Operation FS and the Kantai Kessen carrier battle in August 1942

[Athelstane]

Given New Caledonia was the first planned landing, the failure of the landing there (and it's going to fail, throwing a single regiment against an entire division is a recipe for disaster), it's likely that regardless of how the naval battles go the entire op unravels on the spot.

Yeah. Indeed. And these numbers would have been (and were) even higher by the time of a July campaign. By September, if I recall correctly, the total of Allied troops on New Cal exceeded 30,000...

And then there are the coral reefs...

Take New Caledonia? The Japanese might as well try to take Oahu. And Fiji and Samoa would hardly be much easier.

I would also expecte reinforcement of the air garrisons at Espiritu Santo - absent a threat against Midway, those aircraft are available to be sent south. 105 aircraft in addition to the 121 on Vanuatu and New Caledonia IOTL won't allow them to stand up to the First Air Fleet, but they'd make the islands that much more of a threat.

Indeed, the New Hebrides would not be a terribly hospitable air environment for Kido Butai - especially if they have any warning that the Japanese are coming.

 

[Athelstane]

If the planes were on the flight deck probably none of the carriers would have ended up scuttled.

Without the experience of Midway, I question whether the Kido Butai would feel the same urgency to exercise proper hanger deck hygiene, so to speak. Either way, I think Kaga is toast no matter what. The fueled planes on the hanger deck only hastened the inevitable.

 

[Captain Seafort]

Specifically what flaws are you referring to? I'm given to understand that the fires and sympathetic explosions were the result of battle damage, not poor design practices.

The design flaws are that battle damage can lead to the ship filling with avgas fumes due to damage to storage and transfer arrangements. That's pretty much what happened to Ben-my-Chree, and the RN subsequently became as paranoid about avoid a repeat of it as they were about flash protection to capital ship magazines as a result of Jutland. As Athelstane pointed out, Lexington didn't blow up because her crew failed to do their jobs as they'd been trained to, but because their ship's design flaws made her insufficently resilient to shock damage, and she therefore leaked fumes all over the place and turned into a fuel-air bomb. The USN had never had an aircraft carrier (in the widest sense of the term) come under serious attack, so they didn't have experience of the sort of problems that could be caused. The ideal solution would have been to stop construction on all carriers and resign them to RN avgas handling standards, but there was a minor issue to deal with called the IJN that precluded that, so Lexington's crew came up with a less-than-ideal but still pretty effective stopgap.

The USN did accept more lightly protected designs than the Royal Navy, something that was commented on by US sailors when the British Pacific Fleet joined the USN. "When a kamikaze hits a U.S. carrier it means 6 months of repair at Pearl. When a kamikaze hits a Limey carrier it’s just a case of 'Sweepers, man your brooms.'" The RN carriers were far more hardy and suffered far fewer casualties during kamikaze hits. However, they had to accept the trade off of vastly lower air wing capacity and sortie rate. Additionally, it was realized postwar that some of those kamikaze hits had caused deep structural damage that was not realized at the time and cut several years off the lifespan of the ship. Meanwhile, the American carriers had their wooden flight decks ruined, but they could just be sent into the yards, have the deck chopped off, and a new one applied. Both the USN and the RN understood what they were doing and accepted tradeoffs for what they believed more important. The RN accepted reduced striking capability in favor of inherent platform survivability. The US accepted reduced protection in favor of larger air wings and sortie rates. Though one could argue the USN eventually came to believe the British method superior given that the Midway-class was designed with an armored flight deck.

As mentioned above, RN avgas handling arrangements went back a lot further than the Illustrious-class (which were more about being survivable in the face of land-based air power). As for the late/postwar carrier design, it's more a case of cross-pollination/convegent evolution -the Midway and Malta designs both bore far greater resemblance to each other than either did to Illustrious or Essex.

 

[scifilovr]

The design flaws are that battle damage can lead to the ship filling with avgas fumes due to damage to storage and transfer arrangements. That's pretty much what happened to Ben-my-Chree, and the RN subsequently became as paranoid about avoid a repeat of it as they were about flash protection to capital ship magazines as a result of Jutland. As Athelstane pointed out, Lexington didn't blow up because her crew failed to do their jobs as they'd been trained to, but because their ship's design flaws made her insufficently resilient to shock damage, and she therefore leaked fumes all over the place and turned into a fuel-air bomb. The USN had never had an aircraft carrier (in the widest sense of the term) come under serious attack, so they didn't have experience of the sort of problems that could be caused. The ideal solution would have been to stop construction on all carriers and resign them to RN avgas handling standards, but there was a minor issue to deal with called the IJN that precluded that, so Lexington's crew came up with a less-than-ideal but still pretty effective stopgap.

Disclaimer, I am not an expert or well-read on the design specifics of USN or RN aircraft carriers, but to suggest that American carriers were more fragile because of design flaws (and specifically what about the avgas storage methods and piping made them susceptible to battle damage and what did the RN do to correct the "flaw") is not born out by combat records of any class of American carrier; CVEs excluded. At Coral Sea, Yorktown had a SAP bomb penetrated her flight deck and damage an avgas room, as well as boilers. She also suffered damage to her hull integrity due to almost a dozen near misses. She suffered neither a catastrophic explosion like Lexington nor was she sunk due to cumulative damage. At Midway, she suffered multiple bomb hits, including hits on her boilers, ammunition, and fuel storage, but improved DC practices prevented major fires from spreading. Even after a second successful attack, one which occurred I might add because the American damage control was so good the Japanese thought she was an unscathed carrier, she was still afloat and not sinking until I-168 sunk her.

An awesome counterpoint to your assertion that USN avgas storage and fueling systems were flawed, is the USS Franklin which was bombed in the middle of fueling and arming a strike, detonating 13 to 16 tons of high explosive, as well as aircraft in the hangar deck which were fueled and armed, causing an avgas explosion. Despite this damage, similar damage of which killed all four Japanese carriers at Midway, Franklin survived her damage and evacuated the battle area under her own power.

British carriers were hardier than their American counterparts, they were expected to operate in the North Sea and the Mediterranean where they would be at high risk of attack by larger numbers of more capable land-based aircraft. They paid for this with air groups that were barely, or less than, half the size of an American carrier and were noted as being cramped and awkward to operate in with tight hangars and because of a refusal to practice deck park or conducting turnaround operations on the flight deck, significantly reduced sortie rates due to the closed hangar; you can't warm up warplanes in a closed hangar for the same reason you don't start your car with the garage door closed.

 

[Jellico]

The USN did accept more lightly protected designs than the Royal Navy, something that was commented on by US sailors when the British Pacific Fleet joined the USN. "When a kamikaze hits a U.S. carrier it means 6 months of repair at Pearl. When a kamikaze hits a Limey carrier it’s just a case of 'Sweepers, man your brooms.'" The RN carriers were far more hardy and suffered far fewer casualties during kamikaze hits. However, they had to accept the trade off of vastly lower air wing capacity and sortie rate. Additionally, it was realized postwar that some of those kamikaze hits had caused deep structural damage that was not realized at the time and cut several years off the lifespan of the ship. Meanwhile, the American carriers had their wooden flight decks ruined, but they could just be sent into the yards, have the deck chopped off, and a new one applied. Both the USN and the RN understood what they were doing and accepted tradeoffs for what they believed more important. The RN accepted reduced striking capability in favor of inherent platform survivability. The US accepted reduced protection in favor of larger air wings and sortie rates. Though one could argue the USN eventually came to believe the British method superior given that the Midway-class was designed with an armored flight deck.

It is more than just the carriers. By RN standards the USN battleships were noted to have insufficient flash protection. The RN would not have put the Iowa's secondary magazine where they were. We all know why this is the case. I have also read the RN wasn't impressed with engineering subdivision in the US battleships.

For all of that, USN ships were gold plated by the standards of other navies. They cost more to put in the water but paid off in things like superior structural steel. Warships are made to be lost. Some navies were more wiling to accept ships were disposable than others.

An awesome counterpoint to your assertion that USN avgas storage and fueling systems were flawed, is the USS Franklin which was bombed in the middle of fueling and arming a strike, detonating 13 to 16 tons of high explosive, as well as aircraft in the hangar deck which were fueled and armed, causing an avgas explosion. Despite this damage, similar damage of which killed all four Japanese carriers at Midway, Franklin survived her damage and evacuated the battle area under her own power.

Given Franklin is an Essex with half a war's lessons built into her, including Lexington's adventures, you would hope that she would do better than the mixed lot Japan sent to Midway.

 

[JasTysoe]

An awesome counterpoint to your assertion that USN avgas storage and fueling systems were flawed, is the USS Franklin which was bombed in the middle of fueling and arming a strike, detonating 13 to 16 tons of high explosive, as well as aircraft in the hangar deck which were fueled and armed, causing an avgas explosion. Despite this damage, similar damage of which killed all four Japanese carriers at Midway, Franklin survived her damage and evacuated the battle area under her own power.

I thought the USN didn't fuel or arm aircraft in the hangar? Had Franklin's a/c been fueled and armed on the flight deck and then moved down below, still in that state?

I must also say that while I've never checked it up, I'd be surprised if there was a vast difference between damaging bomb hits on an aircraft on a flight deck and an aircraft below that flight deck; didn't armed and fueled aircraft tend to go up in flames that let burning fuel leak through the damaged deck into the hangar?

PS - I'm not criticising the outstanding USN damage control training or their general designs.

 

[Dorknought]

PS - I'm not criticising the outstanding USN damage control training or their general designs.

But the RN found that they needed to be modified. https://www.royalnavyresearcharchive.org.uk/ESCORT/DASHER.htm

A board of enquiry was quickly assembled and this convened on-board DASHER’s sister ship ARCHER on the morning of Tuesday March 30th. Twenty six survivors were also present on ARCHER to give evidence. The 5 board members toured ARCHER’s hangar, engine room, petrol stowage and petrol control room, as well as the add Depth Charge Magazines. After two days of hearing evidence the board departed ARCHER. The enquiry established that the initial explosion was caused by the ignition of petrol probably due to a cigarette or faulty light switch; at this time all 6 Swordfish and 2 Sea Hurricanes were in the hangar, 2 Swordfish were being refuelled, 1 Sea Hurricane remained on the flight deck the Petrol control Room was open and manned for fuelling aircraft, ‘No Smoking’ signs were correctly displayed but no sentry was posted. Evidence of petrol leakage into inaccessible and unsafe areas was given and it was established that access hatches to the FAA mess and engine room shaft tunnel were open. They concluded that the initial explosion occurred in either the Petrol stowage area or the aft Depth Charge Magazine (containing 68 Depth Charges) which ware adjacent to each other and was caused by a build-up of petrol vapour. [It is assumed, but not stated, that the second explosion was the petrol stowage tanks themselves going up; she carried up 85,000 gallons of aviation petrol.

Further investigation into the standards for safety of both petrol and explosives storage on U.S. built CVEs found these were to be below those used on British Carriers. As a result all US built Escort Carriers which were in service and those under construction were to be modified. Particular attention was paid to the Aviation fuel distribution system, ammunition storage and hangar fire containment systems.

 

[JasTysoe]

But the RN found that they needed to be modified. https://www.royalnavyresearcharchive.org.uk/ESCORT/DASHER.htm

True, but I didn't want to buy into that discussion.

 

[Athelstane]

I didn't add to my scenario that Japan does get their airfield on Guadalcanal operational but frankly, I would expect the USN to interdict the KB in a place outside of Japanese land based aircover. Kind of risky going 5 on 6 fleet carriers (plus the 2nd string IJN flattops) and land based planes as well. However I am not sure exactly where this spot in the Pacific exactly is?

Jumping back to the OP scenario, this post offers a premise that perplexes me a little, @steel_captain : If Yamamoto is scrapping (or never even entertaining) Operation MI, why would he wait all the way until late August to mount Operation FS? Just to have the benefit of some kind of land-based air operating out of the completed Lunga Point airfield on Guadalcanal?

 

[Athelstane]

Dr Mark L Bailey, a former naval officer turned academic who specialises in shipping in the WW2 Pacific theatre, points out that the shortage of shipping was so vital that if the Japanese had an operating airfield on Guadalcanal, much less New Caledonia, it would have caused major problems for the Allies. He says that the extra distance that ship would have had to sail would have had huge flow-on effects.

Hello Jas,

By chance, do you have a link or cite on Bailey's analysis? Would be interested to take a look at it.

 

[Athelstane]

I thought the USN didn't fuel or arm aircraft in the hangar? Had Franklin's a/c been fueled and armed on the flight deck and then moved down below, still in that state?

This is a little unclear to me. The Wiki account, relying on an essay of Admiral James Russell, puts it this way:

At the time she was struck, Franklin had 31 armed and fueled aircraft warming up on her flight deck, and these planes caught fire almost immediately. The 13 to 16 tons of high explosives aboard these planes soon began detonating progressively, and although "Tiny Tim" air-to-surface rockets were loaded aboard Vought F4U Corsairs, their three-point, nose up attitude allowed most of the rockets to fly overboard when their engines ignited. The hangar deck contained planes, of which 16 were fueled and 5 were armed. The forward gasoline system had been secured, but the aft system was operating. The explosion on the hangar deck ignited the fuel tanks on the aircraft, and a gasoline vapor explosion devastated the deck. The twelve "Tiny Tim" rockets aboard these planes ricocheted around the hangar deck until their 138 lb (63 kg) warheads detonated.​

​

Skimming through Joseph Springer's Inferno : the epic life and death struggle of the USS Franklin in World War II, it confirms that standard practice on appearance of kamikazes was to de-fuel and disarm any planes on the hanger deck. But this did not happen with Franklin, due mainly to the lateness of the detection of the attack. My sense is that, as the air defenses and detection capabilities of fast carrier task forces became ever more robust in the late stages of the war, they relaxed practices in regards to fueling and arming on the hanger deck.

On March 19, 1945, it all came back to bite them, hard.

 

[steel_captain]

After FRANKLIN's ordeal that the USN let Capt. Gerhes off the hook for being held responsible for allowing that one lone plane not just for getting through to attack the ship but allowing it to be hit in such a vulnerable state just shows to me the corruption in naval leadership. Then afterwards allowing him to denigrate and disrespect his valiant crew only made everything so much worse. A classic example of toxic leadership being rewarded instead of reprimanded...simply tragic!

 

[CV12Hornet]

After FRANKLIN's ordeal that the USN let Capt. Gerhing off the hook for being held responsible for allowing that one lone plane not just for getting through to attack the ship but allowing it to be hit in such a vulnerable state just shows to me the corruption in naval leadership. Then afterwards allowing him to denigrate and disrespect his valiant crew only made everything so much worse. A classic example of toxic leadership being rewarded instead of reprimanded...simply tragic!

The fuck are you talking about? Of course they let him off the hook for the attack, he didn’t do anything wrong. Yes, he downgraded the alert condition - for the sensible reason that his men were exhausted and needed food and rest. Yes, a lone bomber slipped through all the defenses. Shit happens and sometimes a plane just goes completely undetected through no fault of anyone.

And “let” him denigrate and disrespect his crew? You’re crediting the Navy with more control over the situation than they had. Until Franklin reached Ulithi the Navy had exactly zero control over what he said or did. And in fact the minute Franklin pulled into New York for repairs the Navy hauled him in front of an investigation committee, cleared his crew of wrongdoing, and then kicked him upstairs by putting him in charge of the air station at San Diego. Hardly a reward!

 

[steel_captain]

Sure shit happens...as soon as he took command of FRANKLIN, Gerhes berated the crew for letting the Kamikaze through that hit the ship off the Philippines, telling them it was their fault. But he was the one to downgrade the defensive condition of the ship even though there remained a credible threat of being attacked and the plane that hit the carrier did not surprise them...it was tracked by other ships in the group and warning was spread! Armed and fueled aircraft on deck and in the hanger but not ordering the ship go to GQ at the first moment the warning came in?

Gerhes was a huge asshole who himself as c/o was responsible for the ship getting hit as it did off Japan and should have been court martialed! A classic case of the USN sweeping the disaster under the rug instead of admitting the man who was put in command was not experienced as a carrier c/o and really not up to the job! They should have left him in the Aleutians to rot.

 

[scifilovr]

The fuck are you talking about? Of course they let him off the hook for the attack, he didn’t do anything wrong. Yes, he downgraded the alert condition - for the sensible reason that his men were exhausted and needed food and rest. Yes, a lone bomber slipped through all the defenses. Shit happens and sometimes a plane just goes completely undetected through no fault of anyone.

And “let” him denigrate and disrespect his crew? You’re crediting the Navy with more control over the situation than they had. Until Franklin reached Ulithi the Navy had exactly zero control over what he said or did. And in fact the minute Franklin pulled into New York for repairs the Navy hauled him in front of an investigation committee, cleared his crew of wrongdoing, and then kicked him upstairs by putting him in charge of the air station at San Diego. Hardly a reward!

Sure shit happens...as soon as he took command of FRANKLIN, Gerhes berated the crew for letting the Kamikaze through that hit the ship off the Philippines, telling them it was their fault. But he was the one to downgrade the defensive condition of the ship even though there remained a credible threat of being attacked and the plane that hit the carrier did not surprise them...it was tracked by other ships in the group and warning was spread! Armed and fueled aircraft on deck and in the hanger but not ordering the ship go to GQ at the first moment the warning came in?

Gerhes was a huge asshole who himself as c/o was responsible for the ship getting hit as it did off Japan and should have been court martialed! A classic case of the USN sweeping the disaster under the rug instead of admitting the man who was put in command was not experienced as a carrier c/o and really not up to the job! They should have left him in the Aleutians to rot.

I'm unable to find an exact timeline of the events leading up to the bombing of Franklin, I'd probably have to try and track down the ship's log or something, but reading secondary sources it kinda seems like Gehres ordered the downgrade just before (possibly minutes) the attack, so some of that could come off as bad timing. Though as far as "warning" goes they had a minute or two, the bomber was sighted by the Hancock at 0705 and this was relayed to Franklin who detected the aircraft at 0706 on radar, though it could not be engaged due to hiding in cloud cover. Stepping down to Condition III steaming is an interesting decision, given how close they were to Japan, but the crew did have to get some rest, they had been at battlestations for a prolonged amount of time throughout the night.

That being said, I have found some tertiary sources that say Gehres was considered a harsh disciplinarian and someone we would today call "toxic." There are reports, unverified, their orginators are uncited, that he did not contribute greatly to the damage control efforts that saved Franklin. What stands out to me is that when Franklin arrived at Pearl after the March 19th attack, Gehres refused to allow the civilian harbor pilot to conn the ship into the pier. Gehres brought the ship in too fast and caused an allision with the dock. He blamed the docking arrangements. That account is unverified, but I've heard of captains do similar things and it would seem to be in character for him; if all these accounts are accurate.

 

[steel_captain]

There is nothing written about Gehres to exonerate him and his actions before, during or after FRANKLIN was struck. Hitting the dock in PH is only icing on the cake he baked by trying to charge every man who left the ship when it was blazing with desertion without any attempt to determine if the reason they left was due to being blown overboard or because they were trapped by the flames without an escape route. The mere fact he wanted to shame them when he was the one who should feel the shame of having his ship virtually destroyed by a single plane. I bet he tried to blame the escort ships afterwards that it got through. Never once did he take even a small degree of responsibility for the disaster occurring. He was not anything a good c/o should be.

 

[CV12Hornet]

Well, no, but that's not what you were saying before.

 

[steel_captain]

Well, no, but that's not what you were saying before.

What are you referring to here with this?

 

[CV12Hornet]

What are you referring to here with this?

I'm referring to your braindead take from the post that started this tangent that this one captain being an asshole was somehow a sign of corruption in the Navy and that he was rewarded for being an asshole.

 

[Athelstane]

The fuck are you talking about? Of course they let him off the hook for the attack, he didn’t do anything wrong. Yes, he downgraded the alert condition - for the sensible reason that his men were exhausted and needed food and rest. Yes, a lone bomber slipped through all the defenses. Shit happens and sometimes a plane just goes completely undetected through no fault of anyone.

And “let” him denigrate and disrespect his crew? You’re crediting the Navy with more control over the situation than they had. Until Franklin reached Ulithi the Navy had exactly zero control over what he said or did. And in fact the minute Franklin pulled into New York for repairs the Navy hauled him in front of an investigation committee, cleared his crew of wrongdoing, and then kicked him upstairs by putting him in charge of the air station at San Diego. Hardly a reward!

There is nothing written about Gehres to exonerate him and his actions before, during or after FRANKLIN was struck. Hitting the dock in PH is only icing on the cake he baked by trying to charge every man who left the ship when it was blazing with desertion without any attempt to determine if the reason they left was due to being blown overboard or because they were trapped by the flames without an escape route. The mere fact he wanted to shame them when he was the one who should feel the shame of having his ship virtually destroyed by a single plane. I bet he tried to blame the escort ships afterwards that it got through. Never once did he take even a small degree of responsibility for the disaster occurring. He was not anything a good c/o should be.

Just some thoughts about Gehres - and why I mainly agree with CV12Hornet:

1. I do not think anyone alive, or dead, disputes that it turned out to be a mistake to give Gehres any sea-going combat command (or, indeed, *any* ship).

2. How much of that was visible before he was given Franklin? I have not looked closely at his record, let alone letters of his previous CO's. But that said, what little I have seen does not mark him as obviously, deeply unfit for a senior command - as he turned out to be. It might turn out to be that there was such evidence - I just don't know.

3. On my reading of the incident, I do not think that Gehres reducing alert condition was culpable in the circumstances, and I think the official investigation's finding on this point seems at least reasonable to me. You can't keep up a top alert forever, and what it really looks like is just very bad timing.

4. Many of Gehres' actions AFTER the attack are, obviously, highly problematic and even in some cases downright disgraceful. But while I do not know if Gehres benefited from particular connections or favors, I would like to observe that I would not be the first person to observe that US naval leadership seemed to have a pattern throughout the war, as it had indeed for generations before, of giving undue deference to the senior ranks of its officer corps. It is fairly astounding that Captain Charles B. McVay was the only USN CO in the entirety of World War II to be court martialed for the loss of his ship, especially in light of the fact that Admiral Ernest King just happened to have a grudge against McVay's father. Nor do you need only look at other striking oddities like Carleton Wright getting a Navy Cross and a nice shore command after suffering the second worst defeat in US Navy history to find . . . curious patterns of how senior Navy officers got treated.

Would we call such a pattern a case of corruption? I think we need to unpack what we mean by that term in this context.