Ok, so if you're swapping LatAm and Asia's fates, and China is already going down the route of functionally independent cartel fiefdoms...
Not an exact 1-to-1 swap but that's the rough idea at least vis a vis China. I've never seen anybody take China's stupidly powerful and influential drug lords of the OTL KMT era to their natural and horrifying conclusion and want to play around with the concept haha
 
Sounds like Argentina and Brazil should just sit in their trenches and not attack because it goes very poorly. And yet, each side has generals who are adamant that, no, this attack will be the one that breaks though.

Spoilers: it won't. Trench warfare is devious like that.
 
"...thrusts across the river under cover of dreadnought fire in the early morning, once Argentinean bridgeheads had already been established. As with the Battles of Santa Fe, the central hingepoint of the front was once again the main focus of Operation Repulse (Repulsa in Spanish), with close to a hundred and fifty thousand Argentines punching through Parana while an additional fifty thousand, two divisions apiece, went over to both north and south at Santa Elena and near Rosario.

Contemporary and later historians have generally viewed Repulse as a failure that ended the future political ambitions of Chief of the Army Staff Ricchetti; disaster is too strong a word, but it was definitely not a successful operation. Launched on May 28 to take advantage of late autumn dry and cool conditions and a lull in rains that delayed the operation by two weeks, by June 7th the Argentines were in retreat, pulling back across the Parana to the safety of their lines. The precise reasons why Repulse, which was the first major offensive operation of the Argentinean Army in the war, didn't work are myriad and unclear. Ricchetti himself suggested that he had insufficiently prepared and briefed his commanders and that while his forces were extremely tenacious on defense were unsuited for and undisciplined on the attack. Other less charitable interpretations suggest that the attempted operation was too large and ambitious, with too men untrained men with too few supplies. Brazilian veterans always responded that their superior manpower, weaponry and tactics carried the day.

Whatever the reason, the feints to north and south were total routs, surrounded and destroyed almost instantly, and the main force attacking through Parana was forced to fall back to the river within days, with most of the force retreating while a hardened core of elite troops were left behind in the city under covering fire that prevented Brazilian airplanes from getting in close. In that sense, the operation had one partial success - Argentina once more had a foothold east of the river. However, it had come at the cost of over twenty thousand killed and near three times that figure wounded, captured or both.

As June advanced, Fonseca elected to press his advantage with the collapse of the Argentine offensive and "throw the die," so to speak, on attempting a breakout from the Goya Pocket in the north of the front. Already holding the town of Reconquista on the right bank just south of the impassable Ibera Wetlands, Fonseca sent four divisions across from Goya to march south along the river road, cutting off Argentinean supply routes to Paraguay, while sending another two divisions across from Esquina while his first wave attacked defenders who could have prevented their crossing. Suddenly, a very formidable force of Brazilians was across the river, albeit far from the core of the front. Fonseca's plan was to throw his six divisions down the right bank into the rear of Argentine defenses near Santa Fe, weaken them, and then smash the city once and for all. It was a daring and necessary gamble, considering the frustrations at home with his adamancy that the war had to go on until the green-and-gold Imperial banner flew over the Plaza de Mayo.

Like most of Fonseca's more ambitious gambits in the wake of Uruguay's successful capture, however, the "Goya Breakout" failed. Ricchetti's forces may have been incapable of sustaining an offensive into the teeth of Brazilian defenses but knew how to fight tactically and with discipline when attacked, and had the advantage of not having to face the same kind of overwhelming combined arms tactics of air power and artillery as they had just a month prior during Repulse. The Argentine Army held at San Justo, counterattacked at Ramayon while inflicting disproportionate casualties, and then scattered the larger Brazilian force at San Javier on the marshy banks of the Parana on July 10th. The Brazilians retreated in shambles, with only a single division pursuing at a distance to make sure they put distance between themselves and Santa Fe, to their stronghold at Reconquista to lick their wounds. Fonseca was once again humiliated, unable to force a result even after the enemy had embarrassed themselves, and with Argentina being able to bring the full force of its soldiery to the Parana with Chile out of the war and American naval assets now in the River Plate, Brazil's window of opportunity to strike a killing blow was gone.

The Goya Breakout thus was, in the middle of the Argentine winter, the last major offensive undertaken by Brazil in the entire war..."

- War in the Cone
Did American Army took part in Operation repulse?
 
Sounds like Argentina and Brazil should just sit in their trenches and not attack because it goes very poorly. And yet, each side has generals who are adamant that, no, this attack will be the one that breaks though.

Spoilers: it won't. Trench warfare is devious like that.
Made even more difficult in their case because it's not just no-man's land in between them, but the freaking Parana River, which is basically a floating lake you can sail dreadnoughts up!

So, yes. They should just stay put and hash out a peace treaty.
Did American Army took part in Operation repulse?
Some scattered volunteers from the US, maybe, but not the US Army, no.
 
British media will for sure report angrily on Indian attacks on white residents. What won’t reach the news (except for Asian news and some Western socialist papers) is the inevitable mass murder of Indian civilians by the British army
 
British media will for sure report angrily on Indian attacks on white residents. What won’t reach the news (except for Asian news and some Western socialist papers) is the inevitable mass murder of Indian civilians by the British army
You are more likely to get to get Confederate histories to report about atrocities committed by the men in gray [1] than British press to report about the mass murder of Indians.

[1] Do they still wear gray?
 
British media will for sure report angrily on Indian attacks on white residents. What won’t reach the news (except for Asian news and some Western socialist papers) is the inevitable mass murder of Indian civilians by the British army
You are more likely to get to get Confederate histories to report about atrocities committed by the men in gray [1] than British press to report about the mass murder of Indians.

[1] Do they still wear gray?
Whoa there idk what you’re talking about the British were famously sensitive to the needs of the Indian people, particularly in regards to sanitation and a stable food supply, and definitely would just let bygones be bygones with this whole Punjabi misunderstanding

And yes in my head canon the CS Army wears field gray
 
Why hasn't the United States sent any advisors for helping Argentina develop the necessary institutional knowledge to break through trench warfare? Is it not wanting to help Argentina because "Brazil isn't important now anyway and eww commies don't need any more strength" or is it benign neglect on the part of fhe US?
 
Why hasn't the United States sent any advisors for helping Argentina develop the necessary institutional knowledge to break through trench warfare? Is it not wanting to help Argentina because "Brazil isn't important now anyway and eww commies don't need any more strength" or is it benign neglect on the part of fhe US?
Up to now they’ve sort of just been friends fighting separate wars; there’s probably a bit of that now.

Also, the Parana is simply just an entirely different animal than either the Susquehanna or Potomac, and the Argentines have so far more than held their own fighting on the defensive

And Alemism =\= Communism, though it’s probably a tick or two left of even most progressive Americans
 
Why hasn't the United States sent any advisors for helping Argentina develop the necessary institutional knowledge to break through trench warfare? Is it not wanting to help Argentina because "Brazil isn't important now anyway and eww commies don't need any more strength" or is it benign neglect on the part of fhe US?
I'd honestly say that it is possible that Argentina with all of the institutional knowledge that that US has might not be able to break through. The Argentines don't have the Brazilians outnumbered the way that the Americans do and while the US has broken through rivers, I'm not sure that everything applies
 
I'd honestly say that it is possible that Argentina with all of the institutional knowledge that that US has might not be able to break through. The Argentines don't have the Brazilians outnumbered the way that the Americans do and while the US has broken through rivers, I'm not sure that everything applies
Also, while the US has begun using early tanks, I'm not sure that they are produced in enough numbers for the US to share. The US will still need them in places like Atlanta.
 
Also, while the US has begun using early tanks, I'm not sure that they are produced in enough numbers for the US to share. The US will still need them in places like Atlanta.
I think these are good points - especially since we know that Brazil and Argentine eventually come to terms which favor the prior; I'm expecting Argentina to go on the offensive and get absolutely bloodied, leading to a peace of exhaustion in the not too distant future. Especially coming off the successful conclusion of the Chilean front and now having prevented Brazil's attempt at a breathrough, I'm betting some Argentina generals are going to be flush with victory and figuring that they have men to spare - so why NOT try to kick Brazil 'when they're down.' That will, of course, go about as well as you'd expect
 
I think these are good points - especially since we know that Brazil and Argentine eventually come to terms which favor the prior; I'm expecting Argentina to go on the offensive and get absolutely bloodied, leading to a peace of exhaustion in the not too distant future. Especially coming off the successful conclusion of the Chilean front and now having prevented Brazil's attempt at a breathrough, I'm betting some Argentina generals are going to be flush with victory and figuring that they have men to spare - so why NOT try to kick Brazil 'when they're down.' That will, of course, go about as well as you'd expect
I mean, Argentina just tried attacking across the Parana and got their collective dicks kicked in.
 
Why hasn't the United States sent any advisors for helping Argentina develop the necessary institutional knowledge to break through trench warfare? Is it not wanting to help Argentina because "Brazil isn't important now anyway and eww commies don't need any more strength" or is it benign neglect on the part of fhe US?
You're assuming that Argentinia would accept, let alone ask for American advisors in the first place. Why should they? It's not like the Yankees could possibly know things they don't. Next thing you'll be saying the Yanks could have used British advisors during OTLs Operation Drumbeat 😏.
 
I mean, Argentina just tried attacking across the Parana and got their collective dicks kicked in.
Yeah, the sequence of events Dan is describing has already largely begun/occurred
You're assuming that Argentinia would accept, let alone ask for American advisors in the first place. Why should they? It's not like the Yankees could possibly know things they don't. Next thing you'll be saying the Yanks could have used British advisors during OTLs Operation Drumbeat 😏.
Hehe fair!
 
You're assuming that Argentinia would accept, let alone ask for American advisors in the first place. Why should they? It's not like the Yankees could possibly know things they don't. Next thing you'll be saying the Yanks could have used British advisors during OTLs Operation Drumbeat 😏.
I don't know what that is.
 
A Freedom Bought With Blood: Emancipation and the Postwar Confederacy
TRIGGER WARNING

"...no real way to sugarcoat what had happened at Nashville. Even if much of the city's heavy and medium industry had been evacuated south in anticipation of its fall, it was still a critical strategic target and the Confederacy's command understood the significance of the United States capturing control of the Nashville Basin in May of 1915, perhaps most critically in that it left positions along the Tennessee River to the west unsustainably vulnerable, and a retreat eastwards to a forward base around Corinth, Mississippi was ordered once it was clear Nashville was lost. In one fell swoop, the CS Army was evacuated from almost all of Tennessee west of Dickson County, and the same kind of rapid collapse in order that had been seen in Kentucky followed.

A French observer attached to Confederate command near Jackson, Tennessee remarked in later years that what made lessons from the war difficult for European general staffs to incorporate was the vast size of the theaters involved; only in Virginia, relatively concentrated between the Appalachians and the Chesapeake, did the circumstances even begin to resemble anything approximating a typical European theater of war. The Yankees could not reasonably hope to occupy all of Kentucky and the majority of Middle and West Tennessee, such a task was simply impossible, and so the heavy reliance on small scouting teams - S2s, as they came to be known - as cavalry detachments or driving around on narrow dirt roads in rudimentary automobiles was necessary for patrolling the Confederate countryside. In a scene soon to be repeated in central Virginia and Georgia, the already strained Confederate society living under rationing of supplies as simple as a helping of butter, a paucity of adult men due to the needs at the front and infirm veterans increasingly a burden on meagre resources was not equipped to handle the psychological blow of falling permanently behind enemy lines.

That was way the sudden break of Confederate positions in Tennessee in May and June 1915 started what can best be described as an anarchic civil conflict between neighbors and, most importantly, their slaves. Weapons had a curious way of finding their way into Black hands across the plantations and farmsteads of West Tennessee and the horse ranches south of Nashville as the Confederate Army vanished into thin air and Yankees approached; rumors had already arrived ahead of guns and bullets that Yankee soldiers meant formal emancipation, so the swirling firepower that the land found itself awash in meant informal emancipation until they arrived. Slaves, many of whom had never held a gun before in their lives, shot and killed their overseers and gathered in small groups to defend themselves as they hurried north towards American lines. The white citizenry, engulfed in horror at the idea of the mass slave uprising they had feared their entire lives, responded with a campaign of reactive terror; freedmen in their communities were lynched even without the accusation of a crime simply out of fear that they would join what were quickly becoming known as the "Black Bands," slaves were preemptively sent south ahead of their fleeing masters and those who could not afford to be sent on were summarily executed and left for the advancing Yankees to find.

American soldiers were not of as much help to fleeing slaves as they had hoped, either; they were often marching on fairly empty stomachs after long, brutal and bloody battles and high on victory. Anybody with a rifle was treated as an enemy combatant on several occasions in which excited slaves were gunned down in misunderstandings, and the Army had no orders on what to do with the "emancipees" other than point them in the direction of Kentucky and tell them to get out of combat areas while they could. Refugee trains wandering north were easy pickings not only for Confederate irregulars and militias but simply hungry brigands; upon arriving in Kentucky, they were often shepherded into camps where they could be held for the time being until the Yankees decided how exactly to process them, and while most were eventually sent further along or volunteered to join American forces and such help was readily accepted, a great many - particularly women and children - starved or died of disease outbreaks in squalid huts and poor conditions as the US Army twiddled its thumbs on whether to send them further north.

The US Army's advance into Confederate territory matched with the formation of defensive Black Bands broke the white locals the most, however, and radicalization was rapid. Lurid stories of Yankee infantrymen encouraging freed slaves to gangrape white women after lynching white men from trees spread like wildfire across Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia along with southbound refugee trains; while there were hundreds if not thousands of instances of rape by American soldiers, it is generally accepted by most mainstream scholarship that Yankee infantry was considerably more restrained in occupation than their Confederate counterparts had been in Maryland and Pennsylvania and that strict orders from generals such as Pershing, Lenihan and Farnsworth to refrain from such behavior were generally taken seriously by junior officers. These kinds of rumors, then, instead represent a specific form of white panic common to Dixie, of the fears of bestial Black behavior, used to justify unthinkable cruelty and violence in a self-convinced form of self-defense. Within weeks of the fall of Nashville it was simply taken for granted that the Yankee army represented a rolling wave of looting, debauchery and the rape of the white Confederate woman by freed slaves taking out their revenge. To understand why the last year of the war came to be seen in the Confederacy in uniquely apocalyptic terms and as a civilizational struggle - compared to, say, Mexico or Brazil, which elected in the interim to find peace agreements they and the United States or Argentina could all live with and get out of the conflict - that they were losing, one must understand the Confederate mindset that was witnessing the collapse of its racial slave hierarchy in real time and its anticipation that "Continental Haiti" was afoot, and that it was this foundational horror finally coming to fruition that motivated the spectacularly chaotic atrocities that erupted behind Confederate lines and evolved into such campaigns of terror such as the Red Summer..."

- A Freedom Bought With Blood: Emancipation and the Postwar Confederacy
 
TRIGGER WARNING

"...no real way to sugarcoat what had happened at Nashville. Even if much of the city's heavy and medium industry had been evacuated south in anticipation of its fall, it was still a critical strategic target and the Confederacy's command understood the significance of the United States capturing control of the Nashville Basin in May of 1915, perhaps most critically in that it left positions along the Tennessee River to the west unsustainably vulnerable, and a retreat eastwards to a forward base around Corinth, Mississippi was ordered once it was clear Nashville was lost. In one fell swoop, the CS Army was evacuated from almost all of Tennessee west of Dickson County, and the same kind of rapid collapse in order that had been seen in Kentucky followed.

A French observer attached to Confederate command near Jackson, Tennessee remarked in later years that what made lessons from the war difficult for European general staffs to incorporate was the vast size of the theaters involved; only in Virginia, relatively concentrated between the Appalachians and the Chesapeake, did the circumstances even begin to resemble anything approximating a typical European theater of war. The Yankees could not reasonably hope to occupy all of Kentucky and the majority of Middle and West Tennessee, such a task was simply impossible, and so the heavy reliance on small scouting teams - S2s, as they came to be known - as cavalry detachments or driving around on narrow dirt roads in rudimentary automobiles was necessary for patrolling the Confederate countryside. In a scene soon to be repeated in central Virginia and Georgia, the already strained Confederate society living under rationing of supplies as simple as a helping of butter, a paucity of adult men due to the needs at the front and infirm veterans increasingly a burden on meagre resources was not equipped to handle the psychological blow of falling permanently behind enemy lines.

That was way the sudden break of Confederate positions in Tennessee in May and June 1915 started what can best be described as an anarchic civil conflict between neighbors and, most importantly, their slaves. Weapons had a curious way of finding their way into Black hands across the plantations and farmsteads of West Tennessee and the horse ranches south of Nashville as the Confederate Army vanished into thin air and Yankees approached; rumors had already arrived ahead of guns and bullets that Yankee soldiers meant formal emancipation, so the swirling firepower that the land found itself awash in meant informal emancipation until they arrived. Slaves, many of whom had never held a gun before in their lives, shot and killed their overseers and gathered in small groups to defend themselves as they hurried north towards American lines. The white citizenry, engulfed in horror at the idea of the mass slave uprising they had feared their entire lives, responded with a campaign of reactive terror; freedmen in their communities were lynched even without the accusation of a crime simply out of fear that they would join what were quickly becoming known as the "Black Bands," slaves were preemptively sent south ahead of their fleeing masters and those who could not afford to be sent on were summarily executed and left for the advancing Yankees to find.

American soldiers were not of as much help to fleeing slaves as they had hoped, either; they were often marching on fairly empty stomachs after long, brutal and bloody battles and high on victory. Anybody with a rifle was treated as an enemy combatant on several occasions in which excited slaves were gunned down in misunderstandings, and the Army had no orders on what to do with the "emancipees" other than point them in the direction of Kentucky and tell them to get out of combat areas while they could. Refugee trains wandering north were easy pickings not only for Confederate irregulars and militias but simply hungry brigands; upon arriving in Kentucky, they were often shepherded into camps where they could be held for the time being until the Yankees decided how exactly to process them, and while most were eventually sent further along or volunteered to join American forces and such help was readily accepted, a great many - particularly women and children - starved or died of disease outbreaks in squalid huts and poor conditions as the US Army twiddled its thumbs on whether to send them further north.

The US Army's advance into Confederate territory matched with the formation of defensive Black Bands broke the white locals the most, however, and radicalization was rapid. Lurid stories of Yankee infantrymen encouraging freed slaves to gangrape white women after lynching white men from trees spread like wildfire across Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia along with southbound refugee trains; while there were hundreds if not thousands of instances of rape by American soldiers, it is generally accepted by most mainstream scholarship that Yankee infantry was considerably more restrained in occupation than their Confederate counterparts had been in Maryland and Pennsylvania and that strict orders from generals such as Pershing, Lenihan and Farnsworth to refrain from such behavior were generally taken seriously by junior officers. These kinds of rumors, then, instead represent a specific form of white panic common to Dixie, of the fears of bestial Black behavior, used to justify unthinkable cruelty and violence in a self-convinced form of self-defense. Within weeks of the fall of Nashville it was simply taken for granted that the Yankee army represented a rolling wave of looting, debauchery and the rape of the white Confederate woman by freed slaves taking out their revenge. To understand why the last year of the war came to be seen in the Confederacy in uniquely apocalyptic terms and as a civilizational struggle - compared to, say, Mexico or Brazil, which elected in the interim to find peace agreements they and the United States or Argentina could all live with and get out of the conflict - that they were losing, one must understand the Confederate mindset that was witnessing the collapse of its racial slave hierarchy in real time and its anticipation that "Continental Haiti" was afoot, and that it was this foundational horror finally coming to fruition that motivated the spectacularly chaotic atrocities that erupted behind Confederate lines and evolved into such campaigns of terror such as the Red Summer..."

- A Freedom Bought With Blood: Emancipation and the Postwar Confederacy
This is a horrifyingly well written chapter. Bravo.

You capture the lurid nightmare the Confederates are going through perfectly.
 
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