AHC/WI: The Indian Rebellion of 1857 goes better for the Sepoys...

[SouthernWind]

Hello again, you beautiful persons!

For a long time, I have been writing an alternative history tale which, although it focuses mainly on the American Civil War and the Confederate States of America, will not fail to show events in Europe, Africa and Asia. In particular, the Sepoys Rebellion in India of 1857 will play an important role (albeit in the background) for the development of the story.

As you probably know, there have been numerous reasons why the 1857 uprising failed. Among them, the main ones (which I found here) were:

• Lack of Planning and Co-ordination

There was no planning among the rebels. Different groups pulled in different directions. The principal rebel leaders – Nana Saheb, Tantia Tope, Kunwar Singh, Rani Laxmibai were no match to their British opponents in generalship.

• Weak Leadership of the 1857 Mutiny

The rebel sepoys declared the Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah II as the Emperor of India and the symbol of the revolt. However Bahadur Shah II was already into semi-retirement and hesitant to lead the revolt. Apart from this, there were multiple leaders at different storm centers of the revolt and all were fighting the British for their own reasons and not one single cause.

• Superior British Army

The Indian rebels possessed great courage and will to fight the British enemy, however, they lacked the sophisticated arms and ammunition of the British army. The European soldiers were equipped with the latest weapons like the Enfield rifle. While the Indian rebels fought the 1857 mutiny mostly with swords and spears and very few guns and muskets.

• Limited Supplies and Lack of Modern Communication

The Indian rebels had limited military supplies. They used weapons and bullets from wherever they could loot or they already possessed while the British soldiers had advantage of the modern Railways and the Telegraph that had already started to communicate and plan quickly. The British also possessed almost unlimited supplies of modern artillery to suppress the 1857 Revolt.

• Lack of Societal Alternative

By proclaiming Bahadur Shah as the leader of the Revolt, the mutinous sepoys demonstrated a lack of societal alternative to the British occupation. One foreign power was going to be supplanted by former feudal powers. For this reason, the masses did not participate in the Revolt.

• The Princes and Educated Classes did not participate

Most of the Princely rulers and big Zamindars did not support the 1857 Revolt and actively sided with the British. Their dominions remained free of any anti-colonial uprisings. Governor General Lord Canning remarked that these rulers and chiefs “acted as the breakwaters to the storm which would have otherwise swept us in one great wave”. The educated middle and upper classes were mostly critical of the rebels since the rebel’s appeals to superstitions and their opposition to progressive social measures repelled them.

• Limited Spread of the Revolt

The 1857 Revolt remained concentrated in the Central India and some parts of northwestern India. It did not spread to South India and most of Eastern and Western India.


Therefore, what I would like to ask you is:

1. What actions or strategies could the rebel sepoys and their allies have implemented to remedy to these serious weaknesses? In particular, how could the rebel sepoys have increased the chances of involvement in their revolt by the masses, the upper and middle classes and the regions of South India and East / West India?
2. Which figure, among the Indian personalities who took part in the revolt against the British, could have had a more incisive role and contributed to "unify" and broaden the anti-English front?
3. Finally, what errors on the English side could the Indians have taken advantage of, which were neglected in the OTL, and that could have greatly favored the insurgents?

Important Notice: My aim is not "necessarily" to have the rebel sepoys win and expel the British from India. If you believe that it is impossible for the Sepoys to win without ASB, and that at most their revolt could have lasted longer (and be more bloody), do not hesitate to express your opinion. Even a Sepoys uprising that lasts until 1859-1860 could be useful to my story...

 

[SouthernWind]

No reply?

 

[Madhukar_Shah]

I think the sepoys could very well have forced the British from India as a guérilla force.

First of all, the former feudal powers were a welcome alternative for many Indians- we have to remember that for a lot of rebels, it was the English who were really rebelling as they had since their first territorial annexation proclaimed their status as vassals of the emperor and only now were assuming airs of superiority. People were excited for a return to the pomp and ritual of the High Mughal Era and were discussing what mansab rank the various raja’s would have. It also probably wouldn’t be a return to feudalism in actuality as Mirza Mughals wartime council used positions with names derived from English- at the highest levels of government it was at least partly accepted that the British government was a model to emulate for success in the modern era.

In terms of Delhi, the area I actually have some knowledge of the specifics for, all this would require is a continuation of the jihadis plan of attacking the British from behind- they gave up thinking it was ineffective just when the British were beginning to consider their position untenable. A major victory like that would have allowed Mirza Mughal to reign together the disparate elements through improved moral and maybe pay if for some time at least Delhi is given a taxable agrarian hinterland to fuel the rebellion. It’s really all about momentum, so if Delhi can be secured, even if rebel held territory around Delhi doesnt increase it gives rebels all across the empire reason to continue as guérilla forces, which can bleed thé British dry through a thousand cuts.

Fundamentally however, there have been many instances where armies with many disparate groups with divergent interests, weaker command of battlefield tactics and worse equipment and communication than their enemies prevailed and that was always as a guérilla force. Looking at the afghan, Algerian and Vietnamese wars in the last century, and the Mughal-Maratha wars weaker powers prevailed against superior ones. This was despite lack of political unity, support from the majority of people, or a complete plan.

In this case the occupying outside state wins because while it can win most battles and can successfully contest territory it has lost at the strategic level as the haemorrhage of casualties cannot be stopped and the enemy continues to give ever new battles. The resistance is able to do this because it has a safe area that it can retreat to if the pressure becomes too severe. From here it can recover and plan renewed harassing raids and the imperial power finds itself unable to terminate the war and must itself retreat.

While such wars in the last century had at their core support by a second superpower that was arranged against the imperial power occupying them, the Marathas simply had secure places to retreat in the Deep South of the subcontinent or in their many hill forts. Further, when the Mughals captured and killed the highest level of Maratha rebels, there was always another chief or brother or widow ready to take the reigns that can serve as an alternate leader. This was because the Maratha leadership was relatively dispersed.

In the case of 1857, the main problem is that there are very few places the rebels can melt away into. Further, it was eminently impractical to expect Bahadur Shah to leave the red fort and live in hiding, although his sons perhaps could have done it. The rebellion wasn’t over until it’s leaders were executed or disappeared completely- the problem is, unless you evade capture by constantly moving as Tatia Tope was able to do for eight months or so, there aren’t many places to go. Punjab and the Deccan, both great terrain for this sort of thing are firmly British controlled. If Delhi and it’s environs can be maintained by the rebels through good leadership and luck, this could be one of the places where rebel leadership holes up, but I’m doubtful as to whether it could be held long term. Beyond this, for the duration of the opium wars, I’m sure Manchu officials in Tibet would be happy to welcome anyone who promises to screw over the British and it would be very difficult for the British to follow them into the Himalayas.

But I’m sure at the end of the opium wars, the British would force the Chinese to hand over the rebels, so the window is only three years. Beyond that, a safe rear base in Tibet is available only as long as the Chinese government feels like it’s ok to covertly support them by not actively handing them back to the British, claiming that the rebels are evading Beijings nominal attempts to catch them- and a secure rear base is vital. Given the British role in defeating the Taiping Rebellion, this help may not last beyond 1860. I could easily see a situation where a small independent state manages to fend off the British around Delhi, mainly because the British are constantly responding to raids and skirmishes co-ordinated in at first Tibet, but later Kashmir, Nepal and various mobile bases throughout Hindustan. Alternatively, perhaps the Khanate of Kokhand is an ideal place to plan these operations from- it’s ruling house claims descent from Babur, there is a link of Persianate court culture and most importantly it shares a border with Russia who has a bone to pick with the British after the Crimean War and thus the British can’t send an army into Kokand or try and politically dominate the area as it would risk war with Russia. Additionally, Russia can send weapons and officers to help with the rebellion covertly.

If they can keep it up for long enough, perhaps up to five to ten years depending on how many princely states and sepoy armies start thinking that British ability to control India isn’t as strong as they thought, and how strong the reaction is to British racism and harshness against people suspected of harbouring rebels during the war becomes, more princely states and sepoy companies join the rebellion, to the point where the British are forced to concede Hindustan. The retreat, when it came would be protracted and complicated and in itself would leave many variables- would the British attempt to keep the Punjab or Bengal, does the Hindustani state attempt to annex the Nizamat of Hyderabad, if there’s a significant part played by Nana Sahib in co ordinating the attacks does he demand an independent Maratha kingdom in the Bombay presidency or is he content to join the Mughal nobility. If the subcontinent splits up, the British are almost certain to retain the Madras presidency, and if not the united subcontinent simply must be Mughal. Quite frankly, the survival of Mughal leadership is vital as even if Nana Sahib or the Rani of Jhansi or Tatia Tope manages to evade capture through constant movement or escaping to secure holdfasts, if there is no Mughal emperor in Delhi there is no way the princely states are accepting the sovereignty of anyone else.

 

[Vinization]

What if the old emperor Bahadur Shah died a few years before the rebellion and was succeeded by a younger son? Say he swapped places with prince Mirza Fakhru, who died in 1856 at the age of 38-40.

 

[Madhukar_Shah]

What if the old emperor Bahadur Shah died a few years before the rebellion and was succeeded by a younger son? Say he swapped places with prince Mirza Fakhru, who died in 1856 at the age of 38-40.

There’s a decent chance the British simply end the Mughal monarchy at Bahadur Shahs death and refuse to accept an heir. If they do accept an heir, Fakhrus accession instead of Jawan Bakht could be seen as him owing his throne to the British and he would ideally need to retain some level of independence vis a vis the British. Without needing to be considerate for an octogenarian, they are likely to demand he hand over the red fort for use as an administrative building, and this struggle will be important when the rebels arrive in Delhi. It will certainly create a divide between the emperor and the British, but the emperor retaining the red fort is vital to legitimising his authority.

Fakhru was a student of Mirza Ghalib, who once refused a copy of the Ain (regulations) of Akbar, saying that the regulations of the British had surpassed them, and the regulations of the British were the way to the future. It’s a powerful modernising impulse.

Essentially, the difference will show itself in Mirza Fakhru being able to cement himself as the central command, and also effectively delegate and use the talents of the various groups under him. I think he needs to be able to trust his brothers to take advantage of Mirza Mughals administrative diligence, which may not happen if it’s thought he owes his throne to the british- he will have needed to have spent the time since the rebellion not bowing to the British demands. His authority as emperor is stronger than a prince but its not inviolable and he may have to resort to Bahadur Shahs ploy of listen to me or I’m leaving for Mecca forever. Further, he’s a historian, so one can at least hope he’d draw some lessons from history vis a vis the importance of forming a taxable area to pay the army and the effectiveness of guérilla warfare. Then again Persianate historiography tends to be simply a list of dates that explain what happened instead of asking why.

 

[LostInNewDelhi]

I read a paper a while back that painted Mirza Mughal and the other princes as incompetents who lacked the training or temperament to build a working Sepoy administration in Delhi, and which even after being pushed aside by the rebel leader Bakht Khan (an artillery commander who defected from the EIC, so someone much more qualified for the job) conducted little intrigues against him until the whole thing fell apart some months later. The wartime council that used the English titles was actually Bakht Khan's council, staffed by sepoys who had much greater knowledge of English terms in the first place. Mirza Mughal, like his father, was a ceremonial head at best. Also the massive amounts of civil disorder by insubordinate rebel soldiers and emergency taxation on Delhi's banks and financiers by the hybrid Mughal/Sepoy government, which finally destroyed upper-class support for the Rebellion and encouraged spying and other support activities on behalf of the EIC.

So in addition to having someone who actually knows how to wage modern war like Bakht Khan in pole position earlier on (Bareilly faction of the Sepoys revolt earlier, joining their Meerut comrades in Delhi earlier?), there'd probably have to be a concerted effort to keep soldiers away from Delhi to the greatest extent possible. Maybe they chase the EIC away and are able to relocate to other fronts, maybe they just camp outside the city, but civilians and soldiers really didn't mix well.

Also, whatever changes happen in Uttar Pradesh don't really affect events beyond that. The other simultaneous revolts like Lakshmibai of Jhansi, etc. don't report to the Mughal/Sepoy government, they flame out or succeed on their own.

 

[Sriyam Swastik]

Perhaps an earlier POD of Punjab being subdued without much bloodshed would mean no Sikh animosity against Hindustanis or respect for Brits. They could declare rebellion too.

 

[Beacon]

Quite a few changes would have to be made, one of the main ones would be that the muslims clerics decide to outright declare outright jihad against the British, this would help the rebellion gain support amongst the muslim. By some accident or the other, sir Duldeep Singh, former maharaja of the Sikh Empire is blamed for the rebellion and killed and this news travels back to the Sikh Empire, which inflames the anger of the Sikhs against the British (hopefully they will hate them more than they hate the sepoys). Finally, during the OTL siege of Delhi, the british commander apparently wanted to withdraw but was prevented by his junior officers, while in this TL he does withdraw and this gives the leaders of the rebellion time to regroup and push the british out of Delhi.

With Delhi still a target for the British, the decentralised leadership of the rebellion in other places gets more breathing space since the British will focus on Delhi instead.

 

[Madhukar_Shah]

Also, whatever changes happen in Uttar Pradesh don't really affect events beyond that. The other simultaneous revolts like Lakshmibai of Jhansi, etc. don't report to the Mughal/Sepoy government, they flame out or succeed on their own.

True, but if Uttar Pradesh can provide a safe haven for other movements, and news of rebel success in other areas can motivate continued resistance.

Looking at that paper, it seems to have been written before the translation of the mutiny papers by William dalrymple- further it was written by someone trained at the Aligarh school which while specialising in economic history does tend to disregard and thus come to unjustified conclusions about social history, art history and biographies of the people involved. Of course that’s not a reason to discount it out of hand but just something that popped into my head.

While he may have been inexperienced apart from his years as palace paymaster, administratively at least Mirza Mughal was by far the most energetic and personally wrote thousands of letters trying to sort things out. His authority may have been constantly challenged but he definitely wasn’t a sidelined figurehead. He was the driving force between trying to organise the sepoys into actual military camps, organising a police force to protect banks, trying to find a way to pay the army, finding food for everyone, listening to the petitions of individual sepoys, providing the equipment to create defensive works, creating a strict code of conduct for the military, negotiating with Gujar tribes outside the walled city, minting coins and rallying his depressed father and unruly siblings. When panic started to spread only he kept his cool.

Do you have a source for the western inspired court of administration being Bakht Khans rather than Mirza Mughals brainchild? William Dalrymple seems to disagree. And the crucial factor that crippled the courts effectiveness was the unwillingness of Bakht Khan and his forces to recognise its authority, emphasising the divisions in the rebel forces.

Bakht Khan, owing to his jihadi outlook, bore no respect for the emperor or his court or for the wishes of the sepoys. The princes had been chosen to lead them by the army, and if Bakht Khan had any sort of soft skills, he would have seen that the princes were trusted by the sepoys and the jihadis in a way that he could never be, that the glue holding the rebellion together was the authority given to the Mughal court, and would have agreed to work as a general under Mirza Mughals command, a position where his military knowledge and administrative vigour would have been greatly valued without earning the enmity of half the army. And yes, his military knowledge would have done leaps and bounds to expel the British from the immediate environment of Delhi and secure a tax base if he had had engendered any sort of respect at court via his civility and respect towards the emperor. But no, he went so far as to treat the emperor as an equal, meaning that if he could not produce results immediately, no one trusted him enough to deliver with time, and he was duly removed from power.

On the matter of excessive taxation on banks and rebel disorder, you are completely right, and that’s why I maintain the need of forming a taxable agrarian hinterland- if you can régularise payment of the army they’re much more likely to listen to you.

Going back to Mirza Fakhru, I went back to do some reading on him and he probably would have been disastrous for the cause. He was a massive Anglophile and had made an agreement in 1852 that on his accession he would hand the red fort over to the British and drop the emperors claims of theoretical superiority to the British. It is best I think, that he die on OTLs schedule.

one of the main ones would be that the muslims clerics decide to outright declare outright jihad against the British, this would help the rebellion gain support amongst the muslim.

There is a reason Zafar refused to declare a jihad- the jihadis had a political program that alienated the traditional Muslim gentry and the majority Hindu sepoys. Bakht Khan did threaten and force the ulemma of the city to declare jihad, mainly against their will. Emboldened by this, thé Jihadis went out of their way to offend Hindus- instead of sacrificing a goat for eid as normal, they determined to sacrifice a cow and kill any Hindu that tried to stop them.

Because of this threat, Zafar had to expend much political capital and resources to maintain communal harmony by banning cow slaughter, beef consumption, and register every cow owned by Muslims in the city.

More power to them is not the only way to go imho. While the initial parts of the rebellion saw all Delhi participating with equal gusto, the increasing number of jihadis in the city with their mistrust of all non Muslims saw many Hindus reduce their participation in the revolt. Trying to keep the Jihadis from ruining everything sent Zafar deeper into depression and almost insanity, which again ruined morale.

 

[Beacon]

There is a reason Zafar refused to declare a jihad- the jihadis had a political program that alienated the traditional Muslim gentry and the majority Hindu sepoys. Bakht Khan did threaten and force the ulemma of the city to declare jihad, mainly against their will. Emboldened by this, thé Jihadis went out of their way to offend Hindus- instead of sacrificing a goat for eid as normal, they determined to sacrifice a cow and kill any Hindu that tried to stop them.

Because of this threat, Zafar had to expend much political capital and resources to maintain communal harmony by banning cow slaughter, beef consumption, and register every cow owned by Muslims in the city.

More power to them is not the only way to go imho. While the initial parts of the rebellion saw all Delhi participating with equal gusto, the increasing number of jihadis in the city with their mistrust of all non Muslims saw many Hindus reduce their participation in the revolt. Trying to keep the Jihadis from ruining everything sent Zafar deeper into depression and almost insanity, which again ruined morale.

Would it be possible for Zafar to incorporate the jihadis, upstage them and then send them away to do his bidding? Take an oath that he will not eat any meat until the British are removed from India or something along those lines? Because of this oath, the jihadis are asked to go out into the field to fight the british.

Also could you provide some background for the banning of cow slaughter? This is the first time I have heard about any mention of cow slaughter during the 1st rebellion.

 

[Madhukar_Shah]

Would it be possible for Zafar to incorporate the jihadis, upstage them and then send them away to do his bidding? Take an oath that he will not eat any meat until the British are removed from India or something along those lines? Because of this oath, the jihadis are asked to go out into the field to fight the british.

Also could you provide some background for the banning of cow slaughter? This is the first time I have heard about any mention of cow slaughter during the 1st rebellion.

To control the Jihadis, he would need to have established w working relationship with Bakht Khan and Maulvi Sarfaraz Ali, and reconcile these two with the civilian and sepoy leadership. But going vegetarian until the rebellion is over would just turn the jihadis firmly against him, as he would be forsaking the sacrifice needed to celebrate Eid.


After the jihadis sacrificed a cow on the steps of Delhi’s Jami Masjid, some Hindu sepoys cut the throats of five Muslim butchers accused of cow killing. Zafar then banned the butchery of cows, eating beef and authorised anyone found killing a cow to be blown from a cannon. The police reacted immediately, arresting kebab wallahs grilling beef kebabs.

Next Zafar ordered all cows in Delhi to be registered by police and that list sent to the palace. On thirtieth July, the police were ordered to proclaim loudly that cow killing was forbidden as it would cause unnecessary strife and strengthen the enemy.

There was even a plan to round up all the city’s cows and secure them somewhere but it was dropped as there was no secure place to put them and would be resisted by cow owning families. Instead bonds were taken ensuring that they wouldn’t allow the sacrifice of their cattle. Mufti Sadruddin Azurda was sent to mediate with Maulvi Sarfaraz Ali and the latter ordered the mujahedin to forgo eating beef on Id.

When Id passed without riots, a British commentator was left to grumble "it is a good satire on the Mahomedans fighting for their faith that on this Eid, under the Mahomedan King, no one was permitted to sacrifice a cow"

 

[Vinization]

Could a POD that makes the East India Company even more arrogant and heavy-handed could help create a bigger rebellion that begins earlier? Say their wars in the late 18th century and early 19th century in the subcontinent are all cakewalks for multiple reasons.

 

[SouthernWind]

Hello to everyone, you beautiful persons!

First, allow me to wish you a happy New Year and a happy New Year to all those who welcomed the arrival of 2020.

Second, let me congratulate with you again: when I posted this discussion in order to gather ideas and ideas that I could subsequently insert into my story, I did not imagine that I would have had so many interested people, each with a unique and very intelligent opinion and point of view. I greatly appreciated your interventions and your advice, and I intend to make the most of it.

In order to keep this discussion alive and to propose in my turn some ideas that I think you may find interesting, I would like to submit some developments of the subplot that I have hypothesized so far to your attention:

• The events prior to the uprising are almost the same, except for some small events, however, worthless for the plot and which are not real PODs. One of them sees Mangal Pandey succeeding in killing second lieutenant Baugh before killing himself with his musket, an event that will exacerbate both the British authorities and the indigenous Indian population.
• When the uprising broke out, the rebel sepoys immediately began attacking and destroying and destroying the telegraph poles and other means of communication used by the British, thereby reducing the British ability to communicate and coordinate. Due to this, Sir Robert Montgomery, British administrator based in Lahore, has no way of knowing about the outbreak of the sepoys uprising and does not make the decision to disarm the troops of local sepoys, an action that in OTL prevented the uprising in the Punjab region. On the contrary, the sepoys of the region, thanks to a rebel sowan who arrived on horseback from Meerut, learn of the revolt of their brothers and, aware of their precarious situation, mutiny in turn. In the clash between the rebel sepoys and the British, General of the Company John Nicholson was killed and killed, who was having dinner with his friend Herbert Edwardes (taken prisoner by the Sepoys). The revolt spreads to Punjab and makes it more difficult for the British to use it as a base from which to suppress the mutiny.
• Thanks to a more timely and decisive rebellion of the sepoys guarding the Delhi Arsenal, the attempt of Deputy Assistant Commissary John Buckley and eight other British soldiers to destroy the Arsenal fails. The rebels then manage to occupy it practically intact, and to get their hands on enough weapons and ammunition to arm an army and numerous field and siege cannons, with which to strengthen the defense of the city and support their soldiers.
• In Lucknow, the former capital of the Indian kingdom of Awadh (recently annexed by the British), the Resident Sir Henry Montgomery Lawrence tries to spend the little time available before the revolt to organize his Residence in a bulwark of resistance. A large moat is dug and built a wall, which surrounds the perimeter of his home for a mile and a half. In the same way, the neighboring houses are evacuated and destroyed, to prevent any defectors from using them to hit the residence from above. In addition, a deposit of weapons, ammunition and all sorts of commissions is prepared, in order to resist the long siege. However, when the uprising also breaks out in Awadh, the attempt by the rebels to enter by means of an underground mine is successful, and the Residence is captured with all that is inside it: many English prisoners (military and civilian), large quantities of previously looted gold and jewels (including the state treasure of Awadh) and numerous weapons and ammunition (including many cannons). The Begum Hazrat Mahal, who managed to place her son Birjis Qadr on the restored throne of Awadh and became his regent, decides to use the newly found military and economic resources to replenish the army of Awadh and to set up some emergency factories for the production of weapons and ammunition.
• The general idea for the plot is an Indian insurrection which, with some major key successes and consequent greater resources, lasts longer, ending however once again with the English victory, which crush the insurrection as in OTL (albeit with some months late, in February 1859). The only state to make a temporary exception is the Awadh, which will be able to resist for a much longer period (perhaps up to half or even until the end of 1859) and will force the British to mobilize several more resources.

Therefore, here is my point of view. What do you think of it?

 

[Madhukar_Shah]

What is the position of the Sikh population if the Punjab is taken from British hands? If British control is weakened and Awadhi independence is seen as real possibility, wouldn’t the Sikhs move to reform the Sikh empire under a grandson of Ranjit Singh or even direct their hostility more to the British that commanded their earlier defeats than the purbiyas who carried them out and join the main rebels? Even if they stay hostile to the Mughals, I doubt they’d stay loyal to the British.

I think with the advantages you’ve given to the rebels, it’s actually a little implausible that the British manage to take back Hindustan so easily. The typical pattern of rebellion was early rapid rebel victories which overran the British, then the British retreated, were reinforced and then regained control. That model doesn’t really work for the panjab, as it’s not close enough to any securely British areas for it to be reinforced. This means that the early rebel victories are maintained until the British move in from the east through the Gangetic plains.

The fact that the Europeans in Awadh were only captured and not then killed or raped or anything is likely to fuel the anti war section in parliament, and if Awadh and Delhi can unite their forces (considering how Hazrat Mahal cooperated with Nana Sahib, is incredibly likely as soon as Delhi is no longer under siege and its armies are freer to move through the field, which is incredibly likely now that they have the artillery for it and reinforcements from Punjab aren’t arriving anytime soon for the British). With rebel armies free to move around under central direction instead of the leaders being focused on their own little struggle, the rebellion assumes the characteristics of a conventional war of field engagements and large battles.

Once the rebels are actively campaigning instead of reacting, they would probably go to try and assist the rebellious factions in Punjab. Now is where things are a little more up in the air- does the combined rebel army stop off at the Rajput kingdoms (vital to the Mughal regime earlier, with Ajmer both containing a large arsenal and the most important Sufi shrine in India, which also has dynastic links and would thus be attractive to any Muslim commander) to resume control over them, or do they go straight past them to Lahore, a historical Mughal capital and presumable focal point of the fighting in Punjab.
If they go to the Rajputana, do the princely states throw their lot in with the rebellion or is the presence of the residents at the maharajas courts too entrenched. How long are they bogged down there? Also if a large rebel army under the nominal control of the Mughal emperor is marching through Hindustan, and as you said the indigenous population is anyways more inflamed, you can bet many otl neutral states and states aiding the British are going to see their armies end up in rebel command.

Once in Punjab do they lose all momentum as they get stuck in fighting the Sikhs and remnants of the British forces, or have the rebels loyal to the main rebellion mainly sorted it out. If you want the British to still defeat the rebellion, this or the Rajputana is probably the best spot, as it allows the Bombay army to move in from behind the main rebel force and link up with the Sikhs and British remnants in the Punjab or the loyal Rajput states and force the rebels to fight the war on two fronts. Essentially it’s about whether the British are given time to recuperate or are constantly kept on the defensive the rebels- the former leads in British victory and the latter in rebel victory. Thus at the earliest, I would say the rebellion would be dealt with by the end of 1859.

 

[Vinization]

Didn't John Nicholson prevent several British officers from being poisoned by their own cooks? If he's killed beforehand, could the EIC miltary be decapitated for a while?

 

[Madhukar_Shah]

Didn't John Nicholson prevent several British officers from being poisoned by their own cooks? If he's killed beforehand, could the EIC miltary be decapitated for a while?

Even apart from that, he was a major driving force in seizing the initiative. Without him, the British are likely to simply retreat from Delhi rather than even trying to besiege it.

 

[SouthernWind]

To answer your questions, I am writing a quick summary of how I imagined the development of the plot onwards:

• Thanks to the fact that Montgomery is not warned in time and does not disarm the units of the sepoys before they rise against the British, the uprising spreads to Punjab and Hindustan, leaving the British the best-fortified positions, especially on the coast, or the positions where the British manage to suppress the revolt in advance.
• Seeing the successful revolt of the sepoys against the British, the Sikhs in turn rebel in an anti-English and anti-Mughal key. Their revolt, however, is less successful than that of the sepoys, as the English garrisons are warned of what is going on and are on high alert. The British, however, aware of the fragility of their position, decide to fold and concentrate their national and loyalist forces in some key positions, especially along the coast, which can be easily supplied by their Navy. In the abandoned territories the Sikhs reconstitute their Empire, under the command of a grandson of Ranjit Singh (I would propose Kanwar Pratap Singh Bahadur or Shahdeo Singh Bahadur, but I do not have enough information about them to say who would have the greatest chance of being chosen as new Marajah). The Sikhs rebuild their army, placing it under the leadership of Bikrama Singh, who tries to modernize and strengthen the armed forces of the Sikhs. Unfortunately for the anti-English front, the Sikhs, instead of joining their forces with the hated Mughals and launching an offensive aimed at definitively expelling the British from Punjab, begin a long and exhausting war with the same Mughal-allied sepoys, which will end up wearing down their respective forces and will give the British enough time to build up enough forces for their counteroffensive.
• The British make a first attempt to reconquer Delhi with a small force (as in OTL) that starts from Meerut (the main military stronghold-base left to the British west of Delhi). The British force is led by George Anson, who in this timeline does not die of cholera and will take the place of Nicholson in the repression of the rebellion. The British defeat the Indian rebels in the battle of Badli-ki-Serai, as in OTL, thanks to their technological and organizational superiority. Bear in mind that, while many rebels still use the old brown-bess rifles (which have a range of 200m) the British use the Enfield rifles (more precise and with a range of 800m). Therefore, in any battle against the British, the rebel sepoys will almost always find themselves in technological inferiority. The only exception is the Awadh, which, under the influence of King Birjis Qadr and Begum-regent Hazrat Mahal, prepares factories and manufactures for the mass production of the Hanuman 1858 rifle, an Indian-developed version of the Enfield, more suitable for use in the humid Indian climate and whose cartridges are not made with pork or cow. Unfortunately, production of the new rifle in Awadh will be barely sufficient to supply the army of the kingdom, and few Hanumans will be used by other rebel armies. The English victory in Badli-ki-Serai, however, has the galvanizing effect of putting an end (momentarily) to the disputes between the rebels, who place General Bakht Khan in command of the defense of the city.
• The Mughal forces, under the command of Bakht Khan, thanks to the war supplies of the Delhi arsenal, defeat the British preventing them from regaining Delhi. The only British success is the relief of the European population and loyalist sepoys who have been besieged in the Flagstaff Tower since May. This victory, however, is worse than a defeat for the Mughal forces, because, thank of it the English become more determined and fierce in crushing the Uprising. To make matters worse, new rumors are spreading in England about the ferocity and violence of the rebel sepoys, which exacerbate public opinion and reinforce war support.
• The English Parliament passes the new Government of India Act, thanks to which the English East India Company is dissolved and all its assets and resources are absorbed by the English Government and the Crown. One of the first acts of the British government is the sending of further reinforcements and supplies to crush the rebellion, together with some generals capable of leading the new reconquest operations. In addition, new military-economic agreements are made with the Indian kingdoms allied with the British, to open new fronts and force the rebels to disperse their forces. From England comes the English general Colin Campbell, who takes command of all British forces in India and prepares his plans for a counter-offensive.
• As Campbell prepares for his counteroffensive, the Mughal army launches an offensive against Punjab in an attempt to eliminate the remaining British cornerstones and conquer Rajput and Lahore. Indian forces advance rapidly, defeating the best-armed but considerably smaller British forces in a series of battles. The Mughal forces, however, make the mistake of pursue both their objectives at the same time, and because of this, they divide their forces. One part of the army besieges Lahore, where the small English garrison manages to resist for the moment, while the other, having come into contact with a large Sikh army led by Bikrama Singh, is forced to fight. The victory eventually comes to the sepoys, but it is a pyrrhic victory: the Sikh army does not disperse, and manages to retreat in good order to the northwest with numerous captured Indian artillery cannons. At the same time, the Mughal army suffers heavy losses and remains dangerously weakened.
• The British launch their new counter-offensive. In order not to give breath to the rebels and weaken their leadership, the new offensives take place almost simultaneously: from Bombay an English army under the command of Sir Hugh Rose and strong of 35.000 soldiers with 40 field guns marching towards the state of Jhansi, where the rebels placed the Rani Lakshmi Bai in command; another army, with over 120,000 soldiers and 50 cannons, departs from Calcutta heading west, towards Cawnpore and Lucknow; finally, a third British army, which arrived directly in Karachi from England, march north to destroy Mughal forces in Punjab and Hindustan, prologue to a new attack on Delhi.
• British forces face the Mughal army near Faisalabad on the road to Lahore. Thanks to its technological and artillery superiority, the battle ends in a great English victory. The British "liberate" Lahore, rescuing the garrison, and begin an impressive work to suppress the revolt in Punjab and Hindustan. The Sikhs, rather than attacking the British, prefer to entrench themselves in their positions and await future developments. Almost on the same days, the English army of Calcutta defeats Nana Sahib, reoccupying Cawnpore and heading west to Delhi. However, Nana Sahib manages to save a part of his army, and with it, he retreats to Lucknow to support Birjis Qadr's forces. An initial English attempt to recapture Lucknow is stopped in the battle of Unnao, where the royal forces, thanks to their new rifles and knowledge of the area, succeed and block the English offensive.

To be continued (if you like)…

 

[Madhukar_Shah]

Yeah that’d make sense. I’m presuming you meant that the Mughal force that isn’t stopped by the Sikhs gets caught up besieging Ajmer, not Lahore, and Hugh Roses force is ten times smaller than you said, but apart from that it works. It’ll be interesting to see what exactly the new military economic agreements are with the princely states.

 

[SouthernWind]

Yeah that’d make sense. I’m presuming you meant that the Mughal force that isn’t stopped by the Sikhs gets caught up besieging Ajmer, not Lahore, and Hugh Roses force is ten times smaller than you said, but apart from that it works. It’ll be interesting to see what exactly the new military economic agreements are with the princely states.

Well, you are right. I'll fix it immediatly.