Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

That might be the case today, but in WW2 it is so blatantly false as to be laughable. In WW2 a tanks is used to kill absolutely anything enemy-owned that it comes across, be it another tank, an armoured car, a bunker, a MG nest, etc. Heck, the reluctance to give up the hull MG is because it was expected, in large part, to be facing off against enemy infantry.
Even more, in WW2 only 25% of British tanks were destroyed by German tanks: https://books.google.es/books/about...of_German_An.html?id=OV9gB_XhIBEC&redir_esc=y
    • Theatre (tanks) Mines AT guns Tanks SP guns Bazooka Other Total
    • NW Europe (1305)22.1% 22.7% 14.5% 24.4% 14.2% 2.1% 100%
    • Italy (671) 30% 16% 12% 26% 9% 7% 100%
    • N Africa (1734) 19.5% 40.3% 38.2% nil nil 2% 100%
    • Mean values 22.3% 29.4% 25.3% 13.5% 6.1% 3% 100%
 
The Charioteer had an enlarged turret ring of IIRC 60” which allowed not only the 84mm 20 Pounder but also was trialled with the 105mm L7 which worked. The Jordanians improved it with stronger traverse motors and fitted a 0,5” Browning but it was never a tank but rather a turreted anti tank gun. A better Archer. Criticised for a thinly armoured tall turret of poor depression (the hull could not drop the breech low enough) but in use it was found easy to hide in a full hull down position as only the turret was exposed which could be easily camouflaged in a prepared positioned. Useful for many years where the light weight and narrow width allowed it to use forest tracks and light bridges unsuitable for Centurions and the like. Still around here and there in the Middle East where it’s mobility allows a quite powerful gun to be brought to difficult places. The addition of the 0,5” Browning was to allow the Charioteer to approach built up areas by suppressing fire from upper floors. The same reason Lebanese 75mm Staghound armoured cars stayed in use and were fitted with the 0,5” Browning on top.
Well the Victor in this case has a 66" turret ring and a 75mm HV gun, so it won't need as much work to be up-gunned, if indeed the need is ever there.

CS tanks had a howitzer intended for high angle fire with a very short barrel. That’s how they fit a much higher calibre in the same turret. The low velocity round would not have been able to hit a specific target at anything over point blank range.
And that's the thing about HE, you don't need to be perfectly accurate.

No, they added in the 75. The 6 pounder remained in more British tanks (ignoring the Sherman swarm which was as much about production as effective use). And obviously you prefer a larger gun. It had similar AT while also having better HE. If the 77 mm or 17 pounder had been available at the time, they would have gone for that too.
Um, the Churchill VI, VII and VIII were all fitted with the 75mm, and many of the earlier models were converted, including ~210 that were modified to take the Sherman's 75mm gun. In addition, most Cromwells were fitted with the 75mm from the factories.
 
And that's the thing about HE, you don't need to be perfectly accurate.
If one looks at the photographs of the Royal Marines 95mm Centaurs in France in 1944 you can see all sorts of aiming aids painted on the turrets and they were firing from known places on a map at other known places on a map ie known fixed points so their indirect HE fire could be accurate. Now consider a OTL CS 3.7” tank in use firing at anti tank guns indirectly whose position can be seen but the range only estimated, from an estimated position on a map, on which you have only just arrived at and may not even see the anti tank gun position but rely on an estimated map reference. If your gun has a dispersion of 100 yards and the range estimate is 100 yards out then the dispersion of your shot will very rarely hit anywhere near your target. What the later M3 and QF 75mm guns had was a direct fire capability which removed much of the errors except at maximum ranges. This is the reason for the doctrine of masking anti tank guns and/or ones own tanks with smoke when using short barrelled howitzers and breech loading mortars. For the guns in use smoke was the better choice but seems to not have been used so much in North Africa in tank actions as far as I know. Add on a moving target if it were a tank or other moving vehicle then you are in lottery win territory for a chance to hit it lobbing a 3.7” HE howitzer round in it’s general direction.

Whilst this explains the choice of smoke that followed from the deficiencies of the mountain howitzers and breech loading mortars used before the direct fire 75mm guns were in general use. One must look at the priorities of the army pre war. A lower priority than the other services for the Treasury which limited funds and the urgent priories for AA guns and field artillery and so forth. The 2 Pounder was already funded as an AT battalion gun and the 3.7” was an existing mountain howitzer so the funds would not allow for a purpose built gun so they made do with what was already available. Meanwhile they were finishing the designs for the 6 Pounder for production and starting work on the 17 Pounder which gave the direct fire capability and removed the problem so tank guns got HE across the board. The 95mm CS gun was the follow on of cobbled together existing bits and also was not for direct fire, especially on a moving target.

As ever, rather than looking at the technical affairs one should follow the money for the root reason for the 3.7” CS gun not having much HE supplied.
 
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Um, the Churchill VI, VII and VIII were all fitted with the 75mm, and many of the earlier models were converted, including ~210 that were modified to take the Sherman's 75mm gun. In addition, most Cromwells were fitted with the 75mm from the factories.
Over 600 Mk III’s were produced along with 1622 Mk IV’s, all with the 6 pounder. Even with the 200 some converted to the NA 75 (which as far as I can tell where the only ones) that leaves over 2000 produced (less losses). There were 200 Mk VI produced with the 75 mm. The MkVII had the 75 as well but the Mk VIII had the 95 mm. Together there were 1600 of these produced, but the split between them is not obvious (at least to my searching). Even assuming 90 percent of them were Mk VII’s and adding in the 200 North Africa conversions there are still fewer Churchill’s with the 75 than the 6 pounder. What’s more, both the 6 pounder variants and the Mk VI 75’s were later upgraded to the Mk XI and Mk X with armour closer to the Mk VII’s. The 6 pounder and the 75 mm were used alongside one another.

The Cromwell got the 75 because it wouldn’t fit the 77 mm it was supposed to have. A gun which used the 17 pounder projectile.

And that's the thing about HE, you don't need to be perfectly accurate.
You need to be able to hit the same postal code.

In addition to what has already been posted, operational research from Operation Veritable in 1945 found that 3600 rounds of 80 lb 5.5″ fire landing in a 300 yard diameter area managed to knock out just 1 gun of a 5 gun battery. A second six-gun 8.8 cm battery was engaged with 5700 rounds landing in a 300 yard diameter circle. This knocked out two guns. Now those batteries were definitely suppressed, but this does show that the ability of HE to destroy AT guns can be overestimated.
 
If one looks at the photographs of the Royal Marines 95mm Centaurs in France in 1944 you can see all sorts of aiming aids painted on the turrets and they were firing from known places on a map at other known places on a map ie known fixed points so their indirect HE fire could be accurate. Now consider a OTL CS 3.7” tank in use firing at anti tank guns indirectly whose position can be seen but the range only estimated, from an estimated position on a map, on which you have only just arrived at and may not even see the anti tank gun position but rely on an estimated map reference. If your gun has a dispersion of 100 yards and the range estimate is 100 yards out then the dispersion of your shot will very rarely hit anywhere near your target. What the later M3 and QF 75mm guns had was a direct fire capability which removed much of the errors except at maximum ranges. This is the reason for the doctrine of masking anti tank guns and/or ones own tanks with smoke when using short barrelled howitzers and breech loading mortars. For the guns in use smoke was the better choice but seems to not have been used so much in North Africa in tank actions as far as I know. Add on a moving target if it were a tank or other moving vehicle then you are in lottery win territory for a chance to hit it lobbing a 3.7” HE howitzer round in it’s general direction.

Whilst this explains the choice of smoke that followed from the deficiencies of the mountain howitzers and breech loading mortars used before the direct fire 75mm guns were in general use. One must look at the priorities of the army pre war. A lower priority than the other services for the Treasury which limited funds and the urgent priories for AA guns and field artillery and so forth. The 2 Pounder was already funded as an AT battalion gun and the 3.7” was an existing mountain howitzer so the funds would not allow for a purpose built gun so they made do with what was already available. Meanwhile they were finishing the designs for the 6 Pounder for production and starting work on the 17 Pounder which gave the direct fire capability and removed the problem so tank guns got HE across the board. The 95mm CS gun was the follow on of cobbled together existing bits and also was not for direct fire, especially on a moving target.

As ever, rather than looking at the technical affairs one should follow the money for the root reason for the 3.7” CS gun not having much HE supplied.
And also at the politics of the factions involved.

Over 600 Mk III’s were produced along with 1622 Mk IV’s, all with the 6 pounder. Even with the 200 some converted to the NA 75 (which as far as I can tell where the only ones) that leaves over 2000 produced (less losses). There were 200 Mk VI produced with the 75 mm. The MkVII had the 75 as well but the Mk VIII had the 95 mm. Together there were 1600 of these produced, but the split between them is not obvious (at least to my searching). Even assuming 90 percent of them were Mk VII’s and adding in the 200 North Africa conversions there are still fewer Churchill’s with the 75 than the 6 pounder. What’s more, both the 6 pounder variants and the Mk VI 75’s were later upgraded to the Mk XI and Mk X with armour closer to the Mk VII’s. The 6 pounder and the 75 mm were used alongside one another.
~210 Were converted to NA 75mm (using the Sherman's 75 gun), but more (though I can't find conclusive numbers) were regunned with the QF 75mm.

The Cromwell got the 75 because it wouldn’t fit the 77 mm it was supposed to have. A gun which used the 17 pounder projectile.
It was actually the HV 50 calibre 75mm gun that was being developed, not the 77mm gun later fitted to the Comet.

You need to be able to hit the same postal code.
It would be assumed that with a bit of training, that this would be achievable.

In addition to what has already been posted, operational research from Operation Veritable in 1945 found that 3600 rounds of 80 lb 5.5″ fire landing in a 300 yard diameter area managed to knock out just 1 gun of a 5 gun battery. A second six-gun 8.8 cm battery was engaged with 5700 rounds landing in a 300 yard diameter circle. This knocked out two guns. Now those batteries were definitely suppressed, but this does show that the ability of HE to destroy AT guns can be overestimated.
That is from artillery miles away, not the tank which has just reversed over the hill in order to prevent being blasted.
 
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With the perspective of retrospect, for lighter chassis tanks (for arguments sake let's say under 12 tonnes), was a 20mm-25mm autocannon perhaps the sweet spot for combination of anti-tank and anti-antitank gun/ammunition? Something like the German Kwk30 based on the long Solothurn round? On that note do we have any efficacy assessments on the Panzer II? It goes without saying it would be insufficient later in the war as tanks grew and added armour and larger guns....but in 1938-1940 for the opening phases, how effective was it?
 
~210 Were converted to NA 75mm (using the Sherman's 75 gun), but more (though I can't find conclusive numbers) were regunned with the QF 75mm.
Sources seem to conflict on this. Some seem to imply a bunch were converted but others seem to imply the opposite. Reading between the lines it seems like photos exist with Mk III/IV’s with muzzle breaks (which the 6 pounder didn’t have but the 75 mm did) but there doesn’t seem to be much documentation on them? Or at least little that I have found, for what that is worth.

It was actually the HV 50 calibre 75mm gun that was being developed, not the 77mm gun later fitted to the Comet.
It’s the same gun.

It would be assumed that with a bit of training, that this would be achievable.
You know what they say about the word assume right?

Hitting a specific target with a low velocity round from a short barrelled gun is basically an indirect fire task. that was Royal Artillery type training. Doing it from a moving platform just makes it even more difficult. How much extra training do you want to give the gunners of CS tanks?

That is from artillery miles away, not the tank which has just reversed over the hill in order to prevent being blasted.
It’s a 300 yard diameter circle. The first instance dropped 128 tons of explosive into that circle. The second dropped over 200 tons. At that saturation, where it came from starts to not matter.
 
With the perspective of retrospect, for lighter chassis tanks (for arguments sake let's say under 12 tonnes), was a 20mm-25mm autocannon perhaps the sweet spot for combination of anti-tank and anti-antitank gun/ammunition? Something like the German Kwk30 based on the long Solothurn round? On that note do we have any efficacy assessments on the Panzer II? It goes without saying it would be insufficient later in the war as tanks grew and added armour and larger guns....but in 1938-1940 for the opening phases, how effective was it?
Cyclical rate of fire was 600 rounds/minute according to wikipedia, though ~280 rounds/minute was sustainable (presumably due to magazine changes). I'm not sure tests were done, but I'd guess it was actually fairly capable against anything that wasn't another tank or a bunker. Against AT guns it might have actually been fairly good, due to being able to turn parts of the gun-shields into shrapnel.

Sources seem to conflict on this. Some seem to imply a bunch were converted but others seem to imply the opposite. Reading between the lines it seems like photos exist with Mk III/IV’s with muzzle breaks (which the 6 pounder didn’t have but the 75 mm did) but there doesn’t seem to be much documentation on them? Or at least little that I have found, for what that is worth.
Well this site suggests that some 257 were converted, though whether or not that includes the 'NA conversions' isn't mentioned. In addition, it mentions a hair over 1,500 as being 'reworked, though precisely what that means is, again, unexplained.

It’s the same gun.
As far as I can tell, the 77mm was developed from the aborted 75mm HV, so it could be consider the same gun, similar to how the T6 was developed from the M1897.

You know what they say about the word assume right?

Hitting a specific target with a low velocity round from a short barrelled gun is basically an indirect fire task. that was Royal Artillery type training. Doing it from a moving platform just makes it even more difficult. How much extra training do you want to give the gunners of CS tanks?
They were trained to do it with smoke. And I doubt they'd be doing it from a moving vehicle, more likely one that is stopped just behind cover/concealment.

It’s a 300 yard diameter circle. The first instance dropped 128 tons of explosive into that circle. The second dropped over 200 tons. At that saturation, where it came from starts to not matter.
Fair enough, though it does require a trained forward-observer.
 
As far as I can tell, the 77mm was developed from the aborted 75mm HV, so it could be consider the same gun, similar to how the T6 was developed from the M1897.
Not near as extensive. According to Tony Williams the 75 mm HV shell was a 3 inch 20 cwt shell necked down slightly to take the US M61 APCBC and the M48 HE. Then in October 1943 it was decided that it should use 17 pounder projectiles instead. This was redesignated the 77 mm. The gun didn’t change. According to Mr Williams the biggest mystery with the gun is why Vickers ever suggested using the 75 mm in the first place when no such shells were being produced in the UK.

They were trained to do it with smoke. And I doubt they'd be doing it from a moving vehicle, more likely one that is stopped just behind cover/concealment.
Smoke was meant to blanket an area, either covering an advance or withdrawal or cutting a portion of the enemy force off from the rest. You don’t need to hit quite so specific a target.

Fair enough, though it does require a trained forward-observer.
Thats true. The point that even HE is not guaranteed to knock out an AT gun does stand though.
 
In addition to what has already been posted, operational research from Operation Veritable in 1945 found that 3600 rounds of 80 lb 5.5″ fire landing in a 300 yard diameter area managed to knock out just 1 gun of a 5 gun battery. A second six-gun 8.8 cm battery was engaged with 5700 rounds landing in a 300 yard diameter circle. This knocked out two guns. Now those batteries were definitely suppressed, but this does show that the ability of HE to destroy AT guns can be overestimated.
Suppression can be quite valuable. It means you and your friends have time to implement other ways of doing something nasty to the opposition. I note that those figures also don't talk about damage to the squishy meatbags who were meant to be crewing those guns, nor to the delicate sighting and recoil apparatus that make the guns usable.
Casualties are generally caused in the first few moments of a fire mission. By the end of the first minute or so, everyone who is going to get into cover will be there, and anyone who isn't probably isn't going anywhere except an aid station. So, the number of rounds landing in that time is more valuable for causing casualties than their size (within limits). However, suppression depends on how frequently something goes bang in the target area, and how long things continue to go bang nearby. Those are impressive numbers of shells, and without knowing context I would guess that it was a mission fired with the intent of suppressing the guns for significant period.

All of this is to say that us gunners like to destroy things, but the more thoughtful among us recognise that suppression can be even more important, and are willing to call in fire for that purpose. Destruction, although nice, is not always the point.
 
Not near as extensive. According to Tony Williams the 75 mm HV shell was a 3 inch 20 cwt shell necked down slightly to take the US M61 APCBC and the M48 HE. Then in October 1943 it was decided that it should use 17 pounder projectiles instead. This was redesignated the 77 mm. The gun didn’t change. According to Mr Williams the biggest mystery with the gun is why Vickers ever suggested using the 75 mm in the first place when no such shells were being produced in the UK.
Possibly because the gun was being developed by Vickers, so they used tooling they already had, namely for the Vickers Model 1931, which was still in production in late 1942.

Smoke was meant to blanket an area, either covering an advance or withdrawal or cutting a portion of the enemy force off from the rest. You don’t need to hit quite so specific a target.
Fair.

Thats true. The point that even HE is not guaranteed to knock out an AT gun does stand though.
It's far more likely to do it than plinking away with a hole-puncher.
 
Possibly because the gun was being developed by Vickers, so they used tooling they already had, namely for the Vickers Model 1931, which was still in production in late 1942.
Were they? The latest I can trace a possible delivery of the gun is 1939, and I am not positive on that. If so, I can’t think why on earth it would be in production when the British were only using leftovers for barrage units.
 
Were they? The latest I can trace a possible delivery of the gun is 1939, and I am not positive on that. If so, I can’t think why on earth it would be in production when the British were only using leftovers for barrage units.
Well depending on how much you want to trust wikipedia, production was still still going on into at least October of 1942. it makes sense I suppose, since you're going to add a unique round (handling a 583mm long round would prove to be awkward in a restricted space), you might as well utilise a production line that isn't seeing a lot of use anyway.
 
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Well depending on how much you want to trust wikipedia, production was still still going on into at least October of 1942. it makes sense I suppose, since you're going to add a unique round (handling a 583mm long round would prove to be awkward in a restricted space), you might as well utilise a production line that isn't seeing a lot of use anyway.
The Wiki entry is, if I am not mistaken, referring to production in Romania. The Romanians purchased a license and produced the gun themselves (though at least one site I found claims that a few of the initial order of 150 was delivered from Vickers). Once war broke out they ignored the license restrictions and produced it en mass. The latest I can find a delivery from Vickers was 1939 and I am not positive on that one.
 
You may be right. Regardless, that's my interpretation of events, Vickers used tooling they had that wasn't being used, knowing for a fact that they'd be dealing with a unique round anyway. That was later changed to at least use the 17-pounder shell.
 
25 February 1942. Blairgowrie, Scotland.
25 February 1942. Blairgowrie, Scotland.

Brigadier-General Stanisław Maczek saluted his men as they marched past. Commander in Chief of the Polish Forces, Władysław Sikorski, had managed to persuade the British to form an Armoured Division from the Polish troops that had been evacuated from France. The core of Maczek’s senior officers were made up of his old command of 10th Mechanised Brigade.

The 10th Armoured Brigade, now joined by the 16th Armoured Brigade, formed the Polish 1st Armoured Division (Pierwsza Dywizja Pancerna), but would have to wait for full equipment to be issued. The next few months would see many of the men off on courses to learn new skills and improve old ones. It would make a nice change for many of them from guarding airfields and parts of the Scottish coastline.

One of the problems Maczek faced was trying to reach the establishment of almost eleven thousand men. There was a limited quantity of recruits available, with particular problems in supply, workshops and medical services. There was also the question of replacements of casualties in due course. Sikorski had agreed that the Polish forces could accept volunteers from other nationalities, but that wasn’t going to solve all the problems.

The Polish forces in the Middle East were about to be reinforced with survivors from the Soviet gulags. Sikorski was negotiating with Churchill to bring Anders men back to Britain, so that they could recover from their captivity and be trained on new equipment. General Wavell was into two minds about agreeing to this request. Under Wavell’s command was one strong Polish Brigade, which had been so effective in the defence of Crete. There was no way of knowing how many Poles would arrive from Russia, and what kind of state they would be in. Wavell could appreciate having an even stronger Polish contingent under his command.

On the other hand, there was still a great strain on the Middle East’s resources because of the length of time it took convoys to reach Egypt. With the Japanese invasion of Malaya and the Far East, the resources of India, on which the Middle East depended, were now being partly diverted. Having so many people, probably needing a lot of medical care, then training, would probably take at least a year for them to be operational. The idea of sending them back to Britain would certainly cause difficulties for shipping resources, but Wavell could see the advantages of the Poles health, equipment and training if it happened within the British Isles.

The idea of sending the Independent Polish Brigade from Egypt back to Britain, to provide Sikorski with a creditable basis for a Polish Corps, wasn’t something that Wavell wanted. The Brigade had done well on Crete and provided the Middle East Command with a seasoned and well-trained unit for which there would be plenty of work to be done in the future. Sikorski was adamant that any Air Force or Navy personnel that Anders brought should be sent back to Britain, and he was keen to have anyone with mechanised experience for Maczek’s Armoured Division.

All of that was beyond Maczek’s immediate concerns. The people of Scotland had welcomed the Poles very warmly, and Maczek was pleased that the formation of the Armoured Division would continue under the auspices of Scottish Command. Lieutenant-General Augustus Thorne (GOC Scottish Command) attending the parade to mark the establishment of the Polish Armoured Division, shared Maczek’s happiness that they would stay in Scotland. Thorne was pulling all the strings at his disposal to try to get the Poles equipped with tanks as soon as possible. It was likely that the Division would be equipped with Crusader tanks in the first instance. Thorne would have preferred Valiants, but as a training tank the Crusaders might well be useful. Hopefully these would be replaced eventually with a more effective tank.

Experimentation with the shape of an Armoured Division was still being undertaken. The Guards Armoured Division was trying to learn the lessons that Lieutenant-General O’Connor had shown effective in North Africa. It was becoming clearer that the current model of two Armoured Brigades and a Support Group wasn’t flexible enough. Having one Armoured Brigade and one Motorised Infantry Brigade, with Divisional strength artillery and engineers was certainly winning adherents. With the Poles’ lack of numbers, having one Armoured and one Infantry Brigade was perhaps a more realistic formation. The reality of the situation for the Polish Armoured Division was that between 10th and 16th Armoured Brigades, there was certainly enough for one strong Armoured Brigade with a depth of resources.

The formation of the 1st Airborne Division had given the Poles a particular outlet for their enthusiasm. Colonel Stanisław Sosabowski had been transforming his 4th Rifle Brigade into a Parachute Brigade. Based in Upper Largo in Fife, this Brigade’s enthusiasm had given Thorne’s staff a few headaches, but Thorne himself was delighted to have them in his command. With Sosabowski having taken with him the cream of the Polish infantry, the other infantry units in Polish I Corps were little more than cadres. If Thorne had been asked, then bringing the Polish Parachute Brigade back as a mechanised Infantry Brigade would be a better option. However, Thorne knew he wouldn’t have much luck persuading Sosabowski.

The Poles were scouring the world for the children of Polish emigrants, looking in Canada, the United States, Argentina and many other places where Poles had made their homes. This had worked in France in the 1940 to some extent, but Sikorski and Maczek were aware that this wasn’t going to solve the problems, that would rely on Anders and the men and women gathering in Southern Russia.
 
I can't believe you lot, I go off on holiday and come back to over 400 posts to read! If it was just about food, I could probably have coped, but there's been a lot of discussion about guns and many, many other things. I am working my way through them, but thanks to everybody who contributes to the thread.
Allan.
 
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