoted by the government, carries geopolitical weight. As the church aligns with state objectives, it becomes a key player in shaping national identity and international alliances. The promotion of Eastern Orthodoxy globally positions Russia as a cultural and spiritual influencer, challenging traditional spheres of influence.

Continued Debates on the Interplay of Religion and State: The contrasting dynamics also fuel ongoing debates about the interplay of religion and state affairs. In the West, where secularism is on the rise, discussions center around the separation of church and state. In Russia, the collaborative efforts project a different model, where religion becomes an integral part of the state's diplomatic and geopolitical toolkit.

Conclusion:
The contrasting trends between the West and Russia in the realm of religion, identity, and geopolitics underscore the evolving dynamics of spirituality in the 21st century. As Eastern Orthodoxy expands its global influence through strategic collaborations, the world is witnessing a complex interplay between religious resilience, identity crises, and the geopolitical instrumentalization of faith. The trajectories of Western secularization and the resurgence of Eastern Orthodoxy shape the global narrative, highlighting the intricate relationship between religion and geopolitics in an era of profound societal transformations. This juxtaposition prompts reflection on the role of faith, the resilience of religious identity, and the potential ramifications of geopolitical alliances shaped by religious narratives. In navigating these crossroads, societies grapple with fundamental questions about values, ethics, and the future trajectory of the intricate dance between spirituality and global affairs.
 
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The Land of the Rising Sun
The Land of the Rising Sun

As Russia rose in many ways so did Japan as the history of both nations became increasingly intertwined since the fall of the Soviet Union as people, resources, and ideas all travel across their borders changing both and Japan especially.


Intern Japanese-Russian Migration and its Effects

The Japanese Boom and Japanese Migration to Russia

As was stated before the increasing demands for entertainment in Russia lead to the major rise of convention scene which apart from making comics, and anime and manga popular in Russia were some of the first major push for the interchange of Japanese and Russian culture between both groups as Vladi-Con 1995 and the Cool Vladivostok advertisement campaign saw the first major Russian penetration of the Japanese zeitgeist as a place other than a cold war enemy and into a destination for the Japanese to travel to. What further drove this immigration was Japan's predicament of the Lost Decade or a period of time when the Japanese meteoric economic rise stagnated or even fell as the massive spending that dominated Japan was stopped as money became tighter, people were forced to work part time or as freeters lacking full time employment, while the GDP of the nation had to recover from the damage.

All of these events plus the good word of mouth from those who made the trip on how they were able to take advantage of the gap between the Ruble and Yen to live comfortable live, lead to a large wave of Japanese migration which occurred as it became clear that even the lower-class Japanese could live comfortingly in the Russian Far East especially as many Japanese business and investment banks saw the opportunity to invest and dominate the Siberian Industrial and Resource Boom as Russia was more than willing to allow anyone to invest into the region. The Russians for the most part took advantage of the situation as the Vladivostok Economic Development Treaty made the city and the Russian Far East an even more enticing are to invest into.

All of this worried Russia and Japan over the situation as the Russians feared the possibility of Japanese colonization while Japan was worried about its citizens and their health and rights in the area. The situation lead to the research the effects of the migration in what was called the Vladivostok Report which overall saw that the situation was an overall net positive to both nations. From there further moves were made with the Far Eastern Economic Development Treaty and the Vladivostok Immigration and Travel Treaty of 1996 both made it easier to do business across the Russian Far East and made travel easier between Russia and Japan further driving migration between both nations. This lead to further moves to improve the political and economic situation between each other as the The Sakhalin–Hokkaido Tunnel/Bridge would for the most part be seen as the main symbol of such a relationship.

Overall by 2003 a million plus Japanese had migrated into Russian with many who had settled down and would contribute to Russian society as a whole.


Russian/Ukrainian Migration to Japan

While we now know the overall reason for Japanese migration to Russia, Japan would experience its own rise in immigration as for the first time Japan became a target for international migration.

As a whole Japan had for most of the 20th century had lacked much immigration to Japan as after World War 2 and the Japanese economic miracle most of Japan was content with its own internal migration as the rural population moved to cities and contributed to the economy leading to a lack of demand for overseas migration. Even as things changed later in the 21st century Japan would initially still have low international immigration which at first glance might seem to be a consequences of Japan being anti-migration but the situation was actually more complicated.
  • For starters Japans overall migration policy was actually not a restrictive as most people though as overall it was rather similar to the one that the US and other nations so unlike what people think it was not the main driver for lack of migration.
  • As was stated Japan had mostly relied on its own internal population leaving little room for international migration early on.
  • Other problems to migration was Japan's geographic isolation as being an island it was difficult for most to travel to as boat or plane was required limiting who could reach it, which further limited from any nations to gain migrants from when compared to the situation with the US and Latin America.
  • There was a cultural divide as most people saw Japans culture as foreign and hard to understand along with their language at least compared to the rest of the world. This made most migrants to not want to move there due to what they saw as a difficult nation to acclimate to.
  • And finally it was simply that there were better options or at least that is what most migrants thought. Both the US and Western Europe in general were seen as the main destination to go to as they freedom, economic situation, and pre-existing communities made them prime destination for international migrants
All of this lead to Japan to lack any major migration even when attempts were made to improve things as most Filipinos, Vietnamese, and others would rather go to America than Japan. However things did change as the Russian-Japanese relationship grew.

As the Russian and Japanese people interacted more and as the Russian economy grew so did the number of Russian tourists to Japan as many wished to visit the nation due to its perceived beauty and its major entertainment and electronic market which had major demand across the Russian population. This would lead Japan to experience an increase in demands to support the creation of advertisements campaigns that would target the Russian demographic. This demand lead to the push for Russian models who would both advertise to Russians but also to the Japanese which lead to a demand for Russians with blond hair and blue eyes as a way to cater to both the Russian people but also to the Japanese who at this point still had a vision of Russians as blonde haired, blue eyed, tall Europeans. While the demand was meet by Russians at first it was not before long that many Japanese companies moved to Ukrainian models as unlike the economically rising Russia, they did not have to compete with other advertising or entertainment agencies and business. Unknown to most people this move would directly lead to the rise of immigration to Japan as a whole.

For starters what drove the major migration of Ukrainians to Japan was largely due to the situation both nations found themselves in. Ukraine for the most part was doing poorly as the nation was economically poor, it was dealing with major corruption issues, and for the most part most people did not see much of an opportunity in living there leading to a greater willingness to migrate. Japan for its own part was dealing with the Lost Decade which apart from causing a major economic fall, it also lead to a rise in Freeters(people without full-time employment), NEETs, and Hikkiomori which overall lead to a major decline in relationships as most were to poor or dealing with their own problems to think of such matters.

This was largely what drove the rise of the Ukrainian Mail Order Bride industry and the rise in migration to Japan as the rising Japanese economy and the stigma against a lack of wife and marriage made many Japanese men to look at foreign market to fix that. With many Japanese advertisement agencies now flooded with people looking to enter Japan most began to advertise themselves as mail-order bride agencies who would hook up Ukrainian women with Japanese man which was made easier due to the Vladivostok Immigration and Travel Treaty of 1996 which allowed Russians or those who could pass as Russians an easier time to move between each nation. The early success stories and the rise of an Ukrainian population lead to further growth as more people wished to migrate to Japan while many of the Freeters saw is as way to leave their bachelor status behind. Overall by 2003 there was some 1.5 million immigrants of Ukrainian/Russian descent living in Japan mostly in the Tokyo Metropolis area with further growth to be projected in the future as the Sakhalin-Hokkaido Tunnel was completed making travel to Japan easier.


The Effects of the Russian/Ukrainian Migration on Japan

As a whole the mass migration of Russians/Ukrainians to Japan was meet with mixed reception as many Japanese were concerned over the growing number of migrants in the nation and the changing ethnic makeup of Japan. Many people were discriminatory to the migratory population and their children with many facing some sort of abuse from their peers. The reality that most of them came from lower class and poorer households did not help as many saw them as criminals and parasites leeching off the Japanese nation.

However there were many who did support them as many managed to gain sympathy for them due to many of the women being rather beautiful due to being the main ones who were chosen by the mail-order agencies for their beauty. Even the discrimination over hair color saw a decline overall as the increase of those with blonde hair made it less strange overall. Outside of that many of the more conservative minded people would begin to tolerate the migrants as many saw the rise of marriage, children and the decline of NEETs, Hikikomori, and Freeter across those who had interracial marriages as better than having them fall into said stigmatized positions.

Further many of the migrants would make a major effort to integrate into the greater Japanese society along with their children which was seen as a plus to a nation that was dealing with a declining birth rate. Overall the net positives that the migration brought were considered worth the changes that occurred within Japan.

Japan and its Rise
As Japan entered the 21st century it would see major changes as both the immigration between Russia and Japan and their growing economic cooperation changed Japan


Changes in Japan from 2000 to 2010

As the relationship between Japan and Russia grew so did both nations economies as Japan increasingly clawed its way out of the hole that the Lost Decade had gotten it into. The growing conflict between Russia and OPEC further allowed Japan access to cheap oil which along with Junichiro Koizumi and his predecessors policies allowed Japan's economy to grow dramatically although not to the same pace of their previous growth during the 70s and 80s. This growth in part lead to the push for the construction of The Sakhalin–Hokkaido Tunnel/Bridge which was seen as a major move by Ryutaro Hashimoto and his administration. By its time of its completion in 2003 and on the tunnel would prove a major economic advantage for Japan as thousands of goods and resources could be transported from Russia/Eurasia into Japan greatly cutting down in travel time and expanses and furthering Japans growth during this period.

This same economic growth would allow Japan to gain major influence in South Korea as the nation found itself directly competing with Japan and China over the Russian market which both nations had near complete domination over as the premier Russian trading partners in Asia. To say that this worried South Korea would be an understatement as the nation could not take full advantage of the Russian market which made them increasingly desperate for a solution. This is when Keizō Obuchi would go to South Korea to push his idea of a Japan–Korea Undersea Tunnel. While originally such an idea was meet with lack of support from South Korea the growing economy of Japan and Japan-Russia's own Sakhalin-Hokkaido tunnel made them reconsider as having Russia and Japan agree to construct such a project while they did nothing as an embarrassment on their part. Construction would begin in 1999 with completion happening in 2009 and while several obstacles like Japanese-Korean resentment over past war-crimes or the growing cost, the project would be completed.

In Japan itself the growing community of Japanese in the Russian Far East and the construction of the Sakhalin-Hokkaido Tunnel lead to some much needed growth in Northeastern Japan/the Tōhoku region as several people moved there to support the major construction work in the area which further attracted more people to support those people. Overall the Tohoku region saw major growth during the period which was further driven by the rise of Chinese immigration as many Chinese would migrate to the region as metal and construction workers with at least half a million Chinese moving in during the 2000s.

Further south Tokyo saw major growth as the majority of the migrants from Russia/Ukraine moved into the city increasing demands for new construction to be made to house them and their needs. With the growing housing prices people would look back to the Metabolism Movement and their designs for Tokyo bay as many increasingly wished to develop the area by building directly on it. While there were multiple grand plans Junichiro overall push for urban living would lead him to push for the creation of platforms as the costs both financial and ecosystem wise was to high plus the continued sinking of the Kansai International Airport coming to mind. Eventually over a dozen small platforms were completed each housing around a 100 people which would lead to further moves to increase the size of any future platforms to house a larger population and hold more essential needs.

From the 2000s onward Japan would see increased immigration as the number of Ukrainians grew, but so did the number of Chinese, Japanese Brazilians/Peruvians and others from East Asia like Vietnam. In general Tokyo would continue to see major growth both from continued migration from places like Ukraine and its own population growth as many of the interracial families were more willing to have more children than the national average.


Japanese Pop-Culture

While trying to talk about Japanese pop-culture in any major dept would be to long one can see some patterns emerging. For starters there would be a greater push to translate and internationally publish their works as Japan increasingly looks to the world state as a new major market as Japanese Anime, manga, and music all find their own fans across the world.

Internally the number of Russians in Japanese works would grow as the archetype of a blond haired, blue eyed, and tall Russian Kuudere or a busty and sexy R-Idol would increasingly appear in anime, manga, and games. Other archetypes were the Brazilian Japanese girl who would once an episode dress up in revealing carnival clothing, the Chinese ojisan working construction, or the Vietnamese transfer student. Overall Japan would increasingly see the use of foreigners in their media as the number of migrants increased. Russian in general would become increasingly used in anime openings and closings and increasingly in anime music.

In Japanese media there would be a greater push to use the Russian Far East as a setting as the knowledge of the area grew along with the view of it as part of the greater Japanese cultural sphere. Many a show with fantasy elements would have an episode set there especially when fighting monsters or finding a killer was concerned as most saw it as a sort of green and white hell where one could be killed by bears or worse. This was especially true of the Magical Girl Genre where the half-Russian half-Japanese became a recurring archetype and increasingly a protagonist as more attention was giving to the rising young demographic of Russo-Japanese children. In the Mecha genre Russia and the Balkans would be increasingly used especially as the knowledge of the greater Russian-NATO conflict graved their attention as one of few areas where some form of modern war might happen.

Video-game manufacturers like Nintendo and Sega would battle it out across Russia as their demand for video games grew. Nintendo as a whole found major competition from Dendy who for the most part was seen as Nintendo in Russia before Nintendo even got there. Attempts were made to combat this which lead to a greater push for Nintendo to translate and bring Japanese games to Russia as they realized that they needed an edge when compared to Sega. In fact Sega held the advantage in Russia largely due to its own greater control of the European market and due to its overall willingness to have more mature content. However the biggest winner was NEC who managed to no work of their own gain a major share of the Russian market by Russian enthusiasts who played and distributed PC-98s across Russia due to its game selection. Seeing the major success of said activities NEC would release the PC-Engine and later the PC-E-98 one console for the home market and the other for enthusiasts. Both would quickly dominate the Russian video game market pushing Nintendo and Sega to the wayside and allowing Hudson Soft and NEC to become major video game manufacturers in their own right.

This dominance was partially driven due to their far more lenient policy when it came to content which lead to a large number of pornographic and violent video games on said consoles although most were not officially released. None the less the success of that market in Russia saw a major boom in Doujinshi dealing with pornographic and violent subject matter to the point that while not entering the mainstream one was more likely to find it as its own niche.

Finally Japan would become enamored with R-Pop as while it was controversial it would still find a surprisingly large audience with many an R-Idol moving to Japan full time. This caused the rise of Japan's own R-Idol scene and would greatly held the J-Pop and Idols rise as many saw them as the more moral form of entertainment which saw an increase in demand for those who did not wish to partake in the new thing. Either way both R-Pop and J-Pop would have a good relationship with each other as J-Pop fans were also R-Pop fans and vice versa.

The Cosplay and anime and manga scene also rose as the inclusion of the Russian scene let to massive user participation with many conventions in Japan seeing record breaking participation. More importantly Russia would for the most part be the foundation of how monetization of cosplay and online works would occur as the Digital Silk Road extended to Japan greatly expanding the reach of independent creators and leading to further freedom in terms of how they worked and what they made.


Religion in the Russian Far East and Japan

As a whole the Japanese population of the Russian Far East was far more religious than their island counterparts as being in an unfamiliar land made them look for connections to their home which lead to a greater appreciation for what they saw as the Japanese religion which saw a greater willingness to interact with Shintoism as Shinto shrines and temples pop-up all over the Russian Far East although mostly where the Japanese were living in. However Shintoism would not just stay in the Russian Far East as it would travel across the Yellow Dragon community providing much needed spiritual support that at this point was not being provided by the Orthodox Church due to early discrimination against the Chinese migrants. This lead to Russia to become the worlds second largest Shinto community although they would still be a small percentage of the overall religious community in Russia.

In Japan itself the nation saw the rise of the Orthodox Church although only by a small margin as to the disappointment of the Orthodox Church most Ukrainian wives were more willing to convert to Shintoism/Buddhism to better fit into the greater community. There was further growth of other communities with the Catholic Church making some inroads with the Brazilian/Peruvian Japanese migrants and converts from the Japanese. However the biggest religion to grow was Shintoism in the sense that the western concept of religion would begin to proliferate as a larger percentage of the Japanese population counted themselves as Shintoist in surveys with over 20% counting themselves as such up from the 3% that was mostly shown before.


Relationship between Russia and Japan

The relationship between Russia and Japan has for the most part been cordial and business oriented as the Russian governments overall push for Eurasianism and choosing China as a partner has stopped any major attempts to further deepening the relationship.

However while this was the official government line things were more complicated. For starters the majority of the Russian and Japanese population had an overall good opinion of each other and their nations as many Japanese/Russians were enamored with Japanese/Russian pop-culture/culture and have increasingly consumed such cultural outputs. This would only increase as time went on although it was tempered by Russia's growing relationship with China although even that was tempered by the CCPs own incompetence and increasing tension over the Russian-Chinese community and growing economic rivalry between Russia and China.

The attempt by Russia to push for a quota to make the provinces of Russia majority Russian, would see the Japanese/Chinese community not targeted as the sheer disruption both in terms of economics and politics was seen as to great to implement. Such actions lead to both the rise of the far-right and anti-immigration movements in Russia but also the divide between the East Asian community and the Middle Eastern immigration communities in Russia as most people coming from the middle east grew to resent the East Asians over what they saw as preferential treatment. This ironically lead to an increasing number of far-right figures to support Japan and their migrants as many saw them as preferential to the middle Eastern "horde" that they increasingly saw as a danger to Russia.
 
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In general while official relations have remain cordial there is an increasing divide between the official government stance and greater population as more people become acquainted with the Japanese and as the Japanese-Russians grow this divisions will only grow stronger. However not all is set in stone as while Russia sees China as the major power to court Russia does not wish to become a Chinese puppet state or a junior partner and so Russia seeks to balance both Japan and China in their attempt to become the dominant force in Eurasia.

The way i see it opinion change will probably happen in population in China's favor as China itself develops and competition with the West becomes more profound.

So i generally believe that population will more, or less come to prefer China as geopolitical partner and friend opposed to Japan. Don't mistake me for China overtaking Japan culturally anytime soon, but it will be situation similar to many countries in the West where Japanese culture is present but they generally have other countries that are their favorite.

Regarding immigration? Don't know how to feel about changing the quotas as even with rise of right/left anty immigration alliance it's weary unlikely that our policy will change for some regions. Central Asia is getting preferential treatment no matter what as they are members of EEU/CIS/CSTO, but i could see Far East being preferred for cosmetic sake over middle east just to appease opposition, so nice part about tensions between these immigration communities.

Still milion plus Japanese migrating to Russian far East? Not to mention S.Korea and China as well will also have emigration (in Chinese case this number is set to be bigger simply due them having lower living standards and greater population).

Sorry but that's a little to much for Far East to receive, not only from demographic standpoint, but also from infrastructural and economic standpoint as well. Not to mention Russia and more importantly it's far east isn't as developed enough for Japanese to emigrate en mass.

So i would take that number and divide it across Russia maybe 1/3 settling in far east while rest go to European Russia/Moscow as that was also trend for the Chinese. Not to mention i don't see Russia ending its quotas just to accomodate Japan and China in that way.

Maybe quotas will be a little in East Asia's favor on overall level but regionally Russian authorities, especially regional authorities won't allow such en mass emigration to a region.
 
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Otherwise to further specify on governments decisions and preference of China over Japan. We genuinely tried to foster good relations with both in the 90s and only time we put our foot down with Japan and major obstacle for continuation of positive relations is Kuril Islands dispute and that is generally supported by wast majority of our population (over 80 % i believe).

Then there's diplomatic preference of China over Japan. Once again this aversion comes from Japanese side and their preference of USA, plus Kuril dispute while relations with China in the 90s mostly took coordinal course and most of Cold War anonymity was mended.

Regarding future rise of China? It already overtook us economically and Russia doesn't really have a great stake in the losing its position in global leadership as most of developed countries and like China it only stands to gain from change in the world, if anything otl camaraderie will probably still be there, if anything due to both countries being on more equal term and having more similar approach (reform of global leadership) we may see camaraderie between Russia and China being stronger. Then there's a question how this rise will take form? China will rise anyway but that shouldn't be problem for Russia if this rise is mutually beneficial and Russian interests are respected, something Chinese government is more than likely to do so i generally don't see major fear of Chinese rise being present in Russia opposed to otl opinion where it's viewed mostly positive.

As for China not being democracy? Central Asia isn't really as democratic yet they are part of our sphere of Influence and most of Russian political, philosophical and cultural establishment will continue to see them as culturally similar to Russia, especially since economic progress will more, or less diminish dissidents. Not to mention entire concept of Democracy with Russian characteristics revolves around not imposing democracy on other countries and on the right of other countries to choose its model of governance, one model not being inherently superior to other. Also Western actions in upcoming decade will more, or less discredit push to impose a democracy, nor will Russia accept that democracies need to stick together against non democracies.

Based on this i generally don't believe that there's public and political discourse between China and Japan in Russia as there is no reason to choose between the two. Most of the discourse between Russia and Japan don't come from Russian governments decisions opposed to Japanese decisions abd insistence on solving Kuril Islands dispute in its favor, plus strong alignment with USA and if everyone look at decisions of Russian government everyone should notice that government puts strong emphasis on sozial cohesion and any diplomatic engagement with Japan always had strong sozial support, in N.Korean crisis we even took Japanese concerns into account and included USA in the process.

Regarding immigration? Local anty immigration politicians will be opposed to Japanese migration to far east, especially Kuril Islands due to ongoing dispute, if anything S.Korea and China are expected to get preferential treatment.

To sum it up. Yes Japan is culturally dominant but if you ask who the Russians prefer as an ally on the streets most will still answer China and this is reflection of work done well by the Russian government.Russia opposed to Imperial Russia and Soviet Union in the 80s will have equal living standards and strong cultural backbone not to be influenced by the forgein culture to make its decisions like USSR elites at the peak of popularity of Western culture in USSR and most of younger generations in Russia will be educated, pleased with their living standards and have significant cultural pole to rally around to be influenced by Japanese culture (or any other culture) to feel that they need to choose between one, or the other country based on culture alone opposed to state and national interests. If this is wrong then we did something wrong along the way.

If anything i see similar trend even in ITTL 2000s as older generations will stand with governments decisions simply because they had gone through it all with the West and the fact that Japanese culture probably isn't as popular with older generations , as for younger generations? As i said they'll be friendly towards Japan and it's culture will be quite popular, but due to having Russian culture as a strong rallying center and rising living standards, not to mention decent education most will still be able to differentiate between Japanese culture and Japanese geopolitics.

We also need to take into account Japanese WW2 past, many will side with China and S.Korea over Japan here, especially since Japan also wasn't the best with the treatment of Russian community in China (Harbin) in WW2. Soviet Union didn't particularly care about those but government of Russian federation that seeks to reconnect with White Russian community aboard will definitely commemorate these victims.
 
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I think Russia, like most of OTL's world in fact, should be very wary of China. Now ITL the Union state will in fact surpass China if our overlord keeps us at 112% of OTL China's growth (duh). Which is not as unreasonable as it sounds, given the highly educated population and the abundance of natural resources. You just need a good wank at the steering wheel in terms of investments as we done here, by investing in High Tech, IT, Energy and Renewables. Our population is about 13% of the Chinese population. If Chinese income stays about OTL and we manage to raise our population's income to say NL or German level, with our natural resources we'd be richer then them.

Small side thought: If we work with the Afghan Northern Alliance and the US/Allies we might even get (some) access to the resources in Afghanistan.
 
I think Russia, like most of OTL's world in fact, should be very wary of China. Now ITL the Union state will in fact surpass China if our overlord keeps us at 112% of OTL China's growth (duh). Which is not as unreasonable as it sounds, given the highly educated population and the abundance of natural resources. You just need a good wank at the steering wheel in terms of investments as we done here, by investing in High Tech, IT, Energy and Renewables. Our population is about 13% of the Chinese population. If Chinese income stays about OTL and we manage to raise our population's income to say NL or German level, with our natural resources we'd be richer then them.

Technically i would say that most of otl world outside West is more, or less opportunistic when it comes to rise of China which ITTL Russia should be as well. Remember most countries dubbed as global South prefer to have alternative to Western dominated world, even countries like India with its rivalry with China aren't 100% on board with the West. So saying that most of the world is wary is overstatement in my opinion.

Generally every part of the world has its own view and opinion when it comes to rise of China, or Western led order in general and everyone will deal with it separately based on their views, either playing two against each other's, chosing one or other side, or productively engaging with both as for some Chinese money isn't any worse than Western money if it will help to develop their countries.

This is also the pointed out in my post in regards to Japan, if China respects Russian interests and our common rise is mutually beneficial we have no ground to oppose them and even here we are balancing them by bringing India in common organizations and are cooperating with the West on some platforms.

Generally with rise of multipolar world its unlikely that China will dominate Euroasia, opposed to become first among the equals and their goal is mostly focused on economic and technological preeminence. For us? We should generally base our policy towards prosperity of our state and protection of our core interests opposed to engaging ourselves into geopolitical games where we have least to gain from.

In regards to us overtaking China? That would be a little wanky, yes we can overtake Japan but rising to overtake Japan and pose significant rival to USA as a second strongest power seems unrealistic to me. China simply has a lot more going for it. We can still be a Superpower down the line though and i agree that we will be important market, still China with its rise and sheer numbers alone will be able to overshadow us.

Small side thought: If we work with the Afghan Northern Alliance and the US/Allies we might even get (some) access to the resources in Afghanistan.

It's weary unlikely that we will be able to change American approach towards Afghanistan in any meaningful way given our choice not to get militarily involved and it's weary unlikely that USA will want us there.

Also we have a limited amount of Capital to work with and that's better spent on other more stable parts of the world and our own natural resources opposed to paying for USA backed Afghan government on uncertain terms.

Our goal was to distract USA and get them to throw billions in Afghanistan, not for us to throw billions in there without ceartin return.

What we can do is to engage more productively on G8 forum together with Germany, Japan, France and Italy and to try to get to cooperate more with us creating Global North initiative.
 
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I think Russia, like most of OTL's world in fact, should be very wary of China. Now ITL the Union state will in fact surpass China if our overlord keeps us at 112% of OTL China's growth (duh). Which is not as unreasonable as it sounds, given the highly educated population and the abundance of natural resources. You just need a good wank at the steering wheel in terms of investments as we done here, by investing in High Tech, IT, Energy and Renewables. Our population is about 13% of the Chinese population. If Chinese income stays about OTL and we manage to raise our population's income to say NL or German level, with our natural resources we'd be richer then them.
In regards to us overtaking China? That would be a little wanky, yes we can overtake Japan but rising to overtake Japan and pose significant rival to USA as a second strongest power seems unrealistic to me. China simply has a lot more going for it. We can still be a Superpower down the line though and i agree that we will be important market, still China with its rise and sheer numbers alone will be able to overshadow us.
China together with USA and Russia will grow even quicker than OTL, which down the line means that the World would be dominated by three superpowers with the rest of the world trying to adjust to the triangle Washington-Moscow- Beijing
 
Generally with rise of multipolar world its unlikely that China will dominate Euroasia, opposed to become first among the equals and their goal is mostly focused on economic and technological preeminence. For us? We should generally base our policy towards prosperity of our state and protection of our core interests opposed to engaging ourselves into geopolitical games where we have least to gain from.
It is unlikely but not impossible. Given TTL's China economic,industrial and military potential I would say that they can give it a shot.
 
It is unlikely but not impossible. Given TTL's China economic,industrial and military potential I would say that they can give it a shot.

They could but them chosing that course is unlikely, especially if we look at otl China which basically has even greater advantage due to there being no legitimate Euroasian power there to oppose them (otl Russia and India don't have the potential). Yet they generally chose to lay low and are trying to engage with those countries.

This is why i believe that China simply won't chose similar path ITTL with stronger Russia being present and it fits into historical concept of Chinese civilization. I believe what they seek is domestic prosperity paired with prestige abroad, plus economic and political dominance which will come with rise of South/Southeast/East Asia given that great deal of world population lives there and two most populous countries in the world are located in the region.
 
Sorry but that's a little to much for Far East to receive, not only from demographic standpoint, but also from infrastructural and economic standpoint as well. Not to mention Russia and more importantly it's far east isn't as developed enough for Japanese to emigrate en mass.

So i would take that number and divide it across Russia maybe 1/3 settling in far east while rest go to European Russia/Moscow as that was also trend for the Chinese. Not to mention i don't see Russia ending its quotas just to accomodate Japan and China in that way.

Maybe quotas will be a little in East Asia's favor on overall level but regionally Russian authorities, especially regional authorities won't allow such en mass emigration to a region.
Honestly I never supported the quota system since its seems both hard to implement and a human rights violation. Will probably change the number of Japanese migrants or make a mention of more going to European Russia. Also all of the major migration would have happened pre-quota system anyways and in general I do not see Russian authorities of the 90s caring to much at that point considering we were still dealing with the major fallout of the fall of the Soviet Union. I would say the implementation of the quota migration system has more to do with us actually having the resources to implement now compared to before.
As for China not being democracy? Central Asia isn't really as democratic yet they are part of our sphere of Influence and most of Russian political, philosophical and cultural establishment will continue to see them as culturally similar to Russia, especially since economic progress will more, or less diminish dissidents. Not to mention entire concept of Democracy with Russian characteristics revolves around not imposing democracy on other countries and on the right of other countries to choose its model of governance, one model not being inherently superior to other. Also Western actions in upcoming decade will more, or less discredit push to impose a democracy, nor will Russia accept that democracies need to stick together against non democracies.
Central Asia as whole is also completely dominated by us and will follow our tune no matter what.
To sum it up. Yes Japan is culturally dominant but if you ask who the Russians prefer as an ally on the streets most will still answer China and this is reflection of work done well by the Russian government.Russia opposed to Imperial Russia and Soviet Union in the 80s will have equal living standards and strong cultural backbone not to be influenced by the forgein culture to make its decisions like USSR elites at the peak of popularity of Western culture in USSR and most of younger generations in Russia will be educated, pleased with their living standards and have significant cultural pole to rally around to be influenced by Japanese culture (or any other culture) to feel that they need to choose between one, or the other country based on culture alone opposed to state and national interests. If this is wrong then we did something wrong along the way.
Okay I can agree that Russia will take such a position. However I do think that Russia will at least see a rise of anti-CCP sentiment as China deals with its own problems like its demographic crisis, its treatment of minorities, and potential economic stagnation in the future.

I do believe that Russia and China will remain distant at least in terms of culture. The CCP has the problem of having a hard time of distributing its culture OTL and I do not see this changing in this TL either. Also its not like we cannot have a good relationship and have no real ties to each other since the US has good relationships with nations that have no real cultural or any major influence in the US.
 
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Central Asia as whole is also completely dominated by us and will follow our tune no matter what.

That doesn't change the fact that they aren't democracies and most of the people don't really have a problem with it, also i wouldn't put that "no matter what" to the test. While our influence is stronger than otl rise of countries like Iran and China will give central Asia other options.

However I do think that Russia will at least see a rise of anti-CCP sentiment as China deals with its own problems like its demographic crisis, its treatment of minorities, and potential economic stagnation in the future.

By the time those problems come to China its quite likely that they are already present across the West, Japan, S.Korea and even Russia. Regarding economic stagnation? Chinese economy, just like Russian is bound to slow down but it would still grow faster than Western and Japanese economy in that case, if anything it's quite likely that Japan and Europe (Germany) will enter stagnation first with rest of the developed world having slow growth and let's not even speak potential consequences of USA not being able to print Dollars like crazy (but these are just speculations). In our case? We know we won't be able to have a fast growth forever just like China.

In case of demographics? That's once again coming for most of developed world, including Japan. QM generally said that east Asia will implement our measures for it in 2010s and if it works for us it will probably work for them. In China's case it will get worse before it gets better but i expect them to weather it through as by that time they should have enough capital to address the problem.

Regarding minorities in China? Well if we ignore the cases that West likes to speak about (that China denies) minorities in China have quite a decent treatment, ever preferential treatment over Han Chinese under Regional Ethnic Autonomy System. Basically i don't think we will have a problem with China's treatment of its minorities if we have decent and non biased media coverage.

I do believe that Russia and China will remain distant at least in terms of culture. The CCP has the problem of having a hard time of distributing its culture OTL and I do not see this changing in this TL either

Now in regards to China's cultural influence? Chinese movies aren't that bad and they have decent animation with superb gaming industry. I expect that they'll do just fine with spread of Chinese cultural influence from 2010 on. In regards to it being similar to S.Korea and Japan? These countries were quite close culturally for quite some time so it's reasonable for similarities to be there, it's similar to Russia being a part of European culture.

Generally i expect them to have similar global appeal to Russia given that both are relative newcomers to the cultural scene, they will outperform us in some aspects and we will be better in some other aspects.

In my opinion China is doing quite fine with the spread of its cultural influence, especially in terms of gaming industry.

Also its not like we cannot have a good relationship and have no real ties to each other since the US has good relationships with nations that have no real cultural or any major influence in the US.

While people will love anime and Japanese games for example i don't think that other elements of Japanese culture will truly make its way into mainstream Russian culture given that Russian culture itself will frown on some practices.

Same can be said for China, they will probably export their gaming industry quite successfully, same with their cars, electronics etc, but i don't think we will truly embrace it. At the end of the day Russia will always have more in common with Europe than with either Japan, or with China.

But to be honest generally it's better for everyone if they learn from Japan in terms of cultural influence, better to copy things that work opposed to trying to cling to the past, thus we need to invest in Russian animation/anime to actually bring Russian culture to the rest of the world, with practice we will form our own distinct style.

Gaming industry and Animation are the holy grail of cultural influence.
 
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While people will love anime and Japanese games for example i don't think that other elements of Japanese culture will truly make its way into mainstream Russian culture given that Russian culture itself will frown on some practices.

Same can be said for China, they will probably export their gaming industry quite successfully, same with their cars, electronics etc, but i don't think we will truly embrace it. At the end of the day Russia will always have more in common with Europe than with either Japan, or with China.
Considering how currently some of the biggest games in China are anime based and have international reach I will say that while the state has not embraced them a large portion of the population has. As for other elements of Japanese culture not making into Russia I can agree.
Now in regards to China's cultural influence? Chinese movies aren't that bad and they have decent animation with superb gaming industry. I expect that they'll do just fine with spread of Chinese cultural influence from 2010 on. In regards to it being similar to S.Korea and Japan? These countries were quite close culturally for quite some time so it's reasonable for similarities to be there, it's similar to Russia being a part of European culture.

Generally i expect them to have similar global appeal to Russia given that both are relative newcomers to the cultural scene, they will outperform us in some aspects and we will be better in some other aspects.

In my opinion China is doing quite fine with the spread of its cultural influence, especially in terms of gaming industry.
I will say that it goes further than just being similar and more that the Chinese are trying to emulate the Japanese anime and manga culture. Even then this has been meet with some hostility by the CCP which is while I do believe China will become a cultural power it would be hindered by the CCP as it is in OTL. I mean it took until the late 2010s to compete with the west in terms of gaming and such and by that point Russia would have become a major competitor of their own.

As for global appeal its seems like Russia will beat out China in that regard since it has the advantage of having a similar culture to Europe and can more easily sell its cultural products to Europeans. China in general has always had difficulty in spreading its cultural output out into the world either due to a lack of major push within the nation or due to major American competition on that front. We will probably see some change as smart phones develop and China begins to dominate simply due to its population.
 
Something that should be taken into consideration too, is the Great Firewall. China’s attempt to regulate the internet means it is insulated from global cultural trends. And while this is considered a good thing for the CCP, it does hamper the ability for Chinese culture to gain traction on a global scale.
 
Chapter Twenty Two: Bombings in Madrid and capture of Saddam Hussein (May 2003 – March 2004)
T90-0010.jpg

(Russian troops in a Georgian city during the CSTO intervention)

In the wake of the Rose Revolution and President Shevardnadze's escape, the political landscape around Georgia underwent a seismic shift, prompting a decisive response from the Russian government. Faced with the withdrawal of the new pro-American government from Russian-led factions, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), President Shevardnadze urgently appealed to Russia and the CSTO for a swift military intervention to restore the former government. Recognizing the need for a strategic and nuanced approach, the Russian government formulated a multifaceted plan to address the crisis. The first component involved a rapid deployment of CSTO forces to Georgia with the primary objective of reinstating President Shevardnadze. This military intervention aimed to counteract the growing influence of the pro-American government and preserve the historical ties between Georgia and the CSTO. Simultaneously, a diplomatic initiative unfolded to federalize Georgia, accommodating separatist movements within the country. This plan sought to pave the way for a new, pro-Russian president in Georgia, capitalizing on the successful negotiation of the separatist regions' return as part of the leader's legitimacy-building narrative. To further solidify Russian influence, pro-Russian actors were strategically entrenched within Georgia. However, amid there was a divergence of opinions regarding President Shevardnadze's role. While some politicians in Moscow argued against supporting him, citing concerns about his potential puppet status, others suggested a subtle approach. After the restoration of a pro-Union State government to Tbilisi, the plan included efforts to subtly facilitate President Shevardnadze's replacement during the next electoral cycle.

In a swift and decisive military intervention, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) successfully restored order in Georgia within a mere two days. The CSTO forces, led by Russia, effectively countered the influence of the pro-American government, reinstating President Shevardnadze and stabilizing the political landscape. The rapid resolution showcased the efficiency and coordinated efforts of the CSTO, reinforcing its role as a regional security organization. Amid the restoration of order, pro-American politicians, realizing the shift in the political tide, hastily escaped to Turkey. In an audacious move, they established a government in exile, attempting to maintain a semblance of authority from abroad. The establishment of a government in exile marked a symbolic resistance to the CSTO intervention, setting the stage for geopolitical tensions between the newly stabilized Georgia and those who sought refuge in Turkey. As part of the post-intervention strategy, Russia, recognizing the strategic importance of maintaining stability in the region, decided to station troops in Georgia. This move was intended to ensure a continued influence in the country's affairs and prevent any resurgence of pro-American sentiments. The presence of Russian troops served as both a symbolic gesture of protection for President Shevardnadze's government and a practical measure to safeguard Russian interests in the strategically vital Caucasus region. The stationing of Russian troops in Georgia signified a significant shift in the geopolitical dynamics, solidifying Russia's influence in the country. It also acted as a deterrent against any potential attempts to challenge the newly restored order. The move, while ensuring stability, also sparked international reactions and raised questions about the long-term implications of Russian military presence in a sovereign nation.

In the aftermath of the swift CSTO intervention in Georgia, geopolitical tensions escalated as the United States, along with several European NATO members, accused Russia of imperialism. The intervention drew condemnation from Western powers, with accusations of violating Georgia's sovereignty and promoting an expansionist agenda. The United States, taking a decisive stance against what it perceived as Russian aggression, responded by deploying troops to reinforce the eastern and southern borders of NATO. Poland, the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Romania, Moldova, Croatia, Turkey, and Greece became focal points for bolstering NATO's presence. The move aimed to deter any further Russian influence in the region and safeguard the security of NATO member states. The deployment of American troops to these strategically significant locations reflected a heightened state of alert within NATO. The alliance sought to counterbalance perceived Russian aggression and maintain a strong defensive posture along its eastern and southern flanks. The accusations of imperialism and the subsequent military deployments deepened the rift between Russia and the West, transforming the Georgia crisis into a catalyst for broader geopolitical realignments. The contested influence over Georgia, coupled with the strategic positioning of NATO forces, set the stage for an extended period of heightened tensions and strategic maneuvering between the two geopolitical blocs. As the international community grappled with the implications of these developments, the Georgia crisis became a focal point in the larger narrative of Russo-Western relations. The deployment of troops by both Russia and NATO underscored the strategic significance of the Caucasus region and its potential to shape the geopolitical landscape in the years to come.

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(Russian military base in Western Syria)

In the aftermath of the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia found itself at a geopolitical crossroads in the Middle East. As the old order crumbled, a nuanced strategy was imperative for navigating the complex landscape. Russia recognized the significance of bolstering ties with its traditional allies in the Middle East, initiating a round of contacts with nations like Libya and Syria. This encompassed collaboration agreements between secret services, attractive offers for weapons, and invitations as observers to war exercises, strengthening existing partnerships, and establishing Russia as a key player in stabilizing regimes in the region. Acknowledging the need for a front-man for Russian interests in the Middle East, the strategy included forging closer ties with Egypt, Iran, and cautiously, Syria. The emphasis was on preventing these nations from experiencing a fate similar to Iraq. By supplying weapons, sharing intelligence, and maintaining a diplomatic approach, Russia aimed to secure stable regimes aligned with its geopolitical objectives. Continuing the historically close relationship with Iran was integral to Russia's strategy. The focus was on normalizing Iran's relations with the rest of the region, contributing to stability, and enhancing Russia's influence in the Middle East. Recognizing the need for diplomatic channels, the strategy involved approaching the West with an offer for collaboration in the fight against terrorism. This diplomatic overture aimed to position Russia as a responsible and cooperative actor in the region, potentially easing tensions and fostering collaboration on shared concerns. Practical considerations were also at the forefront of Russia's strategy. Ensuring the safety of cargo ships and oil tankers in the region aimed to maintain smooth commercial traffic, safeguarding economic interests, and establishing Russia as a reliable partner in ensuring stability in maritime activities. Preparedness for rapid deployment services in the event of hostage situations demonstrated a commitment to the safety of citizens and allies. This strategy aligned with humanitarian principles and reinforced Russia's role as a responsible actor ready to intervene in crisis situations. Deploying official aid to refugees and internally displaced persons, adorned with the Union's flag and symbols, was a strategic move to win hearts and minds. By alleviating the suffering of those affected by conflicts, Russia aimed to build goodwill and potentially sway local populations toward a favorable view of the Union.

The Znamenskoye Grozny suicide bombing, a tragic incident that unfolded on May 12, 2003, in Znamenskoye, Chechnya, left an indelible mark of devastation. Three jihadist suicide bombers, including two women, orchestrated a heinous act by driving a truck laden with explosives into a local government administration and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) directorate complex. This brutal attack resulted in the loss of at least 59 lives and left around 200 people injured, with the majority being civilians. The targeted complex held significant importance as it housed the republican headquarters of the FSB, making it a focal point for the security apparatus in the region. The attackers strategically aimed to undermine the stability of the Russian North Caucasus by striking at the heart of the security infrastructure. The orchestrators of this appalling act of violence were guided by a malevolent force, as subsequent investigations revealed that the suicide bombing was organized on the orders of none other than Osama bin Laden. The notorious leader of the extremist group Al-Qaeda aimed to exploit existing tensions and grievances in the North Caucasus region to further his agenda of destabilizing Russia.

The 2003 European heat wave unfolded as a defining chapter in the continent's climatic history, leaving an indelible mark on the collective memory. During this scorching summer, Europe faced a meteorological anomaly that surpassed anything recorded in the preceding centuries. The unique combination of factors contributing to the intensity of the heat wave began with the seasonal lag in western Europe. Unlike other regions where July and August traditionally mark the zenith of summer temperatures, the maritime influence of the Atlantic Ocean delayed the onset of extreme heat in this part of the continent. When the scorching temperatures finally arrived, they collided with hot continental air masses and powerful southerly winds, generating a relentless and prolonged period of extreme heat. France found itself at the epicenter of this climatic maelstrom, grappling with unprecedented challenges. The health implications were immediate and severe, especially for vulnerable populations. The elderly and individuals with pre-existing health conditions faced a heightened risk of heat-related illnesses, straining healthcare systems as hospitals worked tirelessly to address the surge in medical emergencies. The unexpected toll on public health infrastructure underscored the need for adaptive strategies to protect communities during extreme weather events. Simultaneously, the heat wave coincided with drought conditions in Southern Europe, amplifying the impact on agriculture.

The scarcity of water, combined with soaring temperatures, led to a significant crop shortfall. Fields languished under the relentless sun, crops withered, and food production suffered. The economic ramifications of this agricultural crisis reverberated through affected regions, highlighting the interconnectedness of climate, agriculture, and economic stability. Beyond the immediate challenges, the human cost of the 2003 European heat wave was staggering. The estimated death toll, surpassing 70,000, painted a somber picture of the consequences of unanticipated climatic extremes. Families mourned lost loved ones, and communities grappled with the profound impacts on their social fabric. The 2003 heat wave emerged as a pivotal moment that thrust climate change into the forefront of public consciousness. It served as a stark reminder of the escalating risks associated with a changing climate and the urgent need for comprehensive strategies to address these challenges. The lessons learned from the heat wave prompted a reevaluation of societal preparedness, emphasizing the importance of adaptive measures, improved public health responses, and forward-looking climate policies.

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(Diplomatic representatives of six states after a round of negotiations in Beijing in 2003)

The six-party talks aimed to find a peaceful resolution to the security concerns as a result of the North Korean nuclear weapons program. There was a series of meetings with six participating states in Beijing:

China;
Japan;
North Korea;
South Korea;
Russia;
United States.

These talks were a result of North Korea withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003. Apparent gains following the fourth and fifth rounds were reversed by outside events. Five rounds of talks from 2003 to 2007 produced little net progress until the third phase of the fifth round of talks, when North Korea agreed to shut down its nuclear facilities in exchange for fuel aid and steps towards the normalization of relations with the United States and Japan. Responding angrily to the United Nations Security Council's Presidential Statement issued on April 13, 2009 that condemned the North Korean failed satellite launch, the DPRK declared on April 14, 2009 that it would pull out of Six Party Talks and that it would resume its nuclear enrichment program in order to boost its nuclear deterrent. North Korea also expelled all nuclear inspectors from the country. The main points of contention were:

Security guarantee – this issue has been raised by North Korea since the Bush administration (2001–2009) took office. North Korea labeled the Bush administration as hostile and accused it of planning to overthrow the North Korean government by force. This concern was elevated when President George W. Bush named North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" in his 2002 State of the Union Address.

The construction of light water reactors – under the 1994 Agreed Framework two light-water reactors would be built in return for the closure of North Korea's graphite-moderated nuclear power plant program at Yongbyon. This agreement broke down after both sides defaulted, especially since 2002.

Peaceful use of nuclear energy – whilst the NPT allows states the right to use nuclear energy for civilian purposes, this was thought to have been used by North Korea as a cover for their nuclear weapons program.

Diplomatic relations – North Korea wanted normalization of diplomatic relations as part of the bargain for giving up its nuclear weapons program. The U.S. has at times disagreed and at times agreed to this condition, providing North Korea irreversibly and verifiably disarms its nuclear weapons program.

Financial restrictions / Trade normalization – The U.S. placed heavy financial sanctions on North Korea for what they see as an uncooperative attitude and unwillingness to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. In addition, other parties such as China took actions such as the freezing of North Korean assets in foreign bank accounts, such as the US$24 million in Macau's Banco Delta Asia. With the nuclear test on October 9, 2006, UNSCR 1718 was passed, which included a ban on all luxury goods to North Korea. These funds were unfrozen by the US on March 19, 2007 to reciprocate actions by their North Korean counterparts. The United States removed North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism in October 2008.

Verifiable and Irreversible disarmament – Members of the six-party talks disagreed on this. Japan and the U.S. demanded that North Korea completely dismantle its nuclear program so that it may never be restarted, and that it can be verified by the six members of the talks before aid is given. South Korea, China and Russia agreed on a milder, step-by-step solution which involves the members of the six-party talks giving a certain reward (e.g. aid) in return for each step of nuclear disarmament. North Korea wanted the U.S. to concede some of the conditions first before it will take any action in disarming their weapons program, which they see as the only guarantee to prevent a U.S. attack on their soil.

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(Aftermath of terrorist attack in Russia orchestrated by Osama bin Laden)

The 2003 Stavropol train bombing stands as a grim chapter in the history of terrorist attacks in Russia. This tragic incident unfolded on December 5, 2003, in Yessentuki, Stavropol Krai, as a regional electric train made its routine commute from Kislovodsk to Mineralnye Vody. A suicide bomber, affiliated with Al-Qaeda, unleashed havoc by detonating explosives equivalent to an estimated 7 kilograms (15 pounds) of TNT as the train departed from the station in Yessentuki. The repercussions of this terrorist act were devastating, with at least 46 lives lost and over 170 individuals left injured. The attack bore a chilling resemblance to preceding assaults on trains along the same line, signaling a pattern of orchestrated violence orchestrated by Al-Qaeda in the region. The connection to Al-Qaeda became particularly pronounced as responsibility for the attack was swiftly attributed to the notorious terrorist organization. This attribution was grounded not only in the immediate aftermath of the Stavropol bombing but also in the context of previous assaults on trains along the same route. The terrorists had struck before, with a notable incident occurring on September 3, 2003. During that attack, 7 people lost their lives, and over 80 were injured, foreshadowing the tragic events that would unfold later in the year. The repetitive nature of these attacks underscored the deliberate and ruthless tactics employed by Al-Qaeda in the region. The targeting of commuter trains, vital arteries of transportation, reflected a calculated strategy to instill fear, disrupt daily life, and claim innocent lives.

Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, harbored a broader agenda that extended beyond targeting the United States. One facet of his strategy involved utilizing suicide attacks to destabilize regions beyond the Middle East, with a particular focus on the Russian Caucasus and Central Asia. Bin Laden sought to exploit existing fault lines, exacerbate ethnic and religious tensions, and spread fear to achieve his overarching goal of establishing a global Islamic Caliphate. In the context of the Russian Caucasus, bin Laden aimed to capitalize on longstanding conflicts, such as the Chechen struggle for independence. By instigating suicide attacks in the region, he sought to further polarize communities, weaken local governments, and create an environment conducive to radicalization. The deployment of suicide bombers was a deliberate tactic to maximize the psychological impact, instilling fear and sowing discord among different ethnic and religious groups.

Central Asia, with its diverse ethnic and religious landscape, presented another strategic target for bin Laden. He envisioned using suicide attacks to exploit existing tensions and foster an atmosphere of instability. By spreading fear through acts of terror, he aimed to weaken the social fabric, undermine the authority of local governments, and create conditions favorable to the establishment of radical Islamic ideologies. The use of suicide attacks was a calculated choice, as it allowed bin Laden to achieve multiple objectives simultaneously. Beyond causing immediate casualties and physical destruction, these attacks were designed to instill terror, create divisions within societies, and serve as a recruitment tool for extremist groups sympathetic to bin Laden's global jihadist agenda. Bin Laden's strategy in both the Russian Caucasus and Central Asia was rooted in a broader vision of challenging existing geopolitical structures, weakening nation-states, and fostering environments susceptible to the establishment of Islamist rule. By leveraging suicide attacks, he sought to spread fear as a potent weapon, aiming to create a ripple effect that would destabilize these regions and contribute to the realization of his radical vision for the Muslim world.

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(A moment when Saddam Hussein was captured by the American troops)

Saddam Hussein, the deposed president of Iraq, was captured by the United States military in the town of Ad-Dawr, Iraq on 13 December 2003. Codenamed Operation Red Dawn, this military operation was named after the 1984 American film Red Dawn. The mission was executed by joint operations Task Force 121—an elite and covert joint special operations team, supported by the 1st Brigade Combat Team (led by Colonel James Hickey) of the 4th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Raymond Odierno. They searched two sites, "Wolverine 1" and "Wolverine 2", outside the town of ad-Dawr, but did not find Saddam. A continued search between the two sites found Saddam hiding in a "spider hole" at 20:30 hrs local Iraqi time. Saddam did not resist capture. Operation Red Dawn was launched after gaining actionable intelligence identifying two likely locations of Saddam's whereabouts code-named Wolverine 1 and Wolverine 2, near the town of ad-Dawr. C squadron Delta Force, ISA operators under Task Force 121, and the First Brigade Combat Team of the 4th Infantry Division conducted the operation. The operation was named after the 1984 film of the same name starring Patrick Swayze. The site names "Wolverine 1" and "Wolverine 2" are also a reference to the American insurgent group in the movie Red Dawn. The forces involved in the operation consisted of approximately 600 soldiers including cavalry, artillery, aviation, engineer, and special operations forces.

The forces cleared the two objectives but initially did not find the target. Then, as the operators were finishing and the helicopters called in to extract them, one soldier kicked a piece of flooring to one side, exposing a spider hole; he prepared to throw a fragmentation grenade into it – in case it led to an insurgent tunnel system – when suddenly Saddam appeared. The Delta operator struck him with the stock of his M4 carbine and disarmed him of a Glock 18C. Saddam surrendered and offered no resistance; he was taken by a MH-6 Little Bird from the 160th SOAR to the Tikrit Mission Support Site where he was properly identified. He was then taken in an MH-60K Blackhawk helicopter by 160th SOAR from Tikrit to Baghdad and into custody at Baghdad International Airport. Along with the Glock, an AK-47 and $750,000 in U.S. bank notes were recovered from the spider hole. Two other individuals were also detained. Following the capture of Hussein, the 4th Infantry Division's area of operations in the upper Tigris saw its "first period of real calm." CJTF-7 also saw IED attacks reduce by 39 percent. The perceived security improvements led to CJTF-7 and the CPA to adopt an optimistic outlook as 2003 ended. CJTF-7 believed that the capture of Saddam and his money heralded the defeat of the former regime insurgency. Using documents and materials captured as a result of the operation, CJTF-7 units pursued "what they believed were the last vestiges of the former Ba'athist resistance.

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(The United States deployed a missile defence systerm in Eastern Europe to counter Russian military capabilities)

The deployment of a complex missile defense system in Eastern Europe, comprising interceptors and radar facilities strategically positioned in Poland, Czechia, Baltic States, Romania, and Moldova, was not a hasty decision but rather a meticulously calculated move by the United States. This strategic undertaking was conceived with the explicit aim of countering and neutralizing the evolving military capabilities of a resurgent Russia in the European theater. Recognizing the changing dynamics of geopolitical rivalries, the United States engaged in a nuanced assessment of the strategic landscape. The resurgent Russia, with its enhanced military capabilities and assertive posture, necessitated a proactive response to safeguard the security of NATO allies. The missile defense system, therefore, was designed as a precision-engineered countermeasure, strategically positioned to negate any potential missile threats emanating from Russia. The choice of locations for the missile defense infrastructure underscored the meticulous planning behind this strategic move. Poland, with its pivotal geographic location, served as a linchpin in the defensive architecture, providing a critical vantage point to intercept and neutralize potential missile threats. The deployment of advanced interceptors and radar facilities in Poland was a strategic chess move aimed at enhancing the overall defensive capabilities of the region. Czechia, as a central European ally, played a complementary role in this calculated strategy. The installation of radar facilities in Czechia was not merely symbolic but a practical measure to bolster surveillance and early warning capabilities. This careful selection of locations contributed to the overall synergy of the missile defense system.

The Baltic States, situated on NATO's eastern flank, were integral to the calculated approach. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, collectively forming a defensive network, were positioned strategically to address the diverse trajectories from which potential missile threats could emerge. The deployment in the Baltic region reflected a deliberate effort to fortify the alliance's defenses against a resurgent Russia. Romania, with its strategic location on the Black Sea, assumed significance in the calculated move to counter Russian military capabilities in Europe. The deployment in Romania was not only about addressing immediate threats but also about creating a flexible and adaptable defensive posture, considering the dynamic nature of geopolitical challenges. Moldova, as a NATO member, featured prominently in this well-thought-out strategy. Inclusion of Moldova in the missile defense system underscored the comprehensive nature of the calculated move, ensuring that all allies, regardless of size, were integrated into a cohesive defensive architecture. In essence, the deployment of the missile defense system was a result of careful strategic calculus, responding to the imperatives of the geopolitical landscape. It was a tangible manifestation of the United States' commitment to reinforcing regional security and strategically countering the evolving military capabilities of a resurgent Russia in Europe.

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(Destruction caused by terrorist attack in Madrid)

The 2004 Madrid train bombings (also known in Spain as 11M) were a series of coordinated, nearly simultaneous bombings against the Cercanías commuter train system of Madrid, Spain, on the morning of 11 March 2004—three days before Spain's general elections. The explosions killed 193 people and injured around 2,050. The bombings constituted the deadliest terrorist attack carried out in the history of Spain and the deadliest in Europe since 1988. The attacks were carried out by individuals who opposed Spanish involvement in the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Controversy regarding the handling and representation of the bombings by the government arose, with Spain's two main political parties—Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and Partido Popular (PP)—accusing each other of concealing or distorting evidence for electoral reasons. The bombings occurred three days before general elections in which incumbent José María Aznar's PP was defeated. Immediately after the bombing, leaders of the PP claimed evidence indicating the Basque separatist organization ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) was responsible for the bombings, while the opposition claimed that the PP was trying to prevent the public from knowing it had been an Islamist attack, which would be interpreted as the direct result of Spain's involvement in Iraq, an unpopular war which the government had entered without the approval of the Spanish Parliament. The scale and precise planning of the attacks reared memories of the September 11 attacks.

Following the attacks, there were nationwide demonstrations and protests demanding that the government "tell the truth." The prevailing opinion of political analysts is that the Aznar administration lost the general elections as a result of the handling and representation of the terrorist attacks, rather than because of the bombings per se. Results published in The Review of Economics and Statistics by economist José García Montalvo seem to suggest that indeed the bombings had important electoral impact (turning the electoral outcome against the incumbent People's Party and handing government over to the Socialist Party, PSOE). After 21 months of investigation, judge Juan del Olmo tried Moroccan national Jamal Zougam, among several others, for his participation carrying out the attack. Although claims were made that attacks were linked to al-Qaeda, investigations and probes conducted by Spanish officials did not find any links to al-Qaeda.Findings issued by Spanish judiciary in September 2007 found 21 individuals of participating in the attacks, while rejecting the involvement of an external mastermind or direct al-Qaeda links.

During the peak of Madrid rush hour on the morning of Thursday, 11 March 2004, ten explosions occurred aboard four commuter trains (cercanías). The date, 11 March, led to the abbreviation of the incident as "11-M". All the affected trains were traveling on the same line and in the same direction between Alcalá de Henares and the Atocha station in Madrid. It was later reported that thirteen improvised explosive devices (IEDs) had been placed on the trains. Bomb disposal teams (TEDAX) arriving at the scenes of the explosions detonated two of the remaining three IEDs in controlled explosions, but the third was not found until later in the evening, having been stored inadvertently with luggage taken from one of the trains. The following timeline of events comes from the judicial investigation. All four trains had departed the Alcalá de Henares station between 07:01 and 07:14 The explosions took place between 07:37 and 07:40, as described below (all times given are in local time CET, UTC +1):

Atocha Station (train number 21431) – Three bombs exploded. Based on the video recording from the station security system, the first bomb exploded at 07:37, and two others exploded within 4 seconds of each other at 07:38. The train cars affected were the sixth, fifth and fourth. A fourth device was found by the TEDAX team two hours later in the first car, which was scheduled to explode when emergency services arrived. Two hours after the first explosions, the bomb was detonated by the bomb disposal team in the first car in a controlled manner.

El Pozo del Tío Raimundo Station (train number 21435) – At approximately 07:38, just as the train (six cars and double-decker) was starting to leave the station, two bombs exploded in different carriages. The carriages affected were the fourth and fifth. Another bomb was found in the third wagon and was detonated hours later by the TEDAX team on the platform, slightly damaging the third wagon. Yet another bomb was found in the second carriage; it was disabled hours later in the nearby Parque Azorín, and allowed the police to find several suspects.

Santa Eugenia Station (train number 21713) – One bomb exploded at approximately 07:38. The only wagon affected was the fourth.Calle Téllez (train number 17305), approximately 800 meters from Atocha Station – Four bombs exploded in different carriages of the train at approximately 07:39. The wagons affected were the first, the fourth, the fifth and sixth. The train was slowing down to stop and wait for train 21431 to vacate platform 2 in Atocha.

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At 08:00, emergency relief workers began arriving at the scenes of the bombings. The police reported numerous victims and spoke of 50 wounded and several dead. By 08:30 the emergency ambulance service, SAMUR (Servicio de Asistencia Municipal de Urgencia y Rescate), had set up a field hospital at the Daoiz y Velarde sports facility. Bystanders and local residents helped relief workers, as hospitals were told to expect the arrival of many casualties. At 08:43, firefighters reported 15 dead at El Pozo. By 09:00, the police had confirmed the death of at least 30 people – 20 at El Pozo and about 10 in Santa Eugenia and Atocha. People combed the city's major hospitals in search of family members who they thought were aboard the trains. There were 193 confirmed dead victims, the last victim dying in 2014 after having been in a coma for 10 years due to one of the Atocha explosions and not having been able to recover from their injuries. A device composed of 12 kilograms of Goma-2 ECO with a detonator and 136 meters of wire (connected to nothing) was found on the track of a high-speed railway line (AVE) on 2 April. The Spanish judiciary chose not to investigate that incident and the perpetrators remain unknown. The device used in the AVE incident was unable to explode because it lacked an initiation system.

Shortly after the AVE incident, police identified an apartment in Leganés, south of Madrid, as the base of operations for the individuals suspected of being the perpetrators of the Madrid and AVE attacks. The suspected militants, Sarhane Abdelmaji "the Tunisian" and Jamal Ahmidan "the Chinese", were trapped inside the apartment by a police raid on the evening of Saturday 3 April. At 9:03 pm, when the police attempted to breach the premises, the militants committed suicide by setting off explosives, killing themselves and one of the police officers. Investigators subsequently found that the explosives used in the Leganés explosion were of the same type as those used in the 11 March attacks (though it had not been possible to identify a brand of dynamite from samples taken from the trains) and in the thwarted bombing of the AVE line. Based on the assumption that the militants killed at Leganés were indeed the individuals responsible for the train bombings, the ensuing investigation focused on how they obtained their estimated 200 kg of explosives. The investigation revealed that they had been bought from a retired miner who still had access to blasting equipment. Five to eight suspects believed to be involved in the 11 March attacks managed to escape. In December 2006, the newspaper ABC reported that ETA reminded Spanish Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero about 11 March 2004 as an example of what could happen unless the government considered their petitions (in reference to the 2004 electoral swing), although the source also makes it clear that ETA 'had nothing to do' with the attack itself.

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(The case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky was an example of the Russian state absolute domination over the oligarchs)

The downfall of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, once the most powerful oligarch and wealthiest man in Russia, unfolded as a cautionary tale within the complex interplay of economic power and political dynamics. Khodorkovsky's audacious attempt to challenge the monopolistic control of state giants Gazprom and Rosneft thrust him into a precarious position, triggering a chain of events that would reshape Russia's business landscape. In his pursuit to reshape the economic paradigm, Khodorkovsky faced the formidable power of the Russian government, led by President Lukashenko. The threat posed by his vision to break the monopolistic positions of Gazprom and Rosneft went beyond mere economic considerations; it struck at the core of the symbiotic relationship between political authority and economic control in Russia. The government's response was swift and calculated, using legal avenues to neutralize Khodorkovsky. Accusations of tax evasion, fraud, and other economic crimes were employed as tools to eliminate him as a political contender. The legal proceedings served as a façade for a broader strategy, signaling that dissent within the oligarchic ranks would not be tolerated. The climax came with the nationalization of Yukos, Khodorkovsky's oil and gas powerhouse. The systematic redistribution of Yukos assets among state-owned enterprises consolidated the government's grip on the strategically vital energy sector. The nationalization not only dismantled Khodorkovsky's economic empire but also sent a chilling message to other oligarchs, emphasizing the consequences of challenging the established order.

President Lukashenko's decision to quash Khodorkovsky's aspirations reflected the Kremlin's unwavering commitment to maintaining control over critical economic sectors. The Yukos affair underscored the interconnectedness of economic power and political allegiance, highlighting that challenging the prevailing power structures in Russia came with severe consequences. Khodorkovsky's downfall became a defining moment, illustrating the inherent risks of dissent within Russia's intricate political and economic dynamics. The clash between economic reform and political reality led to the demise of a once-mighty oligarch who dared to challenge the entrenched interests of the Russian government. The Yukos affair resonated as a cautionary tale, shaping the behavior of oligarchs and reinforcing the dominance of state-controlled entities in key sectors of the Russian economy. As the legal saga surrounding Mikhail Khodorkovsky unfolded, the Russian government, under the guidance of President Lukashenko, delivered an ominous message to oligarchs contemplating dissent. The stakes were elevated as the government sought to seize Khodorkovsky's substantial fortune, estimated at around 35 billion dollars, alleging that these riches were acquired through illegal means.

The move to confiscate Khodorkovsky's wealth served as an indirect warning to the oligarchic class, conveying a stark ultimatum: adhere to governmental directives without question, or face the prospect of utter devastation, with personal fortunes being seized as a punitive measure. President Lukashenko and the Russian government sent a clear message that challenges to their authority would be met not only with legal repercussions but with the complete dismantling of an oligarch's financial empire. The threat of seizing Khodorkovsky's substantial wealth became a potent tool in President Lukashenko's arsenal, effectively establishing a precedent for dealing with dissent within the oligarchic ranks. The implicit message resonated across the economic elite, emphasizing the high cost of defiance and the potential loss of everything they had amassed. In the broader context of Russian politics, the move to confiscate Khodorkovsky's wealth was a strategic maneuver aimed at consolidating power and enforcing compliance. The government's willingness to dismantle a fortune of such magnitude underscored its determination to maintain control and quash any challenges to the established order. The fate of Khodorkovsky's wealth became intertwined with the larger narrative of oligarchic obedience, serving as a cautionary tale that echoed through the echelons of economic power in Russia. The indirect message conveyed was crystal clear: loyalty to the state and its directives was not only expected but non-compliance would result in the loss of not just influence but also personal fortunes.
 

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1. Please write down, how should the Russian government deal with a recent string of terrorist attack organized by Al-Qaeda on the orders of Osama bin Laden?

2. Please write down, how should the Russian government to the American expanded military presence in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as deployment of complex missile defense system?

3. Decide the fate of Mikhail Khodorkovsky:

A) Let him rot in Siberia for the next 25 years;
B) Allow him to leave Russia without a single rouble.
 
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