Stars and Sickles - An Alternative Cold War

Just backtracking a bit, you've butterflied the 1953 East German uprising, in favour of liberalising the Eastern Bloc somewhat - but the uprising was the lever used by Khrushchev et al to depose and execute Beria, and it was the event which broke the link between Beria and Malenkov, convincing him and the other hardliners like Molotov and Bulganin that Beria was weakening Soviet contol. In this scenario very little actually goes wrong for him, so that lever isn't present, and the hardliners would likely be appeased by the pledges of the Eastern Bloc client states to remain committed to the Warsaw Pact. How does Khrushchev take power here? I can't see Beria being ousted by Presidium if the USSR is consolidating its strength and internationally looking strong, and not if he still has the support of the hardliners through Malenkov.
 
Just backtracking a bit, you've butterflied the 1953 East German uprising, in favour of liberalising the Eastern Bloc somewhat - but the uprising was the lever used by Khrushchev et al to depose and execute Beria, and it was the event which broke the link between Beria and Malenkov, convincing him and the other hardliners like Molotov and Bulganin that Beria was weakening Soviet contol. In this scenario very little actually goes wrong for him, so that lever isn't present, and the hardliners would likely be appeased by the pledges of the Eastern Bloc client states to remain committed to the Warsaw Pact. How does Khrushchev take power here? I can't see Beria being ousted by Presidium if the USSR is consolidating its strength and internationally looking strong, and not if he still has the support of the hardliners through Malenkov.

That's a very perceptive observation, xt828, and I'd like to thank you for commenting :) I must admit that I hadn't taken that into consideration when writing the update, so I guess my response must take the form of a defence of the post. Beria was not very well-liked at all within the upper echelons of Soviet decision-making, and with a USSR consolidating its strength the political capital would go to the whole of the Presidium, not just Beria. Furthermore, with all the skeletons in his closet (that the others were aware of), I don't see the political will to oust Beria being absent. After all, he was a rapist and an all-round piece of shit.
 
That's a very perceptive observation, xt828, and I'd like to thank you for commenting :) I must admit that I hadn't taken that into consideration when writing the update, so I guess my response must take the form of a defence of the post. Beria was not very well-liked at all within the upper echelons of Soviet decision-making, and with a USSR consolidating its strength the political capital would go to the whole of the Presidium, not just Beria. Furthermore, with all the skeletons in his closet (that the others were aware of), I don't see the political will to oust Beria being absent. After all, he was a rapist and an all-round piece of shit.

He was certainly well-hated, but he was also the leadership figure of the Stalinists in the Presidium until they were given a reason not to back him. Khruschev and the non-Stalinists needed something as bad as the appearance that a Soviet satellite state may be overthrown to get the Stalinists on-side IOTL, and even then the Anti-Party Group tried to reverse course only a few years later. I think your USSR needs to suffer a sharp reverse in about 1953-54, because if left too long in the leadership, Beria will reassert control over the organs of state security, and if he's dug in there he'll be very difficult to get out. On the other hand, you could have a crack at a timeline where Beria is in charge - I don't think I've seen that before, and despite being a shit of a person, he does seem to have been inclined towards reforming Stalinism. It'd certainly be a different Cold War.
 
He was certainly well-hated, but he was also the leadership figure of the Stalinists in the Presidium until they were given a reason not to back him. Khrushchev and the non-Stalinists needed something as bad as the appearance that a Soviet satellite state may be overthrown to get the Stalinists on-side IOTL, and even then the Anti-Party Group tried to reverse course only a few years later. I think your USSR needs to suffer a sharp reverse in about 1953-54, because if left too long in the leadership, Beria will reassert control over the organs of state security, and if he's dug in there he'll be very difficult to get out. On the other hand, you could have a crack at a timeline where Beria is in charge - I don't think I've seen that before, and despite being a shit of a person, he does seem to have been inclined towards reforming Stalinism. It'd certainly be a different Cold War.

Hmmm... Well I've gone too far with this TL now to just abort and do a Beria one. You make some fair points, although personally I don't think that a sharp reverse is necessary to push out Beria. Although my TL doesn't say this, what about if Beria was blamed for the death of Stalin? I feel though that might not be released to the public, but the Presidium wasn't above being particularly opaque to the Soviet peoples.

Also, IMO a story with Beria in power would be boring. It would pretty much just have the USSR becoming a massive North Korea, IMHO.
 
Hmmm... Well I've gone too far with this TL now to just abort and do a Beria one. You make some fair points, although personally I don't think that a sharp reverse is necessary to push out Beria. Although my TL doesn't say this, what about if Beria was blamed for the death of Stalin? I feel though that might not be released to the public, but the Presidium wasn't above being particularly opaque to the Soviet peoples.

The thing about Beria, as I understand it, is that it was fairly visible in the Presidium that Khruschev was angling for power, and that his gaining power would be detrimental to the Stalinists, but the only rival he had was the Beria-Malenkov alliance. Beria came out quite boldly after Stalin's death as a leadership potential, and gave them someone to back in opposition to Khruschev - they didn't support him per se, but they needed an opposing candidate, and the pair were seen as more in line with the Stalinist mould. One possibility does occur to me - Beria wasn't totally wedded to the expansion of the USSR, and apparently was considering allowing the Baltic states to leave the USSR and become Soviet puppet/client states within the Warsaw Pact - if this becomes known within the Presidium, then that'd certainly be enough to get him the chop.

Also, IMO a story with Beria in power would be boring. It would pretty much just have the USSR becoming a massive North Korea, IMHO.

I disagree - I don't think he has the support or the control for that. The DPRK gets away with being weird and deeply creepy in large part because it doesn't really matter in the international arena - the USSR is, in 1953, stepping into the role of a superpower. Given Beria's extensive time overseeing scientific programs, he also seems less likely to get drawn into Lysenkoism, and likely to be aware of the logistical and land management aspects of Virgin Lands type programs. Being a nauseating person doesn't make one a bad national leader. I must admit, also, that I don't see Khruschev as a good leader.
 
The thing about Beria, as I understand it, is that it was fairly visible in the Presidium that Khruschev was angling for power, and that his gaining power would be detrimental to the Stalinists, but the only rival he had was the Beria-Malenkov alliance. Beria came out quite boldly after Stalin's death as a leadership potential, and gave them someone to back in opposition to Khruschev - they didn't support him per se, but they needed an opposing candidate, and the pair were seen as more in line with the Stalinist mould. One possibility does occur to me - Beria wasn't totally wedded to the expansion of the USSR, and apparently was considering allowing the Baltic states to leave the USSR and become Soviet puppet/client states within the Warsaw Pact - if this becomes known within the Presidium, then that'd certainly be enough to get him the chop.

Good to know about the Baltic thing. I'll put that in when I eventually reboot this (my plan is pretty much to go through the TL and finish it, then launch it again with some corrections, new things etc. to improve it). Nevertheless, I hope you're enjoying it :eek:

On the North Korea point, I could see a Beria-controlled USSR as being far less involved internationally, becoming quite an inward state, but thats just my personal view.
 
Good to know about the Baltic thing. I'll put that in when I eventually reboot this (my plan is pretty much to go through the TL and finish it, then launch it again with some corrections, new things etc. to improve it). Nevertheless, I hope you're enjoying it :eek:

Absolutely am.

On the North Korea point, I could see a Beria-controlled USSR as being far less involved internationally, becoming quite an inward state, but thats just my personal view.

Well, the context in which the Baltic states came up is that apparently, partly in reaction to the 1953 East German uprising, and partly to the ongoing reconstruction difficulties in the USSR, Beria was prepared to concede East Germany to Germany in addition to removing the Baltics from the USSR in exchange for Marshall Plan aid and a lowering of tension in the Cold War. On the international front, bear in mind that Beria selected most of the Eastern Bloc leaders himself, and had been involved in exporting Communism through his time at the NKVD and its various renamings. As you say though, it's your TL, and I look forward to the next update.
 
Chapter 19: Lowland Blues - The Low Countries (1950s)
A New World (1950s): Lowland Blues (Western Europe Pt.1)

In parallel with the East, the 1950s was a major decade for the development of states in Western Europe.

The defining occurrence in Western Europe during this period was the outcome of the Royal Question in Belgium. Leopold III, the reigning King of Belgium since 1934, had been declared incompetent to reign since 1944. Controversy surrounded Leopold's return to Belgium, which had been delayed until 1950 due to feelings that an early return would lead to political anarchy. King Leopold's reputation in Belgium had been damaged by accusations of collaboration or at least complicity with Nazi occupation during the Second World War. Between 1944 and 1950, the regency was held by Leopold's brother, Prince Charles. The split was primarily between the largely secular, industrial, left-leaning Walloons who opposed Leopold and the staunchly Catholic, rural-agricultural and conservative Flemings, although there were notable minorities in both Wallonia and Flanders that supported and opposed (respectively) the King's return.

Despite a commission of inquiry's exoneration of accusation of treason against the King, opposition against the monarchy remained. In 1950, a referendum was held in regards to the future of Leopold III as monarch of Belgium. 57% of Belgians voted for Leopold's return. This was not considered a decisive vote in favour in the monarchy, and Wallonian activists noted that the Belgian government had failed to act on a Wallonian vote in 1945 in favour of unification of the region with France, as opposed to continued federalism within the Belgian state. To understand the significance of the King's position it is necessary to consider the uniquely Belgian aspect of the monarchy: although technically a constitutional monarchy, the Belgian King was granted more extensive powers than the monarchs of the Netherlands or the United Kingdom due to their duty to preserve national unity. The de facto Wallonian rejection of the King's legitimacy made King Leopold incapable of effectively performing such a role.

Upon the King's return in 1950, major demonstrations broke out not only in Wallonia, but in Flanders as well. The situation was aggravated when Belgian gendarmes fired upon the crowds, killing several demonstrators. The entirety of the Pays Noir, the major coal-producing region of Belgium was paralised by industrial agitation. Wallonian industrial workers mobilised and sabotage attacks were mounted on bridges, buildings and rail lines. Consistently harsh responses from Belgian security forces pushed the nation towards civil war. On 8 September 1951, Belgian gendarmes sent to suppress a demonstration in Mons were ambushed and captured, with casualties on both sides. It became increasingly clear that the incident of Samedi Rouge (Red Saturday) signified the irreversible descent into civil strife, an unofficial declaration of war from the Belgian Federation of Labour on the King and his loyalists. Ordinary Walloons flocked to the movements, which became an unmistakably national, as opposed to political movement.[64]

Initially, police forces tasked with suppressing the militant unionists proved incapable. The anti-Royalists had erected checkpoints and barricades which allowed them to rebuff the lightly-armed gendarmes and police forces. Nevertheless, they were incapable of standing up to a professional military and on 12 February 1952, King Leopold III declared a State of Emergency in Wallonia and passed through the Belgian legislature statutes that gave him dictatorial powers in Wallonia until the crisis had been solved. This was managed through the support of the majority of the Christian Democrats. In response, opposing politicians boycotted the Belgian Senate. Walloon flags replaced Belgian flags in Liege, Namur and Mons. In Namur, a major military offensive broke the Republican barricades in the town centre, dispersing the rebels. Their brutality in the operation, however, was criticised by the international community, particularly by France and the United States. The United States' position on Leopold had always been lukewarm. During the Second World War, Leopold had refused to recognise the Belgian government-in-exile which supplied the US with the Congolese uranium which fueled research on the Manhattan Project.[65]

The United States, United Kingdom and France proposed at the Security Council a resolution calling on Belgium to remove military forces from the Wallonia region and to acquiesce to a binding referendum (under UK, French, Dutch and Luxemburgish supervision, as per the Treaty of Brussels) on the future of Wallonia. The Republic of China supported this resolution, whilst the USSR abstained. Whilst King Leopold was infuriated by this proposal, he eventually bowed to international pressure (particularly from the Treaty of Brussels signatories) to accept referenda in Flanders and Wallonia. In the referendum of December 1952, the Walloon people voted to unify with France, which France allowed, incorporating the region as the Région Wallonie. A parallel referendum was held in Flanders, with the Flemish people deciding to not only retain the monarchy, but to retain Leopold III specifically as King and to be incorporated into the Kingdom of the Netherlands as an autonomous region, maintaining their own separate legislature and monarch. In effect this union between the Netherlands and Flanders was in essence a customs union with a common military, a very loose federation. To placate concerns from commercial spheres, trade between the two regions was not subject to commercial restrictions present in the rest of France and the Netherlands, unless specified.[66]

A fateful consequence of the dissolution of Belgium arose far from Europe. The Belgian Congo was transferred to a UN mandate by May 1953, as agreed by the UK, France (reluctantly), Wallonia, Flanders and the Netherlands. The United Nations installed a provisional administration in the former colony, intent on the development of the nation and proper preparation for independence. Although the security forces present were largely the existing Belgian military presence, the civilian administration became increasingly filled by Africans educated by personnel from all over the world, including many of the smaller, non-colonial European nations. Furthermore, existing Western business interests were guaranteed continued operation in the region, including the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (Mining Union of Upper Katanga), a huge and vastly profitable Belgian mining company which extracted a variety of minerals, most notably copper and uranium.

On the night of 31 January 1953, a major storm in the North Sea turned into a major flood. A combination of a high spring tide and a severe European windstorm caused a storm tide which struck with extreme force. The Netherlands suffered approximately 1,800 deaths and major property damage, leaving many homeless, primarily in the province of Zeeland. Over 300 people were killed in England, whilst smaller amounts died in West Flanders and Scotland. The major results of these floods were the creation of extensive sea-defence systems in England and especially the Netherlands. It also contributed the Dutchification of the cities of Aken and Keulen, as many homeless families were resettled in homes which were vacated by expelled Germans. [67]

[64] The 'Red Saturday' was not an actual event, but a device I used to spark a more intense civil conflict.

[65] The point about Leopold's lack of recognition for the Belgian government-in-exile is factual IOTL. In OTL, Leopold abdicated in favour of his son Baudouin. ITTL, he does not. He appears to have been a pretty stubborn character, and I had a good reason for why he wouldn't go with this option ITTL, but it's 1:30 am here and my tired brain had forgot. :eek:

[66] It is important to note with this that there was a significant desire for unification between Wallonia and France. In regards to Flanders, it seems that the main desire of the Flemish was to maintain the unity of Belgium. Failing that, it would be fairly likely that they would join the Netherlands if they could keep the monarchy intact, due to the need to have access to a significant market, especially one that could supply them with industrial and advanced goods.

[67] ITTL, the Bakker-Schut Plan went ahead in its full form (Plan A). This was made possible through the partial expulsion of German locals and was justified on economic need to aid reconstruction. It was supported by this alt-American Government, which did not (at the immediate Post-War period) consider the creation of a strong, remilitarised Germany a major foreign policy priority. Instead the support of established wartime allies was of more significance. Aken is the Dutch form of "Aachen", whilst Keulen is "Cologne/Koln".
 
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I'm struggling to see the USSR or the colonial powers agreeing to set a precedent that armed rebellion can be the basis for a UN intervention and independence referendum of the affected territory, as in 1952 that's in direct opposition to their own interests. I'd strongly suggest that you have the referendum and the whole resolution of the conflict take place outside the framework of the UN - perhaps through the Treaty of Brussels?
 
I'm struggling to see the USSR or the colonial powers agreeing to set a precedent that armed rebellion can be the basis for a UN intervention and independence referendum of the affected territory, as in 1952 that's in direct opposition to their own interests. I'd strongly suggest that you have the referendum and the whole resolution of the conflict take place outside the framework of the UN - perhaps through the Treaty of Brussels?

Fair enough. Will do xt828 (and thank you for your continuing vigilance :D).
 
Fair enough. Will do xt828 (and thank you for your continuing vigilance :D).

It's still framed as the UN being in the driving seat. I'd suggest that France and the UK (this is pre-Suez, they're still happy to act without the US) stepping in directly, so perhaps having Dutch and British peacekeepers moving into Flanders and French into Wallonia and the announcement of a plebiscite leading to partition. In the UN, the Belgian seat gets re-labeled Flanders, and there's no involvement until this point. Congo gets placed under UN control either by agreement or at US insistence, in the latter case with a timetable to independence attached.

Otherwise, great update.
 
It's still framed as the UN being in the driving seat. I'd suggest that France and the UK (this is pre-Suez, they're still happy to act without the US) stepping in directly, so perhaps having Dutch and British peacekeepers moving into Flanders and French into Wallonia and the announcement of a plebiscite leading to partition. In the UN, the Belgian seat gets re-labeled Flanders, and there's no involvement until this point. Congo gets placed under UN control either by agreement or at US insistence, in the latter case with a timetable to independence attached.

Otherwise, great update.

I was more framing it as the interested external parties (France, UK and US) bringing it to the Security Council, which merely allows them to act. At this particular time, the UN was essentially still a forum for interstate dialogue, and the absence of a Korean War UN intervention equivalent in this TL means that the UN doesn't have a precedent for intervention. The Treaty of Brussels signatories, as opposed to the UN are overseeing the operation. And I will clarify that the Congo is placed under UN control by agreement, with the caveat that existing commercial interests are allowed to continue their operations.
 
I was more framing it as the interested external parties (France, UK and US) bringing it to the Security Council, which merely allows them to act. At this particular time, the UN was essentially still a forum for interstate dialogue, and the absence of a Korean War UN intervention equivalent in this TL means that the UN doesn't have a precedent for intervention. The Treaty of Brussels signatories, as opposed to the UN are overseeing the operation. And I will clarify that the Congo is placed under UN control by agreement, with the caveat that existing commercial interests are allowed to continue their operations.

The thing is that without a Korean War, the UN hasn't any teeth, in that its record is no more successful than that of the League of Nations. Without that coming together of nations under the UN banner, there isn't the impetus to not act unilaterally and then come talk to the UN about it once it's done. France and Britain are still considered Great Powers at this point, are permanent members of the Security Council, and are both in the business of intervening within their spheres of influence as necessary - recall that IOTL, four years after this, they invaded Egypt to retake the Suez Canal; in that context, restoring order to a neighboring state and long-time ally would be fairly straightforward.

There also has to be considered that the Walloon unions are playing a significant role in this crisis, and in the halls of power of France and Britain, that's a hair away from Communist agitation - which the USSR, a veto-capable member of the UN, would support. Why would they run the risk of taking this to the UN and the USSR vetoing intervention to stop a possible communist or communist-aligned takeover, when they can just resolve the situation directly?
 
The thing is that without a Korean War, the UN hasn't any teeth, in that its record is no more successful than that of the League of Nations. Without that coming together of nations under the UN banner, there isn't the impetus to not act unilaterally and then come talk to the UN about it once it's done. France and Britain are still considered Great Powers at this point, are permanent members of the Security Council, and are both in the business of intervening within their spheres of influence as necessary - recall that IOTL, four years after this, they invaded Egypt to retake the Suez Canal; in that context, restoring order to a neighboring state and long-time ally would be fairly straightforward.

Because given that this is only 5 years after the UN really came into being, there is still a "lets make it work" motivation which was similar to the LoN. In the early years of the League, many issues were brought to the LoN and solved successfully, such as the Aland dispute and the Greco-Bulgarian border issues. That they made the decision to intervene in Korea OTL is self-evident in showing a strong commitment to multilateral decision-making in the early years of the Cold War. And it is slightly less straightforward in that Belgium is a long-time ally, but their Head of State, King Leopold, is quite iffy, so unilateral intervention would be likely to be without the support of the Belgian Head of State. Therefore by discussing it in the UN (even if the actual intervention isn't UN intervention), they legitimise the cause of restoring order and partitioning the country.

There also has to be considered that the Walloon unions are playing a significant role in this crisis, and in the halls of power of France and Britain, that's a hair away from Communist agitation - which the USSR, a veto-capable member of the UN, would support. Why would they run the risk of taking this to the UN and the USSR vetoing intervention to stop a possible communist or communist-aligned takeover, when they can just resolve the situation directly?

Well the French actually had a very significant Communist Party which was not suppressed as it was in anglophone nations and the British have a vested interest in maintaining stability in Western Europe to make collective security feasible. A civil conflict within NATO would not be desirable to France, nor Britain, nor the US. And even though the USSR may want such a conflict, they're also in a position better off abstaining, since the conflict between the Belgian Federation of Labour and the military has been going in the military's favour (making a leftist victory unlikely) and by vetoing a decision which essentially gives the Walloons self-determination, they would be seen as throwing them under the bus and allowing imperialists to bully their own people. It's a catch-22 for the Soviets, so they're better off abstaining anyway. Given that Stalin is also still in power at the time of the partition, by vetoing it, he would set the precedent that it's acceptable for Great Powers to intervene in the affairs of each others' spheres, which he knows would cut both ways.
 
Because given that this is only 5 years after the UN really came into being, there is still a "lets make it work" motivation which was similar to the LoN. In the early years of the League, many issues were brought to the LoN and solved successfully, such as the Aland dispute and the Greco-Bulgarian border issues. That they made the decision to intervene in Korea OTL is self-evident in showing a strong commitment to multilateral decision-making in the early years of the Cold War. And it is slightly less straightforward in that Belgium is a long-time ally, but their Head of State, King Leopold, is quite iffy, so unilateral intervention would be likely to be without the support of the Belgian Head of State. Therefore by discussing it in the UN (even if the actual intervention isn't UN intervention), they legitimise the cause of restoring order and partitioning the country.

The thing about Korea, for me, is that it only went ahead because the Soviets were boycotting the Security Council at the time. If they hadn't been, they would have vetoed intervention - but I can't see that stopping, at a minimum, the British, French, and Americans from intervening anyway. By boycotting, and inadventently allowing the Korean War to be under the UN banner, the Soviets gave the UN the veil of legitimacy and action which the LoN never had. Without it, it's basically LoN Mk2, this time driven by the US.

On Belgium, while the Belgian Kings had a fairly patchy history, Belgium itself is a long-time ally of France and Britain, with British intervention in the First World War argued as being based upon the German invasion of that state.

Well the French actually had a very significant Communist Party which was not suppressed as it was in anglophone nations and the British have a vested interest in maintaining stability in Western Europe to make collective security feasible. A civil conflict within NATO would not be desirable to France, nor Britain, nor the US. And even though the USSR may want such a conflict, they're also in a position better off abstaining, since the conflict between the Belgian Federation of Labour and the military has been going in the military's favour (making a leftist victory unlikely) and by vetoing a decision which essentially gives the Walloons self-determination, they would be seen as throwing them under the bus and allowing imperialists to bully their own people. It's a catch-22 for the Soviets, so they're better off abstaining anyway. Given that Stalin is also still in power at the time of the partition, by vetoing it, he would set the precedent that it's acceptable for Great Powers to intervene in the affairs of each others' spheres, which he knows would cut both ways.

The French Communist Party wasn't suppressed by agreement with the Soviets - in exchange for the PCF participating in the democratic process, rather than launching a take-over.

The vested interest in maintaining stability would by why the British and French would intervene, especially in the face of what could be a Communist-backed uprising.

The Soviets would not veto a resolution which says that Great Powers can intervene in the internal affairs of countries within their sphere of influence, to the extent of breaking them up and annexing a component. That being said, I don't think that's a message the West wants broadcast.

I think this needs to be reframed as much more populist, much more civil unrest and protest marches, and much less emphasis on unions. Maybe also have the Belgian Army baulking at orders to go in and suppress protests of civilians, including women and children.
 
In regards to the last point, I think my writing may have missed this, but the idea was that it was a populist movement, merely that the unions were at the forefront of it. Given the structure of the unions, it was far easier for them to mobilise large groups to oppose the government. Such mobilisation did occur IOTL. Also, the Soviets didn't historically put their two cents in and I suspect they wouldn't ITTL.

In regards to the UN, the UN had already been overseeing the Italian-administered Trust Territory in Somalia, for instance. So they already have a more significant role than the LoN and a precedent for the UN administration of the Congo.

I would agree that the Soviet boycott allowed the UN intervention in Korea to go ahead and otherwise would have been vetoed, but I don't see how that makes the United Nations an entirely irrelevant organisation if the Soviets still participate.
 
In regards to the last point, I think my writing may have missed this, but the idea was that it was a populist movement, merely that the unions were at the forefront of it. Given the structure of the unions, it was far easier for them to mobilise large groups to oppose the government. Such mobilisation did occur IOTL. Also, the Soviets didn't historically put their two cents in and I suspect they wouldn't ITTL.

The populist side doesn't come through as clearly as it might - it kind of sounds like a union-led movement atm.

The Soviets didn't put their two cents in because the break-up of an Allied state wasn't on the table. This resolution would, for example, give the USSR a Western-backed framework to support the independence of any area which has a solid Communist uprising. I don't think that's what the West wants to do.

In regards to the UN, the UN had already been overseeing the Italian-administered Trust Territory in Somalia, for instance. So they already have a more significant role than the LoN and a precedent for the UN administration of the Congo.

Italian Somalia was run by Italians, and was only different from League Mandates in the sense that it was guaranteed to be independent at the end of the Trust period, with majority rule. The Trust Territories were essentially rebadged LoN mandates.

I would agree that the Soviet boycott allowed the UN intervention in Korea to go ahead and otherwise would have been vetoed, but I don't see how that makes the United Nations an entirely irrelevant organisation if the Soviets still participate.

It'd diminish the potency of the UN because it hasn't had that defining moment of standing up and taking action. Absent the Korean War, the UN hasn't done anything the LoN didn't do, with the added bonus of entrenched Great Power politics in the voting system. It'd encourage nations to go around the UN rather than through it, to engage directly with one or more veto-capable powers rather than the GA or the SC as a whole.
 
Chapter 20: Of Atoms and Allies - Western Europe and Nuclear Proliferation (1950s)
A New World (1950s): Of Atoms and Allies (Western Europe Pt.2)

In the United Kingdom, Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee lost power in an election in 1951, ironically held in order to provide Labour with a stronger majority than the razor-thin preeminence Labour had enjoyed in parliament. The results of the 1950 election had left Labour with only a 5-seat majority. Winston Churchill's Conservative Party returned to government. Like his French contemporaries, Churchill's major foreign policy priority was the retention of the colonial empire. Major problems arose in Oman, Kenya, Malaya and Iran, which Churchill's government prioritised over domestic issues. Nevertheless, the Conservative government did focus on housing, which had been largely ignored during the Labour years and which was the Conservatives' main public policy platform. 1952 proved to be a momentous year for the United Kingdom, marked both by the successful tests of a nuclear weapon in Australia (making the UK the world's third nuclear-armed nation) and the death of King George VI, who had come to the throne as a result of his brother Edward's marriage to divorced American socialite Wallis Simpson. King George was succeeded by his daughter who acceded to the throne as Queen Elizabeth II. A series of strokes provoked Churchill's resignation in 1955 in favour of Foreign Minister Sir Anthony Eden (architect of the 1954 Geneva Accords on Vietnam), who stepped into the role of Prime Minister. Eden focused even more on foreign policy than Churchill, and resigned in 1957 as a result of the political fallout from the failed Suez Intervention of 1956. Eden himself was succeeded by Harold MacMillan, who had been Eden's Foreign Minister. MacMillan's time in office was very successful, with steadily-rising standards of living in an increasingly corporatist economy and low unemployment. He rebuilt the "Special Relationship" between the UK and the United States, whilst doing his best to promote peaceful decolonisation, typified by the independence of Ghana in 1957 and his establishment of the Federation of Malaya. Under his leadership the UK tested its first hydrogen bomb in 1957.

French politics in the 1950s were dominated by Presidents Vincent Auriol and René Coty. Unlike his predecessor de Gaulle, Auriol pursued a comparatively weak presidency. There has been debate as to whether or not Auriol was a competent President, particularly because of the crumbling of French colonial control after his presidency (the accession of Wallonia to France was the only notable success of his time in office). On the one hand, after his presidency he admitted that the work was extremely tiring, especially due to the chronic instability of the French government, with Prime Ministers having very short tenures. He was succeeded by Coty, who had even less influence. Troubled by Algeria in particular and continued instability, Coty invited Charles de Gaulle into power in 1958, who instituted a new constitution, establishing the Fifth Republic. During the 1950s France developed nuclear capabilities, establishing their first nuclear reactors and in 1956 Coty decided to pursue military applications for nuclear weapons and the establishment of nuclear test facilities in Southern Algeria. The first deployable French atomic bomb was produced in 1960 under Charles de Gaulle's presidency.

In Spain, the Francoist regime recovered from the international isolation it had suffered during the 1940s (as a result of friendly relations with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy). An alliance with the US was made in the mid-1950s, leading to an inflow of both military and economic aid. This, combined with new economic policies encouraged by the Opus Dei (a Catholic organisation) technocrats who replaced the Falangist old guard led to an improvement in the economy in the mid-1950s. This experienced a temporary disruption when demand outpaced supply in 1957, causing a brief recession. Economic growth was sparked again in 1959 due to changing international conditions. In the early 1950s, a student called Ekin was founded with the aim of promoting Basque culture. This organisation developed into the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in 1959. This organisation would prove to be the most major threat to the Francoist regime through the 1960s. In the 1950s, however, the most significant threat arose from the newly-independent Kingdom of Morocco, led by King Mohammed V. Spain ceded most of Spanish Morocco to the new Kingdom, but decided to retain the Spanish Sahara, Ifni and the plazas de soberanía (including Melilla and Ceuta) due to it's possession of these areas prior to the establishment of the Spanish protectorate in Morocco. In 1958 a conflict arose over Ifni, a Spanish enclave on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. In response to major demonstrations in the town against foreign rule, 1,500 troops of the Moroccan military encircled the town on October 23 1957. On November 23, Moroccan forces attempted to storm Spanish positions and were repulsed, although several small outposts were subsequently abandoned by the Spanish due to their vulnerability. The remaining Spanish positions remained under tight siege. On November 25, a relief operation was mounted, the Moroccan troops being bombed by five Spanish CASA 2.111 bombers (Spanish-built Heinkel He-111s) whilst five CASA 352 transports (Spanish-built Junkers Ju-52s) transported a force of paratroopers into the Tiluin outpost. By December 3rd, soldiers of the 6th Battalion of the Spanish Legion had recaptured the airfield and broken the siege of Tiluin. Military and civilian personnel were then evacuated to Sidi Ifni. The relief of Telata was less successful. Poor terrain and constant Moroccan ambushes wore down the defenders and made relief difficult. An infantry counteroffensive by small relieving forces failed to rout the Moroccans on December 2 and suffered heavy losses. The garrison of Telata and some of the relief troops were forced to surrender, being taken into captivity by the Moroccans.[68] Moroccan forces besieged Sidi Ifni, but it proved impenetrable, defended by 7,500 Spanish troops dug into lines of trenches and forward outposts, supplied by the Armada Española. Subsequent motorized offensives by the Spanish gave them military dominance, but politically Spain was forced to give up Ifni in exchange for the return of captive Spanish soldiers and civilians. Ifni was ceded to the Moroccans in exchange for significant monetary compensation, which many critics of Mohammed V have said caused unnecessary stress on the Moroccan economy. [69]

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the 1950s saw rapid economic growth, even surpassing that of the other recovering Western European states. Increased demand for industrial products arising from the war in China assisted in the development of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Social Market Economy) under the ruling party, the Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union), based on Catholic social teachings and the interwar Freiburg School of economics. The CDU established a partially corporatist economy which allowed government direction of production. Another boost was found in the incorporation of the Bundesrepublik into the European Economic Community, encouraging market integration. Near the end of the 1950s, the FRG built experimental nuclear reactors, although the leadership showed no interest in the development of nuclear weapons, acutely aware of French concerns over German rearmament. The London and Paris Agreements of 1954 and 1955 restored the FRG's full sovereignty, whilst 1957 saw the Kleine Wedeirvereinigung (Little Reunification) of the formerly French controlled Saarland region.[70] Despite Chancellor Konrad Adenaeur's preference for Bonn as the site of the West German provisional capital (since it was a short distance from his hometown), Frankfurt am Main was chosen as the seat of government for West Germany as long as Germany remained separated. [71]

In 1955, the Austrian State Treaty was signed, establishing Austria as an independent nation and ending the decade-long four-power occupation. Included in both the treaty and the Austrian constitution was "neutrality in perpetuity", although they maintained territorial disputes with Yugoslavia. Austrians felt that the Yugoslavs had unjustly annexed Carinthia south of the Drava and were therefore unlawfully administering Austrian territory under the Socialist Republic of Slovenia. [72]

Although a founding member of NATO and therefore protected by the American nuclear umbrella, Sweden under Tage Erlander's Social Democrats promoted the capacity for defensive self-sufficiency against Communist Finland and the USSR. As a result, the Swedes pursued a nuclear deterrent as a means of ensuring their safety. A report produced in 1954 suggested that the development of nuclear weapons should be a key aspect of a modernised Swedish arsenal to counter potential Soviet aggression. The Swedish Riksdag (parliament) agreed to pursue a heavy water programme geared towards consumption of natural uranium, which Sweden could supply in abundance. This programme was called "den Svenska linjen" (the Swedish line) and was one of Sweden's largest industrial projects in its history. In 1951, the Swedes had already built a small experimental reactor, the R1, in a cavern dug out below the Kungliga Tekniska högskolan (Royal Institute of Technology). R1 was not constructed to produce a usable amount of power, but to gain insight into reactor physics. Swedish scientists made a major breakthrough by discovering that the critical mass for plutonium-fueled weapons systems had been overestimated and and the figure was reduced down to 5-10kg in a report by Sigvard Eklund. In 1955, it was determined that Sweden would be capable of producing a nuclear weapon once it had constructed a plutonium reactor. Despite a split within the Social Democrats on the issue of the procurement of nuclear weapons and the opposition of the United States on the issue, it was decided in November 1958 that the programme would go ahead, although it would not be completed until the 1960s. Outside of the nuclear weapons programme, Sweden also had success in other spheres of defence policy. They overcame US opposition to their nuclear programme and acquired additional aid due to their provision of information from Finnish emigres on the Soviet military. SAAB experienced success in exporting warplanes, particularly the Saab 29 "Tunnan" which was adopted as NATO's European fighter in the early 1950s and replaced by the Saab 35 "Draken", which employed a novel double-delta wing design. Development also went underway for the Saab 36 (Projekt 1300), a supersonic bomber envisioned as the delivery system for the Swedish nuclear bomb.

The 1950s was a less eventful decade for the rest of the continent, although in 1958 the Swiss decided to pursue a nuclear weapons programme in an effort to ensure national survival in the event of WWIII in Europe and to protect their neutrality. In 1956, Prince Rainier III of Monaco married American film star Grace Kelly in a sensational ceremony. Italy and Portugal also had strong economic growth in this period, the former's growth dubbed "a miracle" by economists.

The 1950s was also notable for the genesis of the movement for European integration. The 1951 Treaty of Paris established the successful European Coal and Steel Community (ECSE) which facilitated industrial production. By March 1957, the ECSE had developed into the European Economic Community (EEC) which extended the ECSE to several other aspects of the signatories' economies. In 1958, the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) was established. The integration movement took a major blow after the French proposition for a collective military structure which would allow collective (but French-dominated) control of newly remilitarised West Germany's forces. This proposition ended up failing due to French refusal to ratify agreement, as it had been scuttled in the French parliament by the Gaullists, who cited issues of national sovereignty and incompatibility with the French constitution. This would not prevent the eventual development of a joint European military structure in future decades, however.

[68] IOTL, the offensive against the Moroccans did rout them and allow the Spanish garrison to evacuate to Sidi Ifni.

[69] IOTL, a successful relief of Telata meant that the Moroccans didn't hold Spanish hostages which could be used as bargaining chips. Historically, the Spanish retained Ifni until the 1970s, when they ceded Ifni to Morocco due to pressure from the UN.

[70] Although IOTL, the term "little unification" is used in regards to the unification of the GDR and FRG, ITTL it is a reference to the Anschluss. "Little" implies a benign nature compared to the major reunification in 1938. West Germany always had a bit of an issue with its international image.

[71] IOTL, Frankfurt was very nearly chosen, and even had its parliament building constructed, but it was decided against it because some German politicians were worried that it was such an important city that it may become generally accepted as the capital, wearing away support for the eventual unification of the Germanies.

[72] This was outlined in an update on page 5 (post #95).
 
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So, accept for West Germany getting a new capital, and the little incident with Spain and Morocco, Western Europe is mostly the same as it was in the 50's.
 
So, accept for West Germany getting a new capital, and the little incident with Spain and Morocco, Western Europe is mostly the same as it was in the 50's.

For the most part, although Switzerland is to develop a nuclear weapon (which they planned to do IOTL, but decided against it) as will Sweden. Also, Sweden is a more notable arms manufacturer than IOTL. And of course the expansion of the Netherlands at Germany's expense and the partition of Belgium in my update previous to this one. (i.e. the one near the top of this page)
 
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