The small but densely populated nations of Rwanda and Burundi have long been intertwined in their history. A long and murky precolonial history was defined by the relationship between the Hutu and Tutsi peoples. The Twa People (in the past referred to as pygmies) were also present; a small ethnic group believed to have inhabited the region far longer than the Hutu and Tutsis. All three of these peoples speak Bantu languages, but seem to have represented waves of migration into the region over the centuries. Prior to the arrival of European colonists, the peoples of Rwanda-Burundi were organised under native kingdoms, where the agrarian Hutu were largely beneath the pastoralist Tutsis. Whilst some Hutus were able to achieve high office by merit, and certain particular sub-groups of Tutsi were very low in the social hierarchy, generally the caste system in Rwanda-Burundi favoured the Tutsis over the Hutu. The arrival of European colonisers, rather than upending this social hierarchy, actually ossified it. The Germans, who annexed the region into their colony of German East Africa, allowed the Rwandan and Burundian monarchies to maintain their authority, albeit at the cost of their sovereignty. The transfer of control over the colony from Berlin to Brussels saw a significant change in the relationship between the European rulers and their colonial subjects. The Belgians were far more involved in the territory than the Germans; the road network was significantly extended, as was the cultivation of cash crops, predominantly coffee and cotton in the rich volcanic soils of the region. This policy of course radically increased the profitability of the territory, but at a significant human cost; four famines ravaged the native population between 1916 and 1944 due to failures of the smaller food crops. Without being compelled to produce the more valuable commodities, it is likely that these famines could have been avoided. The Belgians also bureaucratised the ethnic caste system; formalising the hierarchy of tribal chiefs and sub-chiefs under the two
Mwami (kings) in a manner that heavily favoured Tutsis. This hierarchy was based on the pseudoscientific "Hamitic hypothesis", which claimed that the Tutsis were of East African origin and were racially superior to the Hutus, a holdover of the "racial science" of the nineteenth century constructed to favour colonialism and white supremacy. By utilising the Tutsis as intermediaries, the Belgians ensured that most of the Hutu anger at their exploitation was directed at the Tutsi elite, rather than the European colonialists. Identity cards were handed out to subjects which specified their ethnicity (Hutu/Tutsi/Twa). In doing so, the Belgians eliminated the ability to shift between the different castes for their local subjects, something that did occur in the pre-colonial and German colonial periods from time to time. Another major impact the Belgians had was the proselytisation of Catholicism. Protestant missions were also allowed to operate but their influence was limited by a lack of subsidies; whereas the Catholic missions were funded by the government. An elite Catholic secondary school was established in Rwanda, but by the time of independence, there were barely 100 Africans educated beyond the secondary level in Rwanda and Burundi. The dissolution of Belgium and the transfer of Ruanda-Urundi from a UN Trust Territory under Belgian governance to a direct UN administration was largely a formality; the same governing structures remained intact. Unlike in Congo, the UN didn't set a date for independence. The more anachronistic governing structures in Ruanda-Urundi was believed to necessitate a longer presence than in Congo.
Mwami Mutara III Rudahigwa, the six foot-nine monarch of Rwanda
Nevertheless the growth of anti-colonial settlement in the Congo strongly influenced politics in Ruanda-Urundi. A cash economy had been developed since the end of the war, largely to facilitate movement of Rwandan and Burundian labour to the mines of Katanga province and the sugar plantations of Uganda. There was also a shift in the attitude of the local Catholic church authorities; an old, conservative Walloon generation was largely replaced with a younger Flemish clergy which saw in the Hutus' plights parallels with their own position relative to Walloons prior to Belgium's dissolution. A small group of Hutu notables had been educated by the Catholic Church and sought to push against Tutsi political control. The Church, which had once supported the pre-existing Tutsi hegemony, had now turned against it. Tension between the Hutu and Tutsi peoples began to intensify in the mid-1950s. July 1956 saw the publication in Congolese newspaper
La Presse Africaine supposedly written by an anonymous Rwandan priest detailing historic wrongdoings by the Tutsi elite against the Hutu. This was followed up with many other articles about interethnic relations and history in Rwanda and Burundi. In Rwanda, King Mutara III Rudahigwa and the Tutsi elite denied a history of abuse and inequality. In September, a parliamentary election was held, with universal male suffrage. The population were permitted to vote for sub-chiefs, of whom 66% of those elected were Hutu. Higher positions, however, were still appointed and all of these positions were filled by the Tutsi. The results of these elections concerned the Tutsi elite, who feared that their power was slipping. King Mutara and his supporters began to agitate for immediate independence, hoping to solidify their political position. Seeing this, the Hutu counter-elite started to prepare to challenge the Tutsi elite head-on. Notable figures in this Hutu counter-elite were Grégoire Kayibanda and Joseph Gitera. Kayibanda had been active as an editor in at least two Catholic magazines (
L'Ami and
Kinyamateka) and had also been a board member for the TRAFIPRO food cooperative. Kayibanda founded the
Mouvement Social Muhutu (Social Movement for Hutu People, MSM) political party. Gitera was more of a firebrand than Kayibanda. Gitera called for the abolition of the monarchy as early as 1957, but his rhetoric focused on class concerns over ethnic conflict. Gitera founded the
Association Pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse (Association for Social Promotion of the Masses, APROSOMA).
In 1958, Gitera visited King Mutara III at his palace at Nyanza. Mutara III treated Gitera with contempt, seeing him as an unruly subject acting above his station. The king even went so far as to throttle Gitera, and called him and his APROSOMA followers "
inyangarwanda" ("haters of Rwanda"). Whilst some in the Hutu counter-elite had maintained hope that the monarchy could be used as a symbol of national unification in a future, equitable Rwanda, the king's abuse of Gitera shattered any such hopes. MSM, APROSOMA and Catholic publications took a harsher stance against monarchical power. The exposure of Mutara III's behaviour caused a rift between the king and the UN authorities, but attempts by the UN to limit his power were met with large demonstrations by Tutsis and regional chiefs (both Hutu and Tutsi). Early 1959 saw the UN establish a commission tasked with preparing Rwanda for independence. Elections were scheduled for the end of that year. Gitera began a campaign seeking the destruction of the
kalinga, the royal drum which was a key symbol of monarchical power (akin to the crown jewels for the Queen of England). A paranoid Mutara III fled with the drum to Burundi, where he would die from a brain hemorrhage brought on by alcohol abuse. Persistent rumours that the king was murdered by the French or the Catholic Church further inflamed tensions back in Rwanda. Mutara III's brother was installed by the Tutsi elite, without input from the United Nations authority, as King Kigeli V Ndahindurwa. After Kigeli V's coronation, the
Union Nationale Rwandaise (Rwandan National Union, UNAR) party was established under the leadership of François Rukeba. UNAR was a pro-monarchy party, but was not controlled by the king. Instead it was founded by François Rukeba, a Hutu (but of mixed parentage). UNAR was an ethnically-mixed party, but was predominantly Tutsi and aligned itself more with the Tutsi and traditional elites than with the Hutu counter-elite. UNAR promoted a policy of Africanisation, replacing European history with Rwandan history in the education programme, and seeking to limit the power of the Catholic Church and French influence in the economic activity of the kingdom. Gitera falsely claimed that the Catholic Church's anti-UNAR stance represented support for his party, and Kayibanda had the MSM rebranded as the
Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu (Party of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Hutu, PARMEHUTU).
Grégoire Kayibanda, founder of PARMEHUTU
As inter-ethnic rivalry began to heat up, the UN administration attempted to prevent nationwide violence from breaking out. A trio of Tutsi chiefs was arrested by the UN authorities who were calling for violence against PARMEHUTU leaders. The UNAR submitted a protest letter to the UN Trust Territory authority, signed by many sub-chiefs. On 1st Novermber 1959, Dominique Mbonyumutwa, one of the few Hutu subchiefs and a known supporter of PARMEHUTU, was attacked by a gang of Tutsi youths, motivated by his refusal to sign the protest letter. Mbonyumutwa managed to escape with his wife without being seriously harmed, but a rumour swept the nation that Mbonyumutwa was killed. The latter's failure to appear publicly in the aftermath of the attack suggests that he was willing to take advantage of the situation to politically mobilise Hutus. The next two days saw a Hutu protest in Ndiza outside the home of Athanase Gashagaza, a Tutsi chief who was Mbonyumutwa's direct superior in the traditional aristocratic hierarchy. On the second day, violence sparked. Hutu vigilantes, yelling the slogan "for God, the Church, and Rwanda" killed two Tutsi officials and drove Gashagaza into hiding. A Hutu, Mbonyumutwa, was named as Gashagaza's replacement in the hopes of preventing violence. But the spark had already been struck. A wave of arson attacks throughout the country targeting Tutsi dwellings spread throughout the country, and protests turned to riots. The pitiful UN garrison, which was really just a rebranded Belgian colonial force, numbered only 300, and couldn't ensure the safety of Tutsis. A large-scale migration of Tutsis into Congo, Uganda and Tanganyika commenced whilst reinforcements were sent from the UN garrison in Congo. Kigeli V requested permission from the Trust authority to mobilise his own armed force to maintain law and order, but this was refused, as the UN administrators assumed it would lead to civil war. Ignoring the refusal, Kigeli V mobilised a militia (although "mob" might be a more accurate descriptor). On 7th November, Kigeli put his army on the move, and ordered the arrest and killing of a number of prominent Hutu leaders. Gitera's brother was among those killed. Many of the PARMEHUTU leaders who were arrested would be tortured by UNAR officials at the royal palace. Kayibanda had gone into hiding, and could not be found by the royal militia, so they focused instead on the capture of Gitera. An APROSOMA-led militia was quickly scrabbled together, which took a stand at a hill near Save, at the approaches to Gitera's home town of Astrida. The royal militia didn't attempt to storm the APROSOMA position at the top of the hill, lacking the military expertise to attack a prepared enemy on high ground. UN forces arrived on 10th November, preventing bloodshed and allowing Gitera's escape. Whilst UNAR remained more powerful than the Hutu parties, they now saw the UN as no different to the colonial authorities, and believed (falsely) that they had thrown their lot in with the Hutu side[222]. The UN also forced the King to release captured PARMEHUTU leaders or face deposition. PARMEHUTU got a major boost from the Tutsi coup. APROSOMA's ethnically-inclusive policy became much less popular after the violent attempts to suppress opposition by the Tutsi elite, regardless of what had actually sparked the situation. PARMEHUTU leaders, believing that the longer the UN was present in Rwanda, the better they could consolidate their influence, lobbied the Trust authorities to postpone elections scheduled for January 1960 to July. In March a high-level UN delegation arrived in Rwanda. Wanting to give the image of having widespread popular support, all three major parties held demonstrations. This devolved into violence however and the sight of Tutsis homes on fire left a lasting impression on the UN delegation. The United Nations declared the election plans unworkable and cancelled them, instead organising a round-table discussion with representatives from APROSOMA, PARMEHUTU, and UNAR [223]. The Nyanza Conference, held in April, was largely unsuccessful. PARMEHUTU and UNAR in particular were unwilling to work with each other or to share power in a national unity government. The UN representatives argued that if necessary, APROSOMA would be installed in order to maintain ethnic parity. PARMEHUTU and UNAR officials argued that an APROSOMA government would be unpopular and have no mandate. The insurmountability of the different parties' interests forced the UN to set a date for elections in January 1961. They also stated that they would be free elections with UN forces at voting stations to prevent electoral violence or vote-rigging. All parties agreed: APROSOMA believed they could successfully campaign on the promise of peace; PARMEHUTU considered their win a foregone conclusion, and UNAR believed that the Tutsi sub-chiefs could pressure their subjects effectively enough to become the ruling party.
Neighbouring Burundi was also inhabited by Hutu, Tutsi and Great Lakes Twa people, but their monarchy was less committed to ethnic rivalry than in Rwanda. Whilst Burundi also had a disproportionately Tutsi aristocracy, the king and his closest councillors were of the Ganwa people; a distinct social group that regardless of its (uncertain) ancestral origins, was perceived as an ethnic group apart from the Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. This "royal line" was dominated by two clans which often competed for control over the state; the Bezi and the Tare. The most important politician of the independence period in Burundi was Louis Rwagasore. Rwagasore was a son of
Mwami Mwambutsa IV, King of Burundi. Rwagasore saw the dissolution of Belgium and the transfer of Burundi to United Nations authority as presenting an opportunity for native control over commercial activity in the kingdom. In June 1957 Rwagasore founded a federation of cooperatives, the
Coopératives des Commerçants du Burundi (Traders' Cooperatives of Burundi, CCB) in order to empower native commerce. Whilst the remnants of Belgian colonial interests, now under France's control, opposed the CCB, it proved extremely popular with the Swahili traders of the capital Usumbura. In its first public meeting, the CCB drew a crowd of 200 merchants and managed to secure several favourable contracts with exporters. The CCB would eventually run into financial trouble, the causes of which are uncertain in the historical record. Opponents of Rwagasore claimed that he was embezzling significant sums from the CCB, whilst his supporters claim that French commercial interests were operating to clandestinely undermine the CCB. In any case, the financial trouble necessitated an international campaign seeking investment. This campaign was unsuccessful, although it did allow him to forge a good personal relationship with Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika. Rwagasore would end up acquiring credit for the CCB from the Supreme Land Council, an advisory body with royal oversight which had some influence on the national budget.
Louis Rwagasore, Prince of Burundi, head of UPRONA and Burundi's first Prime Minister
Shortly after the CCB fiasco, Rwagasore became involved with the nascent
Union pour le Progrès national (Union for National Progress, UPRONA) political party. UPRONA was quickly able to secure the early financial support of the Swahili population in Bujumbura, particularly the traders. Rwagasore had sought replication of the concerning inter-ethnic situation in neighbouring Rwanda; rallying Tutsis and Hutus alike to his cause. Nevertheless, UPRONA couldn't avoid being drawn into the competition between the Ganwa clans. The French mercantile interests in Burundi had encouraged the creation of the
Parti Démocratique Chrétien (Christian Democratic Party, PDC) affiliated with the Tare clan in order to counteract Rwagasore's appeals to economic nationalism. The PDC was founded by Jean-Baptiste Ntidendereza, whose brother Joseph Biroli would be party president. Both were Tare. The Bezi, of which Rwagasore was a member, were closely associated with UPRONA. Rwagasore also fell out with his father, Mwambutsa IV, with whom he was never particularly close. The
Mwami had encouraged prospective political opposition to Rwagasore, as to ensure that his power remained unchallenged. Having benefitted from relationships with the Belgian/French colonial interests in Burundi, Mwambutsa also disliked the manner with which Rwagasore targeted colonialism in his appeals to the Burundian masses. Rwagasore's political programme promised modernisation, and sought to establish a constitutional monarchy. UPRONA sought to be a broad-based coalition that would rule through consensus, and would be non-aligned in the international competition between the Soviet and US-led blocs. Trying to ensure that Burundi wouldn't encounter the pitfalls of the ethnic party system in Rwanda, both Hutus and Tutsis were put into high-level positions in UPRONA, which was intentionally structured to split important positions equitably between the two major ethnic groups. Despite Rwagasore's best efforts, UPRONA hadn't truly cultivated a mass political base. This may have actually helped it maintain its cohesion, however, as a mass political movement would likely skew towards Hutu interests, considering the country's demography. Rwagasore's populist tendencies and dominance of the party did lead many of the chiefs who had initially formed UPRONA to leave, including founding member Léopold Biha, a close confidany of King Mwambutsa IV.
PDC functionaries began a smear campaign against Rwagasore. They claimed (because of rumours that Mwambutsa IV had decided that Rwagasore's younger brother Charles would succeed him instead of the elder brother Rwagasore) that UPRONA was merely a vehicle Rwagasore intended to use to become king; Rwagasore responded with a promise that, king or not, he would fight for the people of Burundi. In 1959, Tare leader Pierre Baranyanka questioned whether Mwambutsa's marriage to Rwagasore's mother Kanyonga was legitimate according to Burundian custom; implying that he was a bastard with no claim to the throne. Antipathy grew, especially as UPRONA made inroads into Baranyanka's district of Ndora-Kayanza, which the Belgians had appointed him chief of in 1929. Baranyanka, enraged, threatened to have Rwagasore's in-laws living in nearby Rukecu raped by Twas. As the political competition between Baranyanka and Rwagasore grew, the latter began to carry a gun on him at all times, fearing assassination. Some hope remained for a peaceful transition to independence, however. On July 15th 1960, as neighbouring Congo began to descend into the chaos of its immediate post-independence, Rwagasore released a joint communique with Joseph Biroli appealing for calm, and stating that Burundi had "the unique chance... to create in the heart of Africa an island of peace, tranquility and prosperity". As parties made preparations for the 1961 legislative elections, the PDC allied with other parties to create an anti-UPRONA coalition, the
Front Commun (Common Front, FC). UPRONA won the elections, which had 80% turnout, with 58 of 64 seats in the legislative assembly won by Rwagasore's party. Angered by their loss, PFC supporters in Mukenke, Kirundo Province, rioted and attacked UPRONA members. Rwagasore appealed to his supporters not to be provoked by this violence, and the UN authorities quickly restored order. With a clear mandate as
formateur, Rwagasore brought the defeated parties into government. Pierre Ngendandumwe, a well-educated Hutu from the PDC, was named deputy prime minister. Rwagasore's brother-in-law, André Muhirwa, became Minister of the Interior, significantly decreasing the likelihood of a coup. Despite the strong democratic mandate of Rwagasore's national unity government, the Tare were still angered, perceiving Rwagasore's victory as a Bezi takeover, even though the
formateur sought to appease them by appointing a Tare as Director of Tourism.
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[222] IOTL, this was kinda the case. The UN Trust Territory under Belgian administration essentially lead to multiple layers of power in Rwanda and Burundi: Hutu / Tutsi / Belgian / UN (ascending order); but in effect the UN had very little influence over the mechanisms of power. ITTL, with the dissolution of the Belgian state, you have an administrative apparatus largely staffed by Belgians (now French and Dutchmen officially) but where they are overseen by UN superiors. This helps keep things from being too set up to "screw" non-compliant leadership. IOTL the Belgians had decided to side with the Hutus. Many of them, in the church and without, saw this as a good thing, toppling an unfair aristocracy. Others simply saw resurgent monarchical and Tutsi power as a threat to their economic interests. They really opened Pandora's Box though. ITTL however without the direct Belgian administration you don't get figures like Guy Logiest, who stacked things in the Hutus' favour in preparation for independence.
[223] IOTL, the Belgians ignored the UN's recommendations to postpone elections and instead pressed ahead with them.