Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

The Chieftain has reviewed many tanks, and compares it unfavourably to almost everything else he's been in. Also, how many other review channels are there? I'm aware of the Tank Museum, but asking Mr. Fletcher to clamber aound inside the vehicles is probably unfair given his age. Are there any others that give a hands-on, as-the-crew-would-experience-it type of review?
We might be talking about very different things here, you seem to seem to want more "Youtuber X gives opinion about <blank>"videos, and you are absolutely welcome to go out and find that sort of material for yourself. What I'm trying to draw your attention towards is that The Chieftain, like many others, likes to go to primary source material, and in the case of the Sentinel that includes testing done by the Australian Armoured Corps over the 1942-3 period, this is ultimately the people who laid out the specification and would be the ones using the tank in combat (if it came to that). The only problem noted about the gunner's position was they wanted a seat belt. So something doesn't add up here, there's no evidence to my knowledge that the British expert had any concerns over the position, neither did the Australians working on the design, the troop trials only came back with the desired for a seat belt (I'm going off memory here), the US lend-lease tank expert who had no end of negative things to say, even about some trivial matters didn't notice anything amiss, Nicholas Moran has to sit sideways and fold himself up in a most comical way and still can't use the controls (his description of those controls is also in part wrong). Even if you like the guy and his presentations, he's an outlier in this matter.

Re the manpower stuff, the railways went into munitions work because they had a large pool of skilled workers who were idle or under used. The release of workers from the tank project made no real difference to the overall workforce situation because there weren't all that many of them (there is a reason it took so long to build just the 60 odd tanks they did) and a good chunk of those workers, the moulders and casters for example, couldn't readily be used for other war work. The Chullora annexe did not go back to making railway engines, it did some modification work to rectify defects on other AFVs and also aircraft assembly (Beauforts I believe). The only real conflict the tanks had with other munitions work was over draughtsman.
 
It's a pity it wasn't tested by anyone else. The Americans has more exacting standards for crew comfort IIRC.
As I said, the US lend lease sent an Ordnance officer with a considerable amount of experience with AFVs, he got to drive the tanks around and complained the the gearbox was noisy. It uses straight cut gears, that's just what it is going to sound like it's not evidence of a fault. He thought the US VVSS suspension was better than the HVSS the Australian tanks were fitted with, the fun you have with that statement after the US starts fitting HVSS to its tanks. He made no mention of the torturous turret conditions. But ultimately what the US thinks of a tank, that the US will never use itself, is of greatly limited value.
 
Okay, fair enough. Still, I find it interesting that the Chieftain compared it unfavorably to the Matilda II.
If we are prepared to paddle out into uncertain waters and engage in wild speculation as to what might be going on: In his presentation at one point he remarks that the hull ammunition racks have been moved into the turret basket and he's resting his elbow on them, so he's going to feel more constricted than he would otherwise. In the AC1 the hull ammo racks sit above the battery boxes, in a museum exhibit you would want to disconnect and maybe remove the batteries entirely as they're full of acid and if they leak your exhibit begins to dissolve itself, or maybe there's an electrical short and it catches fire. Lots of other reasons too. The easiest access should be from the turret basket, as part of getting access you might want to move the gunner's seat to its highest position so you can get under it to get at the batteries. A tall long-legged person might find that seat-height normal and comfortable and so wouldn't question it, but would be unable to get his legs more forward under the traverse controller as you are supposed to be seated, and from there we get what wee see in the Inside the Hatch video. If you don't know the seat is adjustable you might not realise there is a foot pedal to the front, doubly so if you are seated sideways, that will release the seat and let you freely set the height over its 8" range (or it might be it's 80 year old exhibit and it's rusted or seized in place) and take your position properly. That however would fall squarely under user-error, not design-fault. But as stated, wild speculation: 'Dunno for sure coz I wazn't there, mate.

As for the Matilda comparison, yeah, but one of the Sentinel's design principles was a low silhouette so isn't all that much taller than the Matilda, but the Sentinel also follows the US M3 Medium design and so the drive line runs under the turret basket. There's at most 2m from the hull floor to the turret roof if you strip the tank bare, The Chieftain's a tall bloke, I don't think there's all that much to be done to accommodate his stature short of "make the tank taller". He's on record as saying something along the lines of "if he fits smaller people will have a ton of room" and that's true enough, the opposite though? I would suggest if he doesn't fit no useful conclusions may be drawn.
 
He did mention some specific issues, such as the manual turret traverse mechanism getting in the way of the gunner's knees, or the commander's and gunner's seats being so close together than it would be difficult for the commander to sit straight ahead without his knees digging into the gunner's back.
 
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6 February 1942. Moulmein, Burma.
6 February 1942. Moulmein, Burma.

The declaration of war against Thailand had been made official, though for the men of the 11th African Division it was a moot point. 21st and 22nd East Africa Infantry Brigades had been concentrating at Kawkareik. The pass through the Tenasserim hills had been on the main points at which an enemy invasion from Thailand would have to be resisted. Brigadier Alan Ritchie’s 21st EA Brigade was made up of the 1st Battalion North Rhodesia Regiment, and the 1/2 and 1/4 Battalions of the Kings African Rifles. Brigadier Wilfred Ebsworth’s 22nd EA Brigade had three battalions of the KAR (1/1, 1/6 and 5th Bns). The other Division’s Brigade (1st West Africa Infantry Brigade) would continue the hold the position, and be ready to follow up the incursion into Thailand.

The plan was to advance over the border and through the hills towards the town of Tak and the river Ping. The two Infantry Brigades were accompanied by most of the Division’s artillery, engineers and medical units. The ‘road’ (more like a cart track) towards the Thai border was something that needed to be upgraded for the kind of traffic that would be needed to support a full invasion.

Acting Lieutenant-General Bill Slim had been emphasising the need to improve the infrastructure as far as possible. The Governor of Burma had agreed to this, and the work was being done by local labour under the watchful eyes of the Royal Engineers or Bombay Sappers and Miners. Where enough labour wasn’t available, an agreement had been reached the Governor General in India to provide extra civilian manpower. Slim had also requested elements of the Pioneer Corps be assigned to his command. In the short term he had one of the three Brigades of 14th Indian Division working as Line of Communications troops, while the other two were intensifying their training.

Slim’s old 10th Indian Division was concentrating in Moulmein, ready to follow the 11th African Division. Two Regiments of 2nd Indian Armoured Brigade (13th Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers, 4th Duke of Cambridge's Own Hodson's Horse) were going to accompany the 10th Indian Division, roads allowing. Once the East Africans had secured Tak and a crossing of the river there, then Douglas Gracie’s 10th Indian Division, would swing south to threaten Bangkok.

Already 2nd Burma Brigade had been moving along the west coast of Burma to re-establish control of the country all the way to Victoria Point. For the most part they were finding very little opposition, with the Thai troops that had replaced the Japanese, generally happy to pull back to their own country rather than take on the Burmese regiments.

Slim had deliberately set a slow timetable for this advance. While the capture of Bangkok and taking Thailand out of the war was important, the priority was to give the Japanese facing the Indian and Australian Corps in Malaya another headache to deal with. It seemed clear that the Japanese had underestimated the size of force they would need to capture Singapore. Having to defend their line of communications back to French Indo-China would be another task for which they were unprepared. Hopefully, by taking the initiative, the British Empire forces would make the Japanese have to react rather than follow their own timetable.

The 7th Indian and 9th (Highland) Divisions remained in place, Slim wanted them fully acclimatised and trained before the next phase of operations, which would possibly need to wait until after the next monsoon season beginning in mid-May and ending around mid-October.
 
Hm, so they're taking things slow and building up the infrastructure before going in. Good to hear. This new action will create another headache for the Japanese.
 
He did mention some specific issues, such as the manual turret traverse mechanism getting in the way of the gunner's knees, or the commander's and gunner's seats being so close together than it would be difficult for the commander to sit straight ahead without his knees digging into the gunner's back.
Indeed he does, a condition that can of course be remedied by have the seat, and therefore the gunner's legs and knees lower down. He also says that if the manual traverse isn't disconnected under power traverse the handle will "come around and take your leg off". No. The gearing used does not permit the manual traverse to be back-driven by the electrical traverse, nor vice versa, and in any case the manual traverse handle is a dual control as it also optionally operates the power traverse. Which would of course be doubly impossible if it were spinning wildly of its own accord and amputating legs. What The Chieftain points to and says power traverse, is a sort of secondary-input/fine-control for continuous tracking of moving targets. If you just want to power the turret around to point at a new target you don't need to touch it at all, your left hand never needs to leave the hand crank.

I've been staying solely on the gunner's position because that's what most people fixate on from those videos. Yes the commander's position copped some negative comment, I believe it was words to the effect of "he can be expected to suffer some discomfort if it is necessary to operate closed down for an extended period." As before, it's not a huge tank, they wanted small and hard to hit and that's what was made.
 
Have to wonder if the IJA is still having it's blind optimism however you slice it they are in quite a bit of trouble right now.
 
Have to wonder if the IJA is still having it's blind optimism however you slice it they are in quite a bit of trouble right now.
Well they haven't really had the chance to get 'victory disease' here, since, other than the Philippines, they've really not had a good time of things.
 
Well they haven't really had the chance to get 'victory disease' here, since, other than the Philippines, they've really not had a good time of things.
And China has been going well for them which has really shaped a lot of their Tactical, Strategic and what passes for their logistics.

But China is damned manpower sink at the end of the day. It also doesn't help due to the hyper focus on aggressive doctrine while on the defensive right now its lacking.
 
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Well they haven't really had the chance to get 'victory disease' here, since, other than the Philippines, they've really not had a good time of things.
It was more an affliction that the IJN was prone to, rather than the IJA. The IJN believed that they were invincible until they encounted an equally determined USN. They attempted to enlist the IJA in a scheme where they invaded the Australian mainland. The IJA didn't believe it was possible, with the ships available. The IJN was convinced it was possible. During the conference where this was discussed, their subordinates came to physical blows.
 
Hawker Henley?
That's a target tug, I'm more thinking things like the Hurribomber and then the Typhoon, all planes that could deal with the 109 while dumping death on tactical targets. The fundamental problem is that the Battle belongs to a different age, five years earlier it would have been an integral part of operations but by WW2 it really needed demoting to training, replaced with a medium bomber for its missions and someone to design hardpoints, cannon and a more powerful Merlin into the Hurri a bit earlier.

Obviously while the Covenanter was a crap tank but they were at least trying. Those POS's the Dutch received had no place on a battlefield in 1918 let alone 1941. If a K-Bullet can penetrate the hull it's not even an armoured car let along an AFV.
 
Yeah well obsolete concept let alone type. A light bomber can't carry enough ordinance for anything other than small attacks so once fighter bombers came along their day was done.
The Skyraider was never considered a fighter and its 8000lb payload was not minor ( and it was carrier capable ). So the concept is not obsolete, it just needs a powerful enough engine. Go to the twin engine light bomber and there are more examples ( although working out which are lights and which more accuratly mediums is tricky as the boundary changes with year. )
 
That's a target tug, I'm more thinking things like the Hurribomber and then the Typhoon, all planes that could deal with the 109 while dumping death on tactical targets. The fundamental problem is that the Battle belongs to a different age, five years earlier it would have been an integral part of operations but by WW2 it really needed demoting to training, replaced with a medium bomber for its missions and someone to design hardpoints, cannon and a more powerful Merlin into the Hurri a bit earlier.

Obviously while the Covenanter was a crap tank but they were at least trying. Those POS's the Dutch received had no place on a battlefield in 1918 let alone 1941. If a K-Bullet can penetrate the hull it's not even an armoured car let along an AFV.
The Henley became a target tug. I t was originally concieved as a light bomber and would probably been a better machine than the Battle. It was faster, could carrier a heavier bomb load and suffered in comparison only in the matter of range.
 
The Skyraider was never considered a fighter and its 8000lb payload was not minor ( and it was carrier capable ). So the concept is not obsolete, it just needs a powerful enough engine. Go to the twin engine light bomber and there are more examples ( although working out which are lights and which more accuratly mediums is tricky as the boundary changes with year. )
Different time, the Skyraider was designed as a ground attack aircraft and had some standoff capability (as well as semi decent armour). Dropping smallish ammount of bomb's from an aircraft vulnerable to early war AA (which pre proximity fuse were hyper ineffective and more about morale than anything else) is another matter.
 
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